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From the Editor . . .

This issue concludes our publication of the proceedings of the fourteenth Gulf Coast History and Humanities Conference held at Pensacola Beach on January 26 and 27, 1996. Four of these papers were presented in sessions commemorating the 150th anniversary of statehood for Texas and Florida. They range from the entertaining account of Mexico’s Pastry War to the careful analysis of the two states’ different constitutions.

Two other articles explore the events which long proceeded statehood in 1845, but certainly contributed to them. The 1795 Treaty of San Lorenzo, which gave the Natchez district to the United States, and the surveying of the thirty-first degree boundary of the new nation provide fascinating accounts of the old Southwest before anyone had thought of a state of Texas or Florida in the American union.

Besides these four articles we have a very interesting account of the Catholic Church and race relations in Pensacola in the late nineteenth century, and From the Archives on a category of records in the National Archives of regional interest.

Because of the length of these articles we will have a shorter than usual list of book reviews. The next Gulf Coast Historical Review will be all book reviews so we can catch you up on all the wonderful things coming out about our region. That issue will be prepared by our book review editor, Dr. Jim McSwain, and it promises to be very valuable. Then we will return to our regular format with the Spring 1998 issue.

This is the last GCHR issue in which Dr. George Daniels will serve as Executive Editor. Dr. Daniels is retiring from the faculty at the University of South Alabama effective September 1, 1997. Shortly after his arrival here in 1983 he proposed the founding of the regional journal which you know as the Gulf Coast Historical Review. Over the years he has quietly guided the publication with experienced advice and counsel and helped insure its funding. His will be an impossibly hard act to follow, and while the journal will miss him, we certainly wish him well.
Symposium Notice

The University of Georgia will host a two-day symposium on "Slavery in the Francophone world: Literary, Cultural, and Historical" on October 15 and 16, 1997. Presentations by fifteen French, American, and Caribbean scholars will explore the linkages between slavery and race in the American South and the French Caribbean, most notably in the form of post-revolutionary Haitian refugees, along with other issues ranging from the role of women of color, free and slave, in the urban South, comparative perspectives of Caribbean and American identities, and the postcolonial legacy of slavery in French literature. A highlight of the conference will be the first English-language production of Guadeloupean writer Maryse Conde’s play, In the Time of the Revolution: Chasing the Greased Pig of Freedom? The symposium will be held at UGA’s Center for Continuing Education, in conjunction with the twenty-third annual Nineteenth Century French Studies Colloquium, which follows on October 17-20. For more information contact: Professor Doris Kadish, Department of Romance Languages, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia 30602.
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www.uga.edu/~rom/an/seminarl.htm
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Andrew Ellicott's Observations While Serving on the Southern Boundary Commission: 1796-1800

Robert Register

Where stone which lay on Mother Earth
Now points another way to birth.
-W.G. Gray

A stone is located on the west bank of the Mobile River south of the Alabama Power Company's Barry Steam Plant at Bucks, Alabama, about twenty-one miles north of Mobile on Highway 43. This two-foot high sandstone marker is one of the few eighteenth-century landmarks in Alabama. Erected in 1799, it represents some of the last evidence of one of the greatest accomplishments of George Washington's presidency: the establishment of the thirty-first parallel of north latitude as the southern boundary of the United States of America. It was entirely appropriate that in 1968 the American Society of Civil Engineers selected Ellicott's Stone to become one of the first ten ASCE National Historical Civil Engineering Landmarks in the United States.

October 27, 1995 commemorated the bicentennial of the Treaty of San Lorenzo, also known as Pinckney's Treaty. This agreement established the thirty-first parallel as a 382-mile international boundary between the United States and Spanish West Florida. That document signed by Thomas Pinckney, the American minister to Great Britain in 1795, initiated more than sixty years of fierce, bloody and destructive conflict between the United States and the Muscogee Nation. It also "marked the end for Spain's North American Empire by yielding control over the Mississippi and by surrendering the strategic posts north of the thirty-first parallel and east of the Mississippi."
Named for Major Andrew Ellicott, Continental Army officer, a distinguished astronomer, mathematician and surveyor, Ellicott’s Stone was erected on the river bank by the boundary commissions of Spain and the United States in May of 1799.7 If you own property anywhere in Alabama south of an east-west line passing through the town of Montevallo, the legal description on your deed tells you how far your property is located from Ellicott’s Stone. For example, the designation “Township 23. Range 5 East.” indicates your property is twenty-three townships north and five townships east of this old and magnificent survey monument. Ellicott’s Stone is the initial point from which all surveys of public lands in Alabama began.8

Ellicott’s Stone is not physically located on the thirty-first parallel: the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey established the Stone as latitude 30°59'51.463".9 According to this author’s calculations, the stone is located approximately 863 feet south of the thirty-first parallel. Despite the slight errors that have persisted for almost two hundred years, Ellicott’s survey of the line passing through this sandstone marker continues to mark the boundary between Mississippi and southeastern Louisiana, and the state line between Alabama and the Florida panhandle.10 A quick glance at any U.S. Geological Survey quadrangle map of any portion of the Alabama-Florida border will show three distinct lines following Alabama’s southern boundary. The Alabama-Florida line is based on the ‘mound line’ along the thirty-first parallel that followed mounds built at one-mile intervals during Ellicott’s 1799 survey. The second line is the base line for the public lands survey which was established after 1818 by General John Coffee by using Ellicott’s crooked ‘random line’ of blazed trees. This error resulted in a boundary dispute between Alabama and Florida that was not resolved until 1854.11 The last line is the modern latitude thirty-first parallel as surveyed by the USGS (a portion of Flomaton, Alabama is south of this line.)

Andrew Ellicott’s survey of the ‘mound line’ and the ‘random line’ is a story of one of the first scientific expeditions financed by the federal government. The tale of the Southern Boundary
Commission describes an authentic and exciting adventure containing international plots and subplots, greed, and deception during one of the most turbulent periods in American history. The difficulties that Ellicott encountered after crossing the Mobile River created hostilities that would culminate in a civil war within the Muscogee Nation. The Creek War of 1813-14 and all of the Seminole Wars were rooted in the fact that "the Creeks were divided between the old communist-conservatives and the new 'capitalist-progressives.' The rift between the two was destined to increase until it brought the nation to the very verge of destruction." 12

The difficulties experienced by the boundary commissioners along the present day Alabama-Florida border caused these two factions to become rival governments in 1799. The new "capitalist-progressives" were represented by the central government of the Creek Confederacy under the sway of Benjamin Hawkins, agent of the Southern Indians for the United States. 13 The old "communist-conservatives" had been led by the Tame King of Tallassee, and the Seminole chiefs Methlogley and Kinhijah. 14 These 'banditti' were incorporated into the resurrected State of Muscogee by the unsurpassed of dreamers, William Augustus Bowles, Director General of the Muscogee Nation. 15 Director General Bowles made clear the position of the Lower Creeks and the Seminoles toward the Treaty of San Lorenzo in a letter to the American Secretary of State on October 31, 1799. Bowles charged that the United States and Spain were attempting to "usurp every right which the Indians have possessed since the beginning of times." 16 He went on to state:

Any person or persons who shall run lines of any kind whatever thro'[sic] our territory after the 26th of the month of October, with the intention to subvert or change the sovereignty, shall if taken suffer death, and if any force be employed to affect the same agreeable to the treaty between his Catholic Majesty and the United States, we shall...declare war against the United States from that moment. 17
In a proclamation issued at Wekiva on the Chattahoochee River, October 26, 1799, the Director General said, “We have not agreed by word or act to surrender the sovereignty of our country, nor never thought of so doing.”

Indian hostility to this treaty did not begin with the adventurer Bowles. Baron de Carondelet, Spanish Governor of Louisiana and West Florida, saw war clouds on the horizon as early as May 1796. In a letter to his superior (and brother-in-law), Luis de Las Casas, the Captain-General of Cuba, Carondelet observed:

The evacuation of the forts of San Fernando de las Barrancas (Memphis), Nogales (Vicksburg) and the Confederation (Epes, Alabama) will excite the greatest resentment and probably the hate and vengeance of the Chickasaws and Choctaws, who will accuse us of perfidy if, against the promise we made them at the time they ceded the lands where they are situated, we ever allow those lands to be occupied by the Americans; it is known that through them, themselves, the United States could easily take possession of their lands, and would force them to flee, causing them to settle in the part west of the Mississippi where those numerous and belligerent nations will cause the ruin of our settlements of interior towns and provinces.

A glimmer of hope for Spain’s Indian allies arose in Madrid October 29, 1796. The Court of King Charles II of Spain decreed a suspension of evacuations of posts north of the thirty-first parallel. Carondelet received this order in late February 1797, too late to reverse his evacuation orders. His orders had already been carried out on some of the northern Spanish forts earlier the same month.

Major Ellicott did not need to see the secret orders to the rulers of New Spain to know that Spain had no intention of honoring its treaty with the United States. On at least five occasions he had been delayed by Spanish officials during his descent on the Mississippi River. Even though Governor Gayoso had announced the treaty to the population in Natchez on December 3, 1796, American newspapers had carried news of the treaty since May of 1796. Spanish commanders at Chickasaw Bluffs (Memphis) and Walnut Hills
(Vicksburg) acted as if they never heard of a treaty between the United States and Spain. The Spanish officials along Ellicott’s route insisted on detaining him. On March 22, 1797, Ellicott and the rest of the Americans in Natchez were alarmed when the Spanish reversed their evacuation process. Cannon at Fort Panmure de Natchez had been disassembled in anticipation of evacuation and transported to the river landing, but now was hauled by the Spanish back to the fort and quickly remounted. A letter dated the very next day from Ellicott to Governor Gayoso describes the astronomer’s mood:

Natchez, March 23, 1797

Dear Sir:

The remounting of the cannon at this place, at the very time when our troops are daily expected down to take possession of it, the insolent treatment which the citizens of the United States have lately received at the Walnut Hills and the delay of the business, (on your part) which brought me into this country, concur in giving me reason to suppose, that the treaty will not be observed with the same good faith and punctuality, by the subjects of his Catholic Majesty, as it will by the citizens of the United States. I hope your Excellency will give such an explanation of the above, as to remove doubts and apprehensions, which I am afraid have been too justly excited.

I have the honour to be, with great esteem and respect, your friend and Humble servant,

Andrew Ellicott

His Excellency Manuel Gayoso de Lemos

Ellicott devotes 145 pages of his three-hundred-page journal of the Southern Boundary Commission’s activities to the events on the Mississippi River and at Natchez involving the Spanish delays of the line survey for more than a year. The Spanish necessity for postponing the treaty and delaying Andrew Ellicott was rooted in the fact that Spain needed time to
hatch the plots that would invalidate the treaty and enable her to evade its execution. The Spanish conspiracy focused on two ends, the dismemberment of the United States and the creation of an international conflict between the United States and France, with Spain coming in on the side of France.27

A complete explanation of Spain's political motivation for delays and alliance with France is not within the scope of this paper. Rowland, however, used a quote from Thomas Power to General James Wilkinson that may provide insight into these events: "The crazy, tortuous, vacillating politics of our court baffle the common rules of political prescience, and even the grasp of our conjecture."28 Whitaker's comments on the Natchez situation in 1797 also do a good job of describing the center of the web of intrigue Ellicott and his American party entered when they became the first men to raise an American Flag of fifteen stars and fifteen stripes29 on the banks of the lower Mississippi and not have it cut down30:

In the course of this year almost every thread of frontier history was gathered up at the tiny post on the lower Mississippi. Spanish conspirators of Tennessee and Kentucky, promoters of land speculation at Muscle Shoals and in the Yazoo country, officials of the rival governments, Indian and Indian agents, and ringleaders of the Blount conspiracy—all met in the little town that lay between the river and the worthless Spanish fort on a hill nearby. Though the population of the town and the surrounding district was not large, the behavior of the people was of vital importance; and they were so heterogeneous a mass—Spaniards, Frenchman, Britons and Americans from many states—that public opinion was unpredictable from one week to the next. If, as Daniel Clark wrote somewhat later, these people were always "restless and turbulent," The events of 1797 gave them plenty of action that they found so congenial.31

Behind every excuse, pretense, deception, pretext, or justification for neglecting their obligation was the Spanish conception of the Treaty of San Lorenzo as "...a diplomatic expedient to serve a
temporary purpose.... That it was soon to be rescinded they were assured. The treaty was to them no doubt a very pretty and gracious document, but it did not really mean anything.”

The Spanish procrastination that began in February of 1797 excited more than a year of American rage. If Ellicott had been “disposed to ride in the whirlwind” rather than possessing “an inclination to direct the storm,” the transition from Spanish to American rule would surely have been an antecedent of the Alamo. Baron de Carondelet’s policy produced a controversy that “soon developed hurricane force, and during the twelve-month period of its continuance, it threatened to sweep the two countries into war.... The full force of the storm, however, was felt at Natchez, the largest of the towns in the disputed region, to which the Louisiana authorities had admitted a representative of the United States government (Ellicott) before they received the countermanding order from Godoy, Prime Minister in the Court of Charles IV.”

Apparently, Major Ellicott’s ‘diplomatic’ responsibilities consumed most of his time in the spring and summer of 1797. According to his journal of “astronomical and thermometrical observations,” the astronomer accomplished little scientific work during six months of 1797. His journal entry for March 23, 1797, states: “From this time I was too much occupied by the different commotions in the country, to attend to a regular series of observations till October; there are therefore but few entered till that time.”

On June 1, Ellicott was handed a copy of a proclamation of May 24, in which Carondelet announced a British invasion of upper Louisiana, a suspension of the survey, and the evacuation of the forts north of the thirty-first parallel. Ellicott succinctly describes the mood of the population in Natchez:

After the appearance of the Baron’s proclamation, the public mind might be compared to inflammable gas [sic]; it wanted but a spark to produce an explosion! A country in this situation, presents to the reflecting and inquisitive mind, one of the most interesting and awful spectacles, which concerns the human race.
Two days later, Carondelet sent a long letter to Thomas Power—"an Irishman, speaking French, Spanish and English, naturalized in Spain, who professed to be a wandering naturalist"—outlining a secret mission that proved to be Spain's last attempt to destroy the federal union of the United States. Power was to offer Major General James Wilkinson, Commander of the Army of the United States, the command of an army to defend a new country to be formed by the western frontier of the Atlantic States. Carondelet's letter shows that he truly wanted Thomas Power to test the spirit of the General:

I doubt that a person of his character would prefer, through vanity, the advantage of commanding the army of the Atlantic states, to that of being the founder, the liberator, in fine, the Washington of the Western states; his part is brilliant as it is easy; all eyes are drawn towards him; he possesses the confidence of his fellow citizens and of the Kentucky volunteers; at the slightest movement the people will name him the General of the new republic; his reputation will raise an army for him and Spain, as well as France, will furnish him instantly the means of paying. The public is discontented with the new taxes [Whiskey Rebellion]; Spain and France are enraged at the connexions [sic] of the United States with England; the army is weak and devoted to Wilkinson; the threats of Congress authorize me to succor on the spot, and openly, the Western states; money will not then be wanting to me, for I shall send without delay a ship to Vera Cruz in search of it, as well as ammunition; nothing more will consequently be required, but an instant of firmness and resolution, to make the people of the West perfectly happy.

Power was also authorized to promise the revolutionaries in Kentucky and Tennessee $100,000 for their services in starting an insurrection and another $100,000 for arms along with "twenty pieces of field artillery." Power's mission accomplished nothing. By opening the Mississippi River and establishing a new southern boundary, the Treaty of San Lorenzo had appeased the western people. In his farewell address of September 17, 1796, Washington predicted the end of western intrigue:
The inhabitants of our western country have seen in the treaty with Spain, and in the universal satisfaction at that event, a decisive proof how unfounded were the suspicions propagated among them of a policy in the general government and in the Atlantic States unfriendly to their interests in regard to the Mississippi. 41

Back in Natchez, the spark that ignited the “inflammable gaz” was a sermon by a Baptist preacher named Barton Hannon who had moved to Natchez from Fort St. Stephens on the Tombigbee River in present day Alabama. 42 Ellicott, with Governor Gayoso’s permission, allowed Hannon to preach a sermon in the American camp on Sunday, June 4. This violated the Spanish policy that forbade any public worship other than according to the rites of Roman Catholicism. The novelty of the Protestant sermon drew a large crowd and Mr. Hannon “was extremely puffed up with the attention he received on that occasion.” 43

By Thursday Reverend Hannon had a petition against the Spanish government signed by fifty-six men and was cursing the “government, his Excellency and all the whole fraternity, and said if he was sent to the fort it should be consumed into ashes before morning.” 44 On Friday, June 9, Hannon was

related with the attention he had received on account of his sermon, and imboldened [sic] by having the permission to speak publicly, he had with enthusiastic zeal, which was a little heightened by liquor, entered into a religious controversy in a disorderly part of the town, generally inhabited at that time by Irish Roman Catholics, who took offense at the manner in which he treated the tenets of their church, and in revenge gave him a beating. 45

Hannon sought revenge by organizing a group of armed men to go hunting for the Catholics who had whipped him. Governor Gayoso considered this a breach of the peace in the community and had Hannon arrested. 46 In subsequent testimony the next day, Hannon
admitted that he was so drunk on Friday that he didn’t remember what had happened.47

When the Spanish officer arrested Hannon on Friday, the preacher attempted to escape and yelled, “Help me, fellow Americans!” to Ellicott’s camp. When the sun came up on Saturday, the Natchez Revolt of 1797 had begun.48

With the Spaniards taking refuge in Fort Panmure, the Americans spent Saturday making up miscellaneous plans for taking the rotting stockade. The release of another proclamation from Carondelet on Sunday certainly made matters worse. This proclamation claimed that an American Army was heading for Natchez. Americans in Natchez considered this “a declaration of war against the United States.”49

By Saturday, June 17, the Spanish and American patrols were firing at one another, so the Quaker in Ellicott was in the mood for a compromise. By June 23, a temporary committee for safety had been formed by the Americans and Gayoso had agreed to allow this “neutral” government to administer most of the legal affairs in the Natchez District.50

By September, Ellicott had received the news that Senator William Blount from Tennessee had been involved in a plot that combined Indian, British and American forces for an attack on New Orleans, and furthermore, Mr. Blount had been expelled from the United States Senate. This information confirmed so many of Ellicott’s suspicions. Now the Major saw all of his opponents as being a part of some “conspiracy [that] might be part of a larger plan to revolutionize Spanish America.”51 A. J. Pickett sums up Ellicott’s tumultuous year in Natchez: “In the Midst of scenes like these, Ellicott was kept in suspense, until 29th March, when the Spanish fort was evacuated, and all the Spanish troops sailed down the river.”52

Godoy, the Spanish Prime minister, finally came through on the promises that he made to the United States on October 27, 1795, at San Lorenzo. Before the French could remove him from office in
Map Legend

1. May 16, 1798. Ellicott completes observations at this astronomical observatory at “Union Hill” on the east bank of the Mississippi River and the commissioners determine the first control point on the southern boundary of the United States.

2. June 7, 1798. The commissioners move their camp to Little Bayou Sarah and set up their observatory.

3. August 28, 1798. The line is carried east to Thompson’s Creek. The commissioners abandon the idea of establishing control points at ten mile intervals along the compass line.

4. December 15, 1798. Ellicott dismantles his observatory on the east bank of the Pearl River and proceeds to New Orleans where he spends the winter.

5. April 9, 1799. Ellicott completes work at the observatory built on the west bank of the Mobile River and the commissioners erect Ellicott’s Stone.

6. May 20, 1799. Ellicott completes work at an observatory built on the Conecuh River near Miller’s farm.

7. August 19, 1799. Ellicott ends the survey of the thirty-first parallel on the west bank of the Chattahoochee River, approximately 382 miles east of the Mississippi River.

8. September 17, 1799. Indians violently end the survey at the observatory located in present day Chattahoochee, Florida.


10. February 26, 1800. The commissioners end the actual surveying by building a large mound of earth at the source of St. Marys River.

11. April 10, 1800. Final observations are completed at the south end of Cumberland Island.
1798, Godoy ordered the new Governor of Louisiana and West Florida, Manuel Gayoso, to evacuate the posts. Ellicott writes:

On the 29th of March late in the evening, I was informed through a confidential channel, that the evacuation would take place the next morning, before day; in consequence of which, I rose the next morning at four o'clock, walked to the fort, and found the last party, or rear guard just leaving it and as the gate was left open, I went in, and enjoyed from the parapet, the pleasing prospect of the galleys [sic] and boats leaving the shore, and getting under way.

Now after more than twelve months of waiting, Ellicott could begin the important business of his commission: the creation of a new southern boundary of the United States.

Ellicott and his American contingent left Natchez April 9, 1798, to begin the survey on the eastern bank of the Mississippi River south of Clarksville. Preliminary observations indicated the first point of the line was on the river almost four miles south of the encampment. Desiring to establish the initial point of the survey on higher ground, Ellicott brought his boats down the river, then up Bayou Tunica. He hauled his baggage to the site of his observatory using small skiffs and pack horses.

By the time the Spanish commissioner and his astronomer arrived, Ellicott had completed the observations of zenith distances establishing the initial control point of the survey. Between May 6 and May 16, 1798, Ellicott logged thirty observations of zenith distances of five different stars. The result of these calculations produced a mean latitude north $30^\circ59'43.74"$ for Ellicott’s observatory. When the astronomer from the Spanish commission, William Dunbar, arrived on Union Hill on May 26, he found Ellicott ready to order the crews to begin cutting a sixty-foot-wide trace east and west of this control point. According to Holmes, Gayoso named the site of the first observatory “‘Union Hill’...as an indication of the harmony existing between the Spanish and American camps.”
The arrival of Governor Gayoso on May 31, 1798, brought pomp and ceremony to this wilderness camp pitched on the east bank of the Mississippi. The next day Gayoso and Ellicott went fourteen hundred feet north of the camp where Gayoso “approved of the work on the line.” That evening Governor Minor, the Spanish boundary commissioner, “gave a superb dinner of game and fish, dried fruits and Madeira fit for the gods.” Ellicott was not impressed with everything that came with the company of the Governor of His Most Catholic Majesty’s province of West Florida. On June 19, 1798, in a letter to his wife, Ellicott mentioned Governor Gayoso’s visit to the camp on Union Hill:

Governor Gayoso paid me a visit few days ago at my camp in the woods—we met and saluted in the Spanish manner by kissing! I had not been shaved for two days—Men’s kissing I think a most abominable custom. It is 9 o’clock at night and my eyes almost put out by the muskeetos [sic].

On June 10, 1798, an official communication from Gayoso had informed Ellicott that the American camp was to be attacked and massacred by the Choctaws. In his journal, Ellicott called the communiqué a part of the Spanish “system of delay.” This assumption of Indian passivity was probably supported by the colossal fraud Ellicott had perpetrated on the Choctaw Nation. While camped in Natchez, Ellicott, with no authorization from the United States government, promised the Choctaws two thousand dollars per year in return for the boundary commission’s safe passage through the Choctaw country west of the Mobile River.

In his journal, Ellicott states his negotiations with the Choctaws “would probably be very uninteresting at this time, but little will be said upon it; it was, however, attended with considerable difficulty, and if circumstantially detailed, would of itself require a volume.” Winthrop Sargent, the first Governor of the Mississippi Territory, would certainly have appreciated details of Ellicott’s
activities as an ad hoc Indian agent when the governor wrote to the angry Choctaw chief, Franchamnassatuubba, on November 25, 1799:

Mr. Ellicott has I am told made you many promises, but I believe he was not authorized so to do, nor do I believe our government will be informed thereof, till notice which I have sent forward shall arrive, and which did not come to me for sufficient credit until very lately.\(^{65}\)

Holmes attributes Choctaw acquiescence to the “get-tough policy of the Spanish Governor-General of Louisiana and West Florida, Manuel Gayoso de Lemos, who warned that regular troops and militia would be used to punish the Indians for any insult to the American or Spanish boundary commission members.”\(^{66}\) Regardless, Ellicott’s confidence in Indian cooperation collapsed after he crossed the Mobile River.

By July 28, 1798, the Mississippi River had returned to its banks, and the Spanish commission astronomer, William Dunbar, volunteered to carry the line westward into the swamps.\(^{67}\) Dunbar had settled in West Florida in 1773 and while retaining his British citizenship after the Galvez takeover in 1779, he became a successful planter under the Spanish régime. Gayoso appointed him Surveyor General of the District of Natchez.\(^{68}\) Dunbar vividly describes the working conditions on the survey line while encamped on a bluff above the Mississippi Valley in August 1798.

In this situation were innumerable swarms of Gnats, and a variety of other stinging and biting insects; ...the surface of the earth teemed with life; objects themselves at every step in this animated hot bed, not of those kinds which invite and delight the view of the inquisitive naturalist; but of the most disgusting forms and noxious kinds, a few of those were the Serpents of the waters frequently entwined in clusters to the number of several hundreds, and a vast variety of toads, frogs, including the bull-frog, and the thundering Crocodile [sic], all of hideous forms, with a multitude of others too tedious to mention...many of our modern adventurers...
have established a very considerable reputation upon human credulity, by the display of imaginary sufferings, and the pretended achievement of arduous exploits, which in the country from whence I write, are submitted to and performed as the ordinary occurrence of everyday.\textsuperscript{69}

Dunbar worked on the survey line from May 26 to August 28, 1798. The survey covered only eighteen miles and progress was measured at less than one-quarter mile per day. Dunbar and the Spanish crew pushed the line westward through the impenetrable canes and swamps that bordered the Mississippi River. He described the work done after July 28:

The moist and swampy soil in the vicinity of the Mississippi being considered as hazardous to the health of our Northern friends, I proposed that the American commissioner [Ellicott] should continue his progress eastward, with the White laborers, 50 in number, reserving for myself the task of pushing the line through the low grounds to the margin of the Mississippi with the assistance of 2 surveyors, 22 black laborers and a white overseer.\textsuperscript{70}

The goal of the commissioners was to establish control points at ten-mile intervals along a compass line. Corrections of the line would be made from astronomical observations made at each of these points. The rugged terrain entangled and impeded work to such an extent that they soon abandoned that idea. By August 28, 1798, the line was carried east to Thompson’s Creek. Being the limit of cultivated land, Dunbar decided to quit his post as Spanish surveyor to return home to his family. Less than two miles from Thompson’s Creek, Ellicott also gave up. He wrote, “At the end of the twenty-first mile in the line, the land became of a more inferior quality, from which we concluded to pursue a less scientific but a more expeditious method.”\textsuperscript{71} Ellicott broke camp at Thompson’s Creek on October 27, 1798. Loading the pack horses, the commissioners slowly moved eighty-five miles east to the Pearl River. This was the method
to be used for the remainder of the survey. The final 275 miles of the survey of the thirty-first parallel were corrected at only three observatories: the Mobile, Conecuh, and Chattahoochee Rivers.72

Homesickness and mosquitoes were not the sole factors for Dunbar's departure. The disharmony within the American camp could very well have contributed to Dunbar's resignation of his commission. Ellicott was at 'war' with his surveyor, Thomas Freeman, and the commanding officer of the U.S. Army escort, Lt. McCleary.73 On October 14, 1798, Major General Wilkinson visited the commissioner's camp on Thompson's Creek. Ellicott used his influence with Wilkinson to remove Freeman and McCleary.74

A significant incident occurred on the way to the Pearl River. Ellicott came into possession of evidence that could have very well ended the wheeling and dealing of the cunning Major General Wilkinson. On November 14, 1798, Ellicott sent a letter to the American Secretary of State Pickering. This letter contained passages Ellicott had copied from a letter written by Gayoso to another Spanish officer. Gayoso's letter outlined in detail an elaborate conspiracy, financed by the Spanish crown, to detach Kentucky and Tennessee from the United States. Wilkinson was to be sent at the head of an army into New Mexico to initiate a greater plan: build a new empire west of the Mississippi River.75

Royal Shreve in The Finished Scoundrel suggests that Secretary Pickering ignored Ellicott's letter because it contained only transcriptions and not Gayoso's original letter. In all probability Ellicott's copy would "fare badly in court. Perhaps that is why Pickering, at this point, instructed him [Ellicott] to drop further investigation."76

The friction with Freeman, along with other ghosts of 1798, came back to haunt Ellicott in later years. On September 1, 1811, General Wilkinson was court-martialed on charges of treason. Without Gayoso's original letter, Ellicott's testimony was little more than hearsay evidence.77 Freeman's testimony concerning Ellicott's alleged
ntimacy with the washerwoman, Betsy, contributed to Wilkinson's 'utter demolition of the character of the eminent astronomer.'

Ellicott and both commissions arrived at the canebreak bordering the Pearl River on November 17, 1798. In his journal Ellicott describes the problems he encountered since leaving Thompson's Creek:

The swamps were numerous, and many of them so deep, that we had to go considerably out of our way to cross, or go around them, and others we had to causeway: add to those difficulties, a total want of information respecting the face of the country, which in our direction, did not appear to have been explored by white people; some of the streams were so deep that we had to cross on rafts.

The lavish feasts that had occurred in June with Gayoso were not to be repeated on the Pearl River. In fact, Ellicott ran out of all provisions except beef on November 27, 1798. On November 30 he was finally re-supplied by a pack train from Thompson's Creek.

The pack train also brought Ellicott's small sector, an instrument used in calculating observations. Nineteen inches inadius, it was little more than a sextant with a smaller arc and a longer radius. It was not designed to provide the accuracy for establishing the precise boundary between the two nations, but it was all the commissioners had.

No one knew when or if the rest of the equipment would arrive. Using this instrument in December, Ellicott made thirty-six observations of zenith distances of seven stars on eight evenings. Ellicott's astronomical journal of 1798 ended with a calculation of 11°0'2.7" as the mean latitude north for the location of his observatory on the east bank of the Pearl River. This meant that the observatory was 272 feet north of the actual line. After correcting to the south, David Gillespie, who replaced Freeman, corrected back to Thompson's Creek by laying off mounds by offsets at one-mile intervals along the thirty-first parallel. Daniel Barnet was sent east to
continue the guide line to the Mobile River. Ellicott now went downriver to New Orleans. This was the pattern he would continue in Mobile, Pensacola, St. Marks, and Point Peter. Ellicott would get the credit while much of the work was done by his subordinates. Hamilton describes Gillespie’s legacy:

Gillespie was quietly plodding the forests, running a guide line and by offsets establishing the true latitude of 31°. But nothing from Gillespie can now be found at Washington [D.C.] and even Ellicott’s original report seems to have shared the fate of so much else in the vandal destruction of the Capital by the enemy [British] in 1814.

Some citizens of the United States may have believed the demarcation line of their country’s first expansion was the answer to their prayer. Inhabitants of what was then called West Florida, however, did not agree that the United States of America was the ‘redeemer nation.’ While Ellicott and his party were wintering in New Orleans, the first trickle of refugees began their journey south of the thirty-first parallel to escape the American experiment in human freedom. Peter Hamilton cites the first refugee to arrive in Mobile as Lawrence McDonald, an Indian trader for Panton, Leslie & Co. McDonald was clear that he did not desire “to live under the government of the United States of America.”

November 8, 1798 found the Spanish government in Mobile receiving a list of citizens from the Tensaw District requesting to receive land grants and move into Spanish territory. A.B. Moore quotes Pintado, deputy surveyor of West Florida, as complaining “that most of those who moved down below the line 31° in compliance with the treaty of 1796 were Anglo-Americans, some Scotch and Irish, a few Germans, and about a dozen of Spaniards, most of them unmarried.” The liberal land grants and benevolent policies of the Spanish evidently attracted many.
Land surveys in Alabama based on Ellicott's Stone and line. University of South Alabama Archives.
In New Orleans, Ellicott spent the winter enjoying the hospitality of Governor Gayoso, the man whose mail Ellicott rifled in November. From January 19 to February 26, 1799, Ellicott made twenty-three observations of zenith distances of five stars to calculate the city’s mean latitude north as 29°57’28.7″. Between January 14 and February 17 Ellicott also deduced a longitude of 90°14’ west of Greenwich from observations of the eclipses of Jupiter’s moons.

Ellicott also stayed busy there outfitting the commission’s ship and getting supplies for his trip up the Mobile River. Not finding a vessel to his liking, he bought a hull made of live oak and cedar and hired several men to deck and outfit the vessel. Receiving permission from the local bishop to work Sundays, Ellicott and the crew could labor seven days a week “from daylight until dark, until she was ready for sea.”

Ellicott decided to save money by making himself master of the vessel, crewing it with two British deserters. On March 1, 1799, Ellicott navigated the new United States schooner Sally down the canal that led to Lake Ponchartrain. Possibly named for Ellicott’s wife, the ship was “a small, light-built schooner, of not more than 38 or 40 tons burden.” This ship was built for the coastal trade on the Gulf of Mexico. From March of 1799 until she sailed into the harbor of Savannah on May 1, 1800, the Sally served the Southern Boundary Commission with distinction.

Delayed by bad winds, the ship arrived on the compass line on the banks of the Mobile River the evening of March 17, 1799. Gillespie and his assistants had blazed the line from the Pearl River, arriving some days earlier. They had erected the observatory, and on the morning of March 18 the instruments were set up so that a week later observations of stars began.

These observations ended on April 19, the results being the compass line was found to be 8,556 feet north of the 31° latitude; the bad news for the Spanish was that St. Stephens fell north of the true line. After carefully laying out corrections to the South, the commission set up a two-foot high marker. The marker still stands
to this day it "is the origin of all land surveys in the southern part of Alabama and Mississippi." 95

Ellicott's observations in the Mobile delta caused the astronomer to conclude the waterway was "at this time of much more importance to the United States than all the other waters between the Mississippi River and the Atlantic Ocean," and that the lands drained by this river system were "at this time the most vulnerable part of the Union."96

Ellicott took down his instruments on April 10 to begin his voyage to Pensacola. On April 20, he sailed into Pensacola where he was provided with "convenient lodgings" by Panton, Leslie & Co. Later, Ellicott boasted in his journal he always obtained lodging or camped "free of expense to the public...from the time I left Pittsburgh in the year 1796, until my return to Philadelphia in the year 1800."97

Earlier at the Mobile camp Ellicott had written Benjamin Hawkins requesting Hawkins to attend talks in Pensacola with the apparently hostile Creek Indians. Hawkins arrived in Pensacola April 25 where a series of talks were planned to convince the Indians "that the line we were tracing was not a line of property, but of jurisdiction, a line between white people, and not intended in any way to affect the Indians in either their property, manners, customs or religion."98 The commissioners got a formal agreement, but events in Pensacola started a conflict between the Seminoles and the United States that would not end until the outbreak of the War Between the States stopped opposition to the fugitive Seminoles in the Florida Everglades.

Ellicott and Hawkins argued that ten or twelve days of talks in Pensacola would invite drunkenness in the Indians, further delaying the survey. Winning this argument with Governor Vincente Folch, the talks were moved up the Conecuh River to Miller's farm on April 9. Folch did not attend these talks, leading Mad Dog, principle chief of the Creeks, to observe "well, the Governor has not come, I told you so, a man with two tongues can only speak with one at a time."99
After receiving an agreement from the 212 Indians in attendance to live up to the terms of Article 5 of the Treaty of Coleraine of 1796, the commissioners set up the observatory. The Indians promised to provide an escort for the commission of two chiefs and twenty warriors. Along with observation of the stars Ellicott witnessed a transit of Mercury across the face of the Sun on May 6.

Returning to Pensacola May 26, Ellicott became suspicious of Governor Felch's activities. Deciding to stay a few days, the commission was rewarded when 180 Indians, at the invitation of Governor Felch, arrived from the upper towns of Tallassee and Ocfuskee. Since these Indians were now under United States jurisdiction, Felch handled the potentially embarrassing situation by leaving town. Earlier, Hawkins had been told by "a confidential Indian" that Felch issued the invitation because "the talks were crooked and the line would be stopped."

After calling Felch back to Pensacola in late June 1799 Hawkins got the governor off the hook by agreeing to give the Indians gifts on behalf of the United States. Satisfying the Indian and costing "the amount of two or three hundred dollars," Hawkins financed the deal from an unlikely source. Ellicott had been holding twelve hundred dollars owed the Creek Indians since November 7, 1797. The money had been promised to the Creeks for the year 1796 and 1797 by the United States under a secret article of the Treaty of New York in 1790. Hawkins had satisfied the Creeks with gifts bought with their own money that was three years overdue.

Since May 22, while all this was going on, Gillespie had been working eastward on the compass line, reaching the Chattahoochee June 22. Ellicott had remained in Pensacola too long and arrived much later at the camp—located in the present Houston County, Alabama—on July 25. The delay of more than one month doomed the survey. On September 22 Hawkins wrote his nephew expressing his disgust with Ellicott:
It is not yet explained to me why these gentlemen made a halt of three months at the Chattahoochee. You know I seriously pressed them not to remain more than two [months], and that in that case they might proceed on in perfect safety. They would be moving in the season of the Boosketah when all the discontented would be attending on the annual ceremonies at this annual festival.\textsuperscript{107}

As if enough delay had not occurred, another circumstance ose, increasing Creek resistance beyond anyone’s expectations. While Ellicott was delaying on the Chattahoochee, William Augustus Bowles was acquiring barrels of gunpowder and boxes of bullets from the British port of Kingston, Jamaica. According to Hawkins, the news of Bowles imminent arrival on the Chattahoochee “had put the thieves and mischiefmakers in motion.”\textsuperscript{108}

On two previous occasions, 1788 and 1792, Bowles had attempted to establish a British protectorate among the Creeks of the Gulf of Mexico frontier. Bowles’s last arrest in New Orleans in 1792 had sent him to Spanish prisons in Havana, Madrid, and the Philippines. After six years of imprisonment, he escaped from a Spanish prison ship off Senegal, beginning his return to his Indian family on the lower Chattahoochee.\textsuperscript{109}

Between July 25, 1799 and August 19, 1799, Ellicott made forty-four observations of seven stars to determine a mean latitude of $31^\circ1'9.4''$ for his observatory on the west bank of the Chattahoochee. Ellicott laid off a line 7,110.5 feet south and ended his survey of the thirty-first parallel.\textsuperscript{110}

This 7,110.5 foot north-south line formed the base of a triangle that had its apex at the Tensaw River. After 1818, General John Coffee based his public land surveys on the crooked northern “random line” of this triangle which Gillespie had run by compass. This line “was marked by ‘blazes’ of the trees, every tree on the line being blazed both on the north and the south side; and all other trees within about one hundred feet north and south of the line were blazed on the side nearest the line.”\textsuperscript{111}
Apparently Coffee found the blazed line easier to follow than the actual “mound line” which formed the southern arm of the triangle. This line “was marked by circular mounds of earth, about a mile apart, each surrounded by a ditch from which the earth had been thrown up to form the mound.”

This confusion created a boundary conflict between Alabar and Florida that was not resolved until 1854. By that time the disputed triangle between the two states “was virtually a no-man land, and became the natural resort of criminals and desperadoes from both states, since, within that strip they could defy the officers of the law.” This old conflict comes down to us today in the partially established Alabama townships formed between “Coffee’s line” and “Ellicott line.”

Stephen Minor, the Spanish commissioner, saw the Chattahoochee camp as “a place to form the most beautiful settlements.” In a letter to Gayoso on August 5, 1799, Minor stated:

Now from one side to the other of the river along almost the entire extent of the road to this camp may be found Indian plantations on which may be seen good fields of corn, rice, peas, beans, potatoes, melons, watermelons, cucumbers, etc., and most of them have chickens, pigs, and cattle in abundance. Some of them have very good herds with various Negro slaves, indicating to me that they live in very reasonable comfort. The river abounds with various delicious fish. All these details convince me that white settlements in these areas would prosper greatly. I am sure that on the eastern bank of the Mississippi there are no better lands on which to raise cattle.

Thieving at the Chattahoochee camp reached intolerable levels in August. Ellicott assembled the Indians on August 15 for a conference. They agreed to return stolen horses and protect the survey from harm. Ellicott, however, was apprehensive:

I nevertheless had my doubts of their sincerity, from the depredations they were constantly committing upon our horses,
which began on the Coenecuh [sic] [river], and had continued ever since; and added to their insolence, from their stealing every article in our camp they could lay their hands on.\textsuperscript{118}

On August 21 Ellicott received a warning from Indian trader James Burgess, who lived near the present day Bainbridge, Georgia. Serving as a deputy agent and interpreter for the boundary commissioners, Burgess warned Ellicott the survey crew would be attacked on the way to the St. Marys River and that Hawkins should be summoned.\textsuperscript{117}

At the end of August the commissioners moved their camp down river to the present-day Chattahoochee, Florida, at the forks of the Apalachicola. This observatory was the site where the Seminole Indians began their tenacious defiance of the United States. Today, atop the bluff where the observatory was built is a residential subdivision west of Pearl Street, between High and King Streets.\textsuperscript{118}

On September 1 the Spanish Commissioner, Minor, dismissed his escort, telling Ellicott his men were also unneeded.\textsuperscript{119} This action would indicate Minor was unaware of Indian hostility. About two weeks later, he would have to eat the words he had spoken to Ellicott.

On September 9 Burgess appeared in camp asking if Hawkins had arrived. When told no, Burgess insisted the commissioners “have not written as pointedly as was necessary, or he [Hawkins] would have been here before this.” Burgess went on to say “you will positively be plundered on your way to St. Mary’s; you nay think me a fool, but mark the end.”\textsuperscript{120}

Hawkins arrived on September 14, and on September 17 the camp received a message from Indian Willie, who lived a few miles north of the commissioner’s camp. His note warned that twenty Indians had spent the night near his place and they were up to no good.\textsuperscript{121}

Threatening to overrun the commissioner’s camp, the Indians stole fourteen horses and plundered the schooner. After receiving
information more Indians were in route to join the war party, Ellicott and Minor decided to retreat. Minor was to continue eastward and if he was not pursued by Indians, continue overland to St. Marys. 122

When describing this conflict to the Secretary of State, Ellicott predicted the demise of the Creeks and Seminoles in a letter dated October 9, 1799:

Many of the most sensible and best informed of the chiefs look upon the loss of their country as inevitable and it will be brought about by the bad conduct of their young men, who equally abhor restraint and despise advise. Such people are only brought to reflection by being beaten; and as we have men enough under pay at present, it might probably be done now, and at less expense than at any future period. 123

Hawkins immediately used the incident with the Seminoles at the river junction to consolidate his power in the Creek national council at Tuckabatchee in November 1799. Cotterill writes that Hawkins’s insistence on punishing the perpetrators alienated a Creek council that “was much opposed to an action so unprecedented in Creek history, and so, in violation of Creek custom....The humiliation (of the perpetrators), however pleasant to Hawkins, only increased the recalcitrance of the Tame King and added to the number of his adherents.” 124

Almost fifteen years later, the Tame King would be a leader of the Creek revolutionaries who were defeated by Andrew Jackson’s army. On August 9, 1814, a bitter Benjamin Hawkins witnessed the Treaty of Fort Jackson ceding twenty million acres of Creek land to the United States, and end a war that “had demonstrated his long efforts to civilize the Creeks had failed.” 125

McReynolds uses a letter from Minor to David Gillespie to reveal the Spanish commissioner’s opinion of Ellicott’s retreat from the survey of this first Southern boundary of the United States:
Mr. Ellicott, listening to the whispers of his *familias* spirit, and keeping in view the principles of his Sect, and the irreparable loss that society would suffer by his death prudently embarked with his family, including Parks the parrot, Bit the Squirrel, &c. in Bernard’s schooner, and gently glided down the stream into the bosom of safety.\(^{126}\)

On the way to St. Marks, Ellicott received a letter from Bowles, who was shipwrecked on the eastern end of St. George island. While visiting Bowles, a storm forced Ellicott to remain eight lays. His conversation during that period with the Director General of the Creek Nation convinced Ellicott that Bowles “ought to be counteracted by every citizen of the United States.” Ellicott went on to say, however, that Bowles “behaved on all occasions whilst with me in a polite and friendly manner, and generously furnished me with he necessary charts and directions for sailing around cape Florida.”\(^{127}\)

Ellicott returned Bowles’s favor by supplying the shipwrecked adventurer and his crew with flour and rice. Ellicott also asked Bowles and his men not to attack the commission’s supply ship, en route and expected to arrive from New Orleans, and that Bowles further direct the ship to sail for St. Marys; Bowles agreed to this request.\(^{128}\) Bowles could certainly have been sympathetic with a man waiting ‘for his ship to come in,’ as Bowles had spent his share of time waiting on shore.

On October 7, after two weeks of delay from violent storms, Ellicott finally made landing at the Spanish fort at St. Marks. While preparing for the voyage around Florida, Ellicott enjoyed the company of the Spanish commander, Capt. Thomas Portell and his wife, “an agreeable Spanish lady.”\(^{129}\) His conversations with the Portells confirmed Ellicott’s suspicions regarding General Wilkinson. Ellicott told the General of his conversations with the Portells in a letter dated January 21, 1808:

> About the 16th October, 1799, capt. [sic] Portell, who then commanded at Apalachy [sic], informed me that at New Madrid,
in the year 1796, he put on board a boat under the direction of Mr. T. Power, 9,640 dollars for your use. I questioned frequently whether this money was not on account of some mercantile transaction, he declared it was not.\textsuperscript{130}

This was the type of information that President Washington had instructed Ellicott to collect. In the same letter, Ellicott wrote to the general that:

Before I left Philadelphia in the year 1796, as commissioner on behalf of the United States to carry into effect our treaty with Spain, president Washington communicated to me in the most confidential manner possible, that suspicions had been signified to him of certain citizens of the U. states, improperly connecting themselves with the Spanish government, among whom you were particularly noticed. He thought it a business of so much importance, both to the honour and safety of the country, as to merit a thorough, though private, investigation, and directed me to pay a strict attention to that subject.\textsuperscript{131}

By October 18, Ellicott packed his crew, three years of paperwork, his apparatus and baggage into the small schooner Sally. Bad weather kept the ship in Apalachee Bay until October 20. The opening of a barrel of spoiled beef the first day at sea caused many of the passengers to demand returning to St. Marks. This rebellion earned the malcontents a reprimand which “prevented any complaint during the voyage, though we were frequently in disagreeable situations.”\textsuperscript{132}

The voyage around the peninsula of Florida was a memorable fifty days, especially for fifteen of the passengers who had never been to sea: the ship with provisions passed them (the new crew of which had been provided by Bowles), privateers chased them, crashing waves wrecked the rigging and threatened to founder the ship, and they were witness to a burial at sea. On December 9, these ‘lubbers’ were delighted to reunite in St. Marys with their friends from the
Hillspie and Minor parties who had traveled overland and were waiting for them. On February 26, the Spanish and American Commissioners built a mound at the source of the St. Marys River in the Okefenokee Swamp. This mound is found on all current USGS maps of the area, north of the town of Moniac, Georgia. This was the eastern terminus of the line which began at the junction of the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers. The difficulty of determining the source of this river produced a boundary dispute between Georgia and Florida which was not resolved until 1866. The building of the controversial mound was the end of the commission's actual surveying.

The reports and maps were completed and confirmed by the American and Spanish Commissions on Cumberland Island, April 10, 1800. The next day the Sally left St. Marys harbor arriving May 1 in Savannah. The small schooner had served its purpose in establishing the United States' newest southern boundary. Ellicott decided to send the ship to a place where it could continue serving the United States: Fort Stoddard—near present-day Mt. Vernon, Alabama—the newly established southernmost port-of-entry into the United States. Ellicott believed the United States "needed to be formidable in that quarter," and "the Mobile, Tombeckby [sic] and the Alabama Rivers, are at this time of much more importance to the United States than all the other waters between the Mississippi River and the Atlantic Ocean."

After chartering a sloop bound for Philadelphia, Ellicott and his party sailed from Savannah May 9. Ellicott was reunited with his family in the City of Brotherly Love on May 18, 1800.

By 1803, Ellicott had prepared and published the journal of the commission's activities from 1796 to 1800. At the same time, Thomas Jefferson wrote Ellicott concerning a scientific expedition to the West. In late April and early May 1803, Ellicott worked seventeen days and nights instructing Meriwether Lewis in the use and
application of the instruments used for determining longitude an
latitude.\textsuperscript{139}

Catherine Mathews recognized the importance of these lessor
in her 1908 biography of Ellicott:

There is perhaps no other incident of Major Ellicott’s life which
so appeals to the imagination as this, where the veteran explorer
and engineer brings, for the eager young man whose hope of
conquering a wilderness is so strong within him, all lore of the
land primeval, all the knowledge fought for and gained in the
woods of Virginia, Pennsylvania, and western New York and on
the rivers and bayous of the Southern states. It was the counsel
of a ripe experience that Major Ellicott gave. Danger had been
his own daily comrade throughout long years, privation and
hardship he had met at the very outset of his career, and he had
long ago learned how to make friends with them. How much or
how little of Captain Lewis’s success may be traced to his
[Ellicott’s] wise counsel, we cannot know, but one would like to
have heard with Captain Lewis the secret of baffling and
subduing the adversities of nature, and the way to travel
unharmed through a wilderness that sought to devour you.\textsuperscript{140}

Ellicott’s delineation of the United States southern boundary
also permanently alienated the Seminoles from their ancient connection
with the Creek Nation and produced “the result of so increasing their
[Seminole] already considerable spirit of independence that they
became practically a separate tribe.” This separation of the Creeks and
the Seminoles comes down to us to this day.\textsuperscript{141}

Today, Ellicott’s influence lives with all who call the Gulf
Coast their home. His descriptions vividly depict the sea and
wilderness of that time. Furthermore, his descriptions remind us that
our first communities were Natchez, New Orleans, Mobile, Pensacola,
St. Marks, St. Augustine, Frederica and St. Marys. The incredible
accuracy of the observations and calculations has its contemporary
legacy: the shapes and boundaries of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
Georgia and Florida. The Boundary Commission’s observations should
never be dismissed as having “slight interest save for historical and
scientific specialists." Ellicott’s thrilling story is integral in the founding of the Mississippi Territory in 1798. As we approach the bicentennial of that episode in American history, we should reflect on our Gulf Coast version of the ‘Founding Fathers’ and the beginning of the end for the Spanish empire on the Gulf of Mexico.

Ellicott’s Stone on the Mobile River, showing the Spanish side. Mobile Public Library, Local History Division.

Notes

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Robert Register is a science teacher from Northport, Alabama. He has begun field work devoted to locating all of the astronomical observatories, survey mounds, and witness trees along the first Southern Boundary of the United States. Mr. Register hopes that his research will lead to the proper marking of this old border.
Don Bernado de Galvez. Library of Congress.
The Treaty of San Lorenzo and Manifest Destiny

Ethan Grant

Winthrop Sargent, first territorial governor of Mississippi, held his new subjects in low esteem after visiting the camp of surveyor Andrew Ellicott in 1798. He wrote to his secretary that he had learned that the populace of Natchez were “the most abandoned villains who have escaped from the chains and prisons of Spain and have been convicted of the blackest of crimes.” Frances Bouligny, governor of Spanish Natchez in 1784, remarked that the people came to town and drank all day. The father of Jefferson Davis discovered an aristocratic and prosperous people at Natchez when he arrived in 1806. All three spoke of the British settler community at Natchez, a group who lived under three flags in twenty years. They came as British subjects before 1779, lived under Spanish rule from that year, and became United States citizens in 1798.

The “Black Legend” has painted Spanish colonial administrators as ineffective and lazy at worst, corrupt at best; and rabidly Catholic. Wherever it may have been true, that was not the case in this instance. The crown treated the Anglos with great tolerance and understanding. Authorities did much to gain their loyalty, or at least passive acceptance of His Catholic Majesty’s rule.

Similar pains went into relations with the tribes of the area of modern Alabama and Mississippi. The crown devoted much effort to Indian relations, diligently working to gain peace among tribes long accustomed to warfare with each other. The policy worked more often than not.

At a time when the expanding United States frontier was the scene of much bloodletting, not once after 1780 did any settler at Natchez experience more than an occasional threat of expulsion by Indians of the area. Choctaw chiefs needed reminding from time to time that the authorities would not allow those they ruled to take native land. Though they looked like Americans and spoke the same language, the local “Spaniards” were no threat to them or their lands.
Expediency motivated those who set local colonial policy, not some stirring of the Enlightenment in the New World. The Natchez District of Louisiana served as a frontier outpost for the jewel of the Spanish empire, the viceroyalty of España Nueva. Realizing the importance of that outpost, extraordinary steps were taken by farsighted officials in Madrid.

Their fears proved correct. In 1795 Spain ceded the Natchez District to the United States in the Treaty of San Lorenzo, though the actual change of flags took until 1798. In short order Louisiana went to France, then the United States in 1803. Florida became untenable after 1817. Texas rose in rebellion from Mexico in 1836. After much prodding from James Polk, Mexico "invaded" the United States in 1846. In the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo of 1848, Mexico recognized the loss of Texas and ceded what became California, New Mexico, and Arizona. Had the war dragged into 1849, the All of Mexico movement might have prevailed and Mexico could have disappeared as an independent nation.

Many would assert that manifest destiny was inevitable from the founding of Jamestown and Plymouth Plantation. Whether or not that is the case, at some point its force became overwhelming. This paper asserts the key to this sequence of events was the Natchez District. With it, and continued effective Indian relations, the possession of land West of the Mississippi River was denied to the United States. While numbers of Americans moved into Spanish territory and took the required loyalty oath, the flag need not have followed. Daniel Boone could have died a Spaniard, a respected alcalde in what never became Missouri.

Flights of fancy aside, Spanish Natchez was the key to the North American West. It was the levee holding the flood tide of expansion of the young United States. When it was lost, Spanish and then Mexican efforts to hold their ground were as useless as the orders of the legendary Danish king Canute, who futilely bade the tide to stop.³

This paper is intended not so much to reveal new historical evidence, but to show a plausible causal link between San Lorenzo and Guadalupe-Hidalgo. While manifest destiny may have been inevitable before 1795, it certainly was after that date.
San Lorenzo and the cession of Natchez to the United States was the final episode in the struggle to control the North American Southeast. The earliest rivals were Spain and France. The arrival of La Salle on the Gulf Coast in 1681 set in motion a chain of events which led to the founding of Biloxi, Mobile, Pensacola, and New Orleans. At issue was the safety of New Spain, then an increasingly valuable asset to Madrid.

The Family Compact of 1701 between the Bourbons of the two nations effectively ended potential conflict. Then a new player, Great Britain, arrived on the scene. British merchants from Carolina began to threaten the immensely profitable fur and peltry trade of the French with the natives. Spain, not a participant in this high stakes game, remained marginalized at Pensacola, St. Marks, and St. Augustine. Its chief concern in the region remained protection of the Flota and conversion of the natives to Christianity.

Queen Anne’s War, more commonly known as the War of Spanish Succession, threatened to reorder the area, but peace left the French as strong as ever in the region. Spanish efforts to convert the natives effectively ended with the destruction of the mission network in north Florida. War came again in 1756, beginning this time in America. In the end, though no territory in the Gulf region changed hands by force of arms, the North American map was greatly redrawn.

In 1763 the Treaty of Paris gave Britain all lands east of the Mississippi River. Spanish Florida became two new British colonies, open to immigration as an exception to the Proclamation of 1763. In compensation Spain received Louisiana. Relations between the two powers were wary and cautious. An illegal but flourishing trade developed between Mobile and New Orleans.

British West Florida suffered under indifferent and ineffectual leadership until the arrival of Peter Chester as governor in 1770, and immigration remained sparse for most of the land near Mobile and Pensacola was suitable for little but the production of naval stores.

To the north lay the rich black soil of Natchez and numbers of settlers began to arrive there after 1767. By 1774 hundreds were clearing fields and planting crops. The outbreak of hostilities in
Massachusetts in 1774 created a wave of Loyalist refugees. The population of the area swelled to perhaps two thousand.

Bernardo Galvez arrived in 1778 as the new governor of Louisiana. The presence of so many British subjects and potential soldiers concerned him greatly. His uncle José Galvez, Minister of the Indies, feared war between London and its colonies would eventually involve Spain and perhaps endanger the empire.

France, eager for revenge for 1714 and 1763, needed only the Battle of Saratoga to enter hostilities in 1778. Charles III of Spain resisted implementation of the Family Compact, but relented in May 1779. Bernardo Galvez, already secretly supplying the rebels at Fort Pitt, prepared plans for a preemptive strike on the Mississippi settlements of British West Florida. Before word of hostilities reached the British on September 6, 1779, a motley force of Spanish soldiers, habitant militia, and friendly Indians captured Fort Manchac. On September 20 Colonel Alexander Dickson surrendered at Baton Rouge after a brief cannonade. Included in the terms of surrender were Natchez and its populace.

Any immediate threat to Louisiana ended, but what of the future? How could the people living around Natchez with their long history of enmity to Spain and its Catholic faith be ruled? Galvez possessed scant resources for the task. The garrison at Natchez would number sixty at the most, the British settler community numbered nearly two thousand.

The change of flags was peaceful. Heads of household took the required oath of allegiance to His Catholic Majesty. They were to remain safe in their homes and property. They could not be forced to take up arms against Britain, and did not have to adopt the faith of their rulers. Those who could not abide those terms were given eight months to sell their property and leave.

To the relief of the authorities, the settlers again proved themselves to be apolitical. Earlier an expedition of rebels led by James Willing in 1778 drew little local support. A proclamation of neutrality and parole was issued by Captain Willing, and largely observed. The few settlers who resisted had their lands ravaged, their property seized.
In April of 1781 there was a brief uprising and Galvez lost control of Natchez for six weeks. By the end of May the rebellion collapsed, its leaders imprisoned or fled. The reaction of Spanish officials was critical. How were they to treat this revolt? In their eyes sworn subjects committed treason. In 1765 Alexander O'Reily had six rebels executed following unrest at New Orleans.

The governor dispatched his assistant, Estevan Miro, to Natchez to assess the situation. Eventually, John Blommart, merchant and leader of the rising, lost all of his considerable property. Captain Blommart and his five lieutenants remained under house arrest in New Orleans until 1783 and then they were exiled. One was later allowed to rejoin his family at Natchez. Others not arrested and taken to New Orleans suffered varying degrees of seizure and sale of property based on their involvement. Leniency remained the rule.

Fewer than fifty settlers participated in the rebellion. Others aided the Spanish in seeking and capturing those trying to escape. As in 1778 and 1779 most remained neutral. The latter included many loyalists who had fled the Atlantic colonies and had much reason to prefer the return of the British flag, yet took no action.

Policies put in place in 1779 remained. No one was compelled to become Catholic. Despite the claims of some historians, authorities turned a blind eye toward Protestant worship. For a time in the 1780s authorities officially recognized marriages “performed according to the form of the English church.” From 1782 until 1792 Miro was governor of Louisiana. He expelled the Capuchin order and aborted an effort to establish an inquisition in April 1790. Religious tolerance remained in force. Governors of Natchez from Carlos Grandpre to Manuel Gayoso attended public Protestant sermons there. As early as 1780 constables appointed by the authorities summoned people to court, carried out judgements, and received fees. Many local leaders served as translators, mediators, and appraisers of property. By 1794 and perhaps even earlier, alcaldes were appointed to try civil legal cases. While in no way democratic, the community largely ruled itself. A settler militia served at New Orleans in 1793 and 1794.

Benign rule, respect for Protestant preferences, and recognition of their marriage ceremonies helped cement loyalty or at least passive
acceptance of Spanish rule. Spain sought to forge another powerful motivation to that end. From 1781 to 1789, the Crown bought all the tobacco Natchez settlers could grow at three times the prevailing world price. In the last year of subsidized buying nearly one million pounds were grown and accepted for payment. This expensive practice ended after 1789. The warehouses of New Spain were bulging with a glut of unsold tobacco. Laws protected debtors until 1794 when cotton was on its way to becoming the predominant crop at Natchez.

By 1795 the population at Natchez and the surrounding area neared five thousand. Despite a flood of immigration from Kentucky and Tennessee which began in 1790, no one openly challenged the rule of Spain. The only cabals at Natchez were those of James Wilkinson and Aaron Burr; and their plan was to add to Spanish holdings, not to take them away. Spanish rule seemed secure, relations with the tribes of the region had never been better.

While governor of Louisiana, Bernardo Galvez had little time to concern himself with Indian relations. Natchez had experienced Indian troubles in 1780, shortly after the Spanish conquest. In 1782 newly promoted Estevan Miro embarked on a plan to establish a confederation of tribes. The scheme envisioned a series of offensive/defensive alliances with Spain and each tribe. Thought not directly bound to peace with traditional foes, the terms of these interlocking treaties created generally placid conditions. Even the worst enemies, Choctaws and Chickasaws, were at peace more often than not. By and large the efforts of William Augustus Bowles of the United States to set the tribes at each other failed.

Colonel Juan Delavillebeuvre was the permanent ambassador to the native nations. A lieutenant and the conqueror of the Natchez in 1781, he remained with the Indians for long periods of time, and was well trusted. Miro’s replacement by the Baron De Carondelet in 1792 resulted in no change of his successful policy. If anything, relations became stronger with the Treaty of Nogales in 1794.

To convince the Choctaw to cede land at Walnut Hill (Vicksburg) for a fort to protect their subjects and the Indians, Carondelet sent Delavillebeuvre to each tribe with a set speech, which read in part:
I have sent you a great chief to lead you in the right path, to defend you from your enemies.... He has given you good advice, and he has told you to keep the roads white.... It should prevent the roads from being reddened, the hearths of your brothers from being extinguished, and their wives from being ravished.10

As a result of the measures described above, Spain had a peaceful and secure northern frontier outpost in 1794. Its settlers repaid the authorities by mustering for militia service when needed, yet were largely self-governing. Even the later prominent Andrew Jackson stayed there for a time and took the required oath of allegiance to the Spanish Crown.

Events in Europe erased two decades of patient policy and capable diplomacy. The United States negotiated Jay’s Treaty in 1794, and seemed to be swinging towards abrogation of agreements made with Spain in the wake of the American Revolution. If the new nation became allied with Britain in war, Spanish America was in danger of conquest by either or both.

To forestall that possibility, Charles IV decided to cede the Natchez territory to the United States. This was accomplished in the Treaty of San Lorenzo in 1795. Included in its terms was the right of Americans to deposit their cargos at New Orleans for export with minimal taxes levied. Though the treaty called for implementation in six months, it was not until 1797 that Andrew Ellicott arrived at Natchez to draw the treaty line at thirty-one degrees north latitude.

Ellicott was a competent astronomer/surveyor, but arrogant and opinionated. He saw himself as not a hired artisan, but as the person appointed to oversee a change of flags. With him was a group of about forty adventurers hoping for fortune in the ceded territory. His overbearing attitude so angered governor Manuel Gayoso that the latter began to stall, hoping to cause Spain to abrogate of the treaty. He was backed by Carondelet.

Unrest ensued resulting in the Natchez revolt of 1797. Ellicott, his opportunists, and a few locals began to agitate for an immediate change of flags. The leadership of the community reacted with the creation of a self-appointed, then elected, Committee of Safety. The militia mustered at night to allow the small force of Spanish soldiers at Fort Rosalie to get some rest.
After a time a group including Ellicott and the “Spanish” surveyor William Dunbar made their way south to draw the new border at thirty-one degrees north latitude. They were unable to complete their task. Indians, angry at Spain for violating their treaties, and certain the United States coveted their land, beset the party and they were forced to give up their survey.

Winthrop Sargent arrived in April 1798, the first territorial governor of Mississippi. Many already indicated their choice of flags by moving south to Baton Rouge. Fittingly, their new governor was Colonel Carlos Grandpre. With the change Grandpre, resident at Natchez since 1779, had received promotion and a new position.

For the second time in twenty years the community was under a new flag. In neither case was the populace consulted. In neither case were the wishes of the tribes considered. Events far away dictated who owned Natchez.

The boundary of the United States now extended to the Mississippi River. While one keystone of frontier defense was lost, Louisiana and the thinly populated region of Texas still served as a buffer between the United States and New Spain. The imperial dreams of Napoleon Bonaparte altered that situation.

Prospects of peace in Europe in 1800 led Bonaparte to consider the wider world. The French once held a considerable empire in the Americas, and he set out to regain much of it. Its gem had been half of the island of Santo Domingo.

To restore the island as a source of French wealth, the emperor took a number of steps. He tried to reimpose slavery, undoing one of the first acts of the French Revolution. Restless since 1794, the once and soon-to-be slaves rose in revolt. A French army of thirty thousand sent to secure the island died, largely of disease, and Haiti was born.

An important element of Napoleon’s American strategy was Louisiana. It was necessary to provide lumber for sugar barrels and as a source of food for slaves. Under considerable pressure Spain retroceded Louisiana to France in the Treaty of San Ildefonso October 1, 1800, effective with the Treaty of Amiens in 1802. This supposedly secret pact caused fears of a French empire in the West to rise in the United States. Newly elected President Thomas Jefferson
believed a French Louisiana would force the United States permanently into the arms of Great Britain.  

The next year Bonaparte faced the prospect of renewed hostilities in Europe. Haiti would not be captured in the foreseeable future as he could not under the circumstances afford to send another army. In that case Louisiana became expendable, especially after a long letter from the American minister, Robert Livingston, convinced him the territory was useless to France.  

The United States had been bargaining with little progress with the French foreign minister Talleyrand for New Orleans and possibly Florida. On October 11, 1802, he stunned the American delegation with the offer of all of Louisiana. His master had ordered him to dispose of the whole territory. The United States soon possessed the vast but vaguely bordered lands west of the Mississippi, as well as the vital port of New Orleans. Another domino had fallen to American expansion.

Florida was now useless to Spain. It became untenable with the campaign of Andrew Jackson in 1817. In 1819 the Adams-Onis treaty recognized that reality. It also set the boundary between Spanish Mexico and the United States. The Sabine River, a far less formidable a barrier to expansion than the Mississippi separated the United States from the rich black soil of the northern part of the soon-to-be independent Texas. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams was widely denounced for not demanding more of Spain.

Moses Austin, a native of Philadelphia, moved to Spanish Missouri in 1796. By 1813 he was forming a scheme to move himself and many others to Texas. He did not live to see the plan to fruition, but his son Stephen persevered, and despite the revolution creating Mexico in 1820, he received permission to locate large numbers of settlers in the northern part of the state of Texas-Coahuila.  

Thousands embarked from New Orleans and received generous grants of land through Austin. Very soon, the non-anglo population was overwhelmed in numbers by newly arrived settlers. The constitution of Mexico called for a weak central government, with great autonomy for the states. In the state of Texas-Coahuila there
was a large degree of self-government for the recently arrived Americans.

Only two requirements needed to be met to immigrate. The Catholic faith was mandatory and an oath of allegiance to Mexico was required. As in the rest of newly independent Spanish America, slavery was forbidden. Settlers, including Sam Houston, once seen as a successor to Andrew Jackson, went through the motions of the first, swore the second, and ignored the third. Though technically illegal, slavery flourished, as did Texas. By 1830, it had a population of thirty thousand, including a thousand slaves.¹⁴

Texas became an object of intrigue. Many in the United States resented the boundary of 1819; and in 1825 and 1828 the United States tried to gain adjustment in their favor. Mexico was not interested. Some Americans called for invasion and conquest.

Texans seemed unmoved by these events. They had little to gain by becoming part of the United States. Stephen Austin in particular remained against annexation. By 1828 he held no official office, but retained considerable influence.

There matters might have remained except for a power hungry Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna. Posing as a reformer, he captured the Mexican government in 1832. In 1835 he overthrew the constitution and decreed a very strong central government. Civil war broke out in Mexico against the new regime, and the northern part of the country was no exception. Texas gained independence after the victory of Houston over Santa Anna at the Battle of San Jacinto on April 21, 1836.¹⁵

For the next ten years, the issue of the annexation of Texas remained in limbo. Presidents from Andrew Jackson to John Tyler resisted political pressure. The main fear was upsetting the balance established by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. The abolition movement had begun to grow into a real force, and abolitionists feared the addition of more slave territory. As long as Texas lay outside the United States, the issue of the expansion of slavery need not dominate national politics.

As with Natchez in 1795, not all Texans favored annexation. Pioneer founder Stephen Austin and his supporters feared their power and influence would wane. As no president could succeed himself,
Austin alternated with the hero of San Jacinto, Sam Houston. Houston favored annexation. So great was their enmity that each change of administration caused a change of the national capitol. Both Britain and France favored an independent Texas as a counter weight to the growing United States.16

Santa Anna again caused war. Deposed in 1836 for losing Texas, he returned to power in a coup in 1841. He quickly subdued resistance to his rule and began to scheme to regain Texas. In the fall of 1842 his army raided San Antonio. A strike in retaliation at Santa Fe failed miserably. Rather than let matters rest, he ordered border raids which kept Texas on edge.

Although deposed again in late 1844, Santa Anna had created an unstoppable movement in the United States and Texas. It became one of the central issues in the presidential election and was vital in carrying James Polk to victory with the slogan “All of Texas, 54 '40 or Fight,” the former referring in many minds to Santa Fe and that region, the latter to the Pacific Northwest.17

On his last day in office, March 3, 1845, John Tyler signed the resolution creating the state of Texas. His successor resolved to carry out his campaign promise of “All of Texas.” He demanded the Mexican government surrender Santa Fe. Short of war, that country would not give it up.

Polk found himself in a delicate position. The United States was a peaceful nation which went to war only when attacked. But he was determined to gain Santa Fe and California and therefore needed an incident. Polk moved the Army to south Texas. Armed forces now confronted each other across the Rio Grande. On April 23, 1846, sixteen hundred Mexican cavalry troops crossed the river and an American patrol of sixty-three was decimated. The Mexican War had begun.18

On February 2, 1848, Nicholas Trist and Mexican commissioners appointed for the purpose signed a treaty of peace at Guadalupe-Hidalgo. The saying “So near the United States, so far from God” proved true. Terms of the pact forced Mexico to surrender nearly half of its territory. Though Polk had dismissed Trist, he had little choice but to accept the treaty as negotiated. A movement was
rapidly growing to take all of Mexico with all the attendant political dangers.

Slavery and its expansion became an issue which could no longer be ignored. The Missouri Compromise had seemingly laid to rest the problem of its continued existence as an institution. For thirty years, the two sections and their leaders could fall back on the measure's boundaries. Because of the Wilmot Proviso of 1846 barring slaves from lands acquired in the Mexican War, the subsequent Compromise of 1850 was only a truce, one that would end at Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861.

In 1795 Spain need not have given up Natchez. Its populace seemed complacently willing to accept her rule. The tribes of the area enjoyed relative peace, they did not harm the inhabitants of Spanish Natchez. Indian lands were guaranteed to them and not threatened. But then, like a series of dominos, blocks of territory fell to the United States after San Lorenzo: Louisiana in 1803, Florida in 1819, Texas in 1845, California and the Southwest in 1848. Once the levee was breached in 1795, the flood became unstoppable.

Notes


2 Grandpre to Miro, October 2, 1790, Kinnaird, Spain, 4:380.


5 Seville, Archivo General de Indias, Papeles de Cuba, legato 2360; Kinnaird, Spain, 3:12; May Francis McBee, ed., The Natchez Court Records (Baltimore, 1973), 54.


7 The most exhaustive account of the revolt of 1781 remains John Caughey, "The Natchez Rebellion and Its Aftermath," Louisiana Historical Quarterly 16 (1932).
McBee, *Natchez Court Records*, 344. This is but one of numerous references in court documents.


Proclamation of Carondelet, Kinnaird, *Spain*, 4:140.


Ibid., 258.


Ibid., 490.

Ibid., 499.

Marquis James, *The Raven* (New York, 1966), 263.


Ibid., 65.

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"La Tempestad" lashing out at a French ship of the blockading squadron.

"La peste" left many French graves on the island known as "Sacrificial." Author's collection.
“Peste, Tempestad, & Pâtisserie”
The Pastry War: France’s Contribution to the Maintenance of Texas’ Independence

Betje Klier

Battles with Mexican armies under General Antonio López de Santa Anna stand like bookends at the beginning and end of the Republic of Texas, which existed from 1836 to 1845. The events of the Texas Revolution and the defeat of Santa Anna’s army are well known, but little is known of Santa Anna’s rise to power in 1829, or his return to power after the eighteen-minute debacle at San Jacinto and his disgraceful return home.

Santa Anna is one of history’s most gifted opportunists. The first two times he rose to power it was by masterfully taking credit for events beyond his control: pushing back foreign invasions by the Spanish in 1829 and by the French in 1838. His first rise to power was due to environmental opportunism, symbolized by the “peste” (plague) and “tempestad” (storm). Both scourges had supernatural overtones to the Mexicans for whom “la peste y la tempestad” also became the foreign policy and the formula for dealing with invasions.

The Texans knocked Santa Anna from his pedestal in 1836. During the Pastry War with the French in 1838, another loss restored Santa Anna to his pedestal: the loss of his leg! The French naval blockade enabled Texas to remain independent from Mexico, be recognized in Europe, and function as a fragile nation until statehood. Tempted to call this paper “Biology and Opera” to underscore the disparate nature of Santa Anna’s two opportunistic events but, unable to resist the beauty of the Spanish and French languages, the author has settled instead for “Peste, Tempestad, & Pâtisserie.” Mexico had just slipped out of Spain’s grasp after three hundred years of colonial domination when Isidro Barradas arrived in 1829, sent by Ferdinand VII with three thousand troops to initiate the reconquest of the land initially subdued by Hernando Cortés in 1521.1 For Cortés the conquest had been made simple, or at least possible, when smallpox decimated his opponents. But in 1829 the reverse was true: it was the
Spanish invaders who were ravaged by “la peste.” The surrender of General Barradas to a Creole general at Tampico demonstrated that Spanish soldiers were then incapable of conquering Mexico because their immune systems no longer provided them the biological advantages they had enjoyed three hundred years before. Although historians once claimed that military power and divine intervention shaped Mexico, microbiology was the strongest determinant of Mexico’s destiny.

Cortés’s first major decision after landing in Mexico was irreversible. He grounded his ships to prevent desertions. Men and biology were irreversibly launched by his action; there could be no return. Cortés conquered Mexico for Spain and as a “great service to God” with fewer than six hundred men, the first horses and guns his enemies had ever seen, and “the courage never to submit or yield.”

Today we would add invisible biological weapons to his winning arsenal.

As Alfred Crosby cautions, “When strangers meet, the degree of difference between their bacterial florae can make more history than the differences between their customs.” The bacterial florae introduced by the conquistadores to the inhabitants of the New World, who lacked the immunities of the invaders, induced epidemics of European diseases. Eruptive fevers such as measles, typhus, or smallpox were the most deadly, and massive deaths followed in the wake of Cortés and the Spaniards. Recent estimates put the Amerindian population at twenty-five to thirty million when Cortés arrived. They were reduced to three million in the first fifty years. Contagious diseases spread among epidemiologically virgin populations which the Spaniards encountered in sufficient density to generate disease cycles. That density threshold is reached when organisms can sustain human-to-human infection indefinitely. Smallpox in 1520, measles in 1530, typhus in 1546, and influenza in 1558 struck Mexico in epidemic proportions.

This first recorded American pandemic permitted the indigenous survivors to develop immunities to European diseases. Sporadic lethal epidemics then gave way to endemic patterns of infections, even though the evolutionary selection process operating in the person-host was operating simultaneously in the parasites. As the host grew
resistant, the parasites grew virulent. Different communities exhibited varying levels of susceptibility and immunity. But the immediate result of the epidemics was depopulation of the Amerindian worker pool, which triggered the importation of African slaves from the Caribbean Islands or Africa as replacements.

The human cargo introduced African diseases like malaria and yellow fever along the Gulf Coast and tropical lowlands. Sub-Saharan tropical African diseases depend on constant moist temperatures above 60°F; 72°F is ideal. Immunity to these diseases generally lasts only one to two years. Mosquito larvae were transported in standing water, typically around water casks or some other manufactured object. Soon mosquitoes that could host and propagate potentially lethal microbes thrived along Gulf Coast. Yellow fever was first recorded in 1648, when the arrival of the *Aedes aegypti* mosquito was signaled by an epidemic among people and monkeys, and “malaria appears to have completed the destruction of the Amerindians in the tropical lowlands emptying formerly well-populated regions almost completely.” There is no evidence, on the other hand, of African slaves dying of European diseases. The danger exists in the reverse since heat and moisture support life more easily: microbes from warmer climes tend to endanger people from cooler regions.

The ruling Spanish oligarchy would maintain its hold over Creoles, Mestizos, and Amerindians for three centuries through an ongoing replenishment of Spanish civil and religious personnel. Importation of a ruling class even continued many years after importation of slaves became illegal. Spaniards seldom settled in the coastal lowlands, where the slaves were most valuable for agricultural work. Malaria was lethal to non-immune adult Europeans who, therefore, preferred to reside instead in the more salubrious central plateau where tropical diseases could not penetrate.

Finally, through the voice of the Catholic priest Father Miguel Hidalgo, Mexico declared her independence from Spain in 1810, when Ferdinand VII abdicated in favor of Napoleon’s brother, King Joseph. At first the goal of Padre Hidalgo and his followers—devout Catholics who supported rule by divine right—was to separate from Spain and return to the Bourbon king (by divine right transmitted through descendency), after ridding Mexico of Spaniards. Wildly
divergent political factions united on a single objective: rid Mexico of the ruling class. Spain’s response was to shoot and decapitate Hidalgo, and place his head on a pike at the gates of Guanajuato, where it remained until 1821. As the revolution progressed, the divine right principle was forgotten, and the Mexicans, who remained and still remain Catholic, came to believe that God supported Mexican independence instead. He gave them many biblical signs which they recognized, especially “la tempestad” and “la peste.” “La tempestad” was the late summer and early autumn hurricane season on the East coast of Mexico. “La peste” was an epidemic of one or several European or African diseases.

After nearly a decade of civil war Mexico and Spain agreed to the Plan of Iguala in 1821. Resident Spaniards would have a year to leave Mexico and would be permitted to take their money with them. In 1822 the last Spanish cohort awaiting passage at Fort San Juan de Ulúa [St. Jean de Ulloa] was trapped there, and it was four years before they could leave. By 1826 few Spaniards were left in Mexico, and the Mexicans felt protected by their impregnable fort and “la tempestad.”

The 1829 military attempt of Ferdinand VII and Barradas fell in line with Spain’s long history of heroic conquistadores and reconquistadores. Wishing to emulate Cortés, when he arrived in July, Barradas marooned his men on the mainland by sending his ships back to Cuba. Mexico was bankrupt and in a state of political and military disarray. Barradas and his men triumphed in early skirmishes along the coast until they began to fall ill from malaria and yellow fever, or a combination of tropical diseases. Soldiers in close quarters also fell prey to diseases of crowding like TB, dysentery, and pneumonia. Nine hundred of Barradas’s men died in the first two months. Hundreds of others undoubtedly wished to die and there were no boats to take them home.

Intent on halting the reconquest after receiving word of the landing of Barradas, General Antonio López de Santa Anna sent armed soldiers in the middle of the night to the homes of wealthier Mexican families and foreign investors in Veracruz. Although the departing Spaniards had withdrawn the major capital from the economy and the national treasury was empty, Santa Anna’s
henchmen succeeded in making “forced loans” to finance an army. He appeared in Tampico with his ill-equipped and undisciplined troops and demanded a capitulation from the Spaniard. Barradas refused, but offered to pardon Santa Anna’s troops and make him “Duque de Tampico” if they joined him. Santa Anna asked for three days to think it over. It was time Barradas could not spare, but he agreed nonetheless. While waiting, the surgeons performed autopsies on some of Barradas’ dead soldiers and reported “la peste oriental.” Barradas also fell ill. They were running out of food, and more of his men succumbed to the fevers.

During their negotiations, on the evening of September 9, the war zone was struck by a hurricane, “la tempestad.” The devastation was horrific:

“En Pueblo Viejo, los soldados están refugiados en las azoteas. ‘Todo el país, hasta formar horizonte, es un mar.’ Flotan las chozas, el ganado, cadáveres.”

Cortados de su base, sin alimentos, enfermos, sin esperanza, el tiempo sólo los [los soldados españoles] hará capitular.

Pero un triunfo así no debe satisfacer a un soldado. Santa Anna lo es...
No le interesa que sea la peste que rinda a Barradas. Quiere ser él.

While Santa Anna was pondering Barradas’s offer, Mexican reinforcements arrived, bringing his troop strength to eight thousand. Barradas capitulated on September 11, 1829. All he could do was plead for an honorable surrender and medical attention, plus transportation away from the cursed tropics. His surviving troops sailed back to Cuba after promising never to return and bear arms against the Mexican Republic. “Mil setecientos no regresan. Metralla y peste. Bayoneta y plomo.” Muñoz described the joyful celebrations in the capital when the dispatch arrived announcing the capitulation, “melodramático y plagado de mentiras.”

Typically, Santa Anna claimed a great military victory and became the “hero of Tampico” instead of its Duke. It requires an adjustment of thought to consider as “biologically advantaged” the sallow, runty, pock-marked Santa Anna, often mocked for the
difficulty he experienced preventing his sword from dragging the ground. The Veracruz native was nonetheless immune to the invisible “bullets” that proliferated along the hot and humid Gulf coast and leveled the “reconquering” Spaniards.

Revisiting this incident today, one might be inclined to say that it was Santa Anna—not Barradas—who emulated Cortés, because it was Santa Anna who inherited the personal, political, and military spoils delivered by his invisible biological weapons. The European diseases brought by Cortés’s followers no longer influenced the outcome of colonial confrontations as soon as Spaniards and Mexicans alike had immunities to them, and the advantage shifted to the side of those who could tolerate the tropical biota, as well as the newer, more virulent Mexican strains of European diseases. Barradas was obviously devoted to the monarchy and to Ferdinand VII, but none of his men were immune to the African diseases that had taken up residence during the long colonial period. Practically speaking, Mexico had just one border to defend, the Gulf Coast, where the microbes stood invisible guard. And “la peste” of spring and summer was seconded by “la tempestad” in the autumn, and San Juan de Ulúa barred entry into the harbor in the winter. Spain eventually had no choice but to recognize Mexico’s independence. The Mexican people perceived that Santa Anna had been chosen by God, who sent both “la peste” and “la tempestad” to aid him in a holy cause, and the Spaniards, also Catholic, concurred that it was God’s will for Mexico to be independent.

The year following the defeat of Barradas, Mexico’s president, Vincente Guerrero, was unseated by his vice-president, General Anastasio Bustamante, who ruled for the next two years with a vigorous and efficient government. (His minister Lucas Alamán deserves most of the credit, however.) Crime was reduced, and roads were cleared of bandits. Customs house revenues, the sole source of government funding after the departure of the Spaniards, increased because smuggling was stamped out.

In view of the efficiency of the Bustamante administration, how did Santa Anna usurp his position? Biological opportunism. Santa Anna awaited the outcries against the reforms from those who had lost their privileges, then seized the customs houses at Veracruz and
personally pocketed the revenues. Bustamante sent government troops to Veracruz, but malaria defeated them. Emboldened by Santa Anna’s audacity, other states announced that they would no longer accept the dictates of Bustamante’s central government. Finally, when Presidente Bustamante resigned in disgust and sailed to England, Congress simply proclaimed Santa Anna president of the Republic and Gómez Farías vice-president.

Instead of journeying to the capital to be installed as president in 1833, Santa Anna retired to Manga de Clavo, his hacienda near Veracruz. He sent Farías to stand in for him at the inauguration, then act as provisional president. Gómez Farías, “a drum-beating anticlerical fanatic,” led the Congress to enact severe reform bills which dealt “sledge-hammer blows” to the clergy. The government assumed the right to make ecclesiastical appointments, instituted a secular branch of education, and permitted nuns and priests to retract their vows. Farías’s government also cut the pay, size, and privileges of the army. As the public outcry began to peak, a plague of cholera struck. The Mexican people reacted predictably: “An eerie silence fell over the capital, broken only by the tolling of church bells and the rumblings of death carts heaped high with corpses.” The superstitious said this was an anathema of God, punishing them for allowing Gómez Farías to attack the church.

Bored with cock-fights, bullfights, and banquets, Santa Anna finally returned to Mexico City to throw Farías out of office. At the clergy’s urging, he accepted the role of dictator, dismissed the Congress, repealed the anticlerical laws, returned the privileges to the army, sent liberals into hiding or exile, and settled down to enjoy the glory of life as the “Liberator of Mexico.”

When Mexico achieved its independence from Spain in 1821, recognition of this independence by various countries was strung out over a period of several decades. Part of Mexico did not view itself as liberated, however: the most northeasterly portion called Texas. Realizing the importance of having the land bordering the United States populated, Mexican officials permitted, indeed invited, various American-Indian tribes to settle in Texas, to create a human-buffer zone. The Congress realized as well that its best chances of permanently settling the remote and undesirable province would be to
grant land to *impresarios* bold enough to undertake colonization. This pattern was initiated in 1821 with a grant to Moses Austin, which was transferred to his son Stephen F. Austin when the father died unexpectedly.

Grants of free land attracted numerous colonists to Northeast Mexico. Speaking different languages, and though nominally Catholic as required by Mexican law, they held radically different beliefs about African slaves as well as about God's will for northeastern Mexico. The flood of Anglos brought an assortment of bacterial floras that had a similar impact on immunologically naive Indian populations as the contact with Europeans had had on earlier indigenous peoples who came into contact with Cortés's followers. However, many of the Indians in Texas had been reduced in numbers before being pushed out of Canada or the United States by Europeans and their American descendants. They were in epidemically advanced stages of survival, having immunities similar to Europeans. Examples of these small, immunologically advanced tribes included the Delawares and Cherokees, who generally refrained from meddling in the next stage of Texas and Mexican relations.

At first the "Texicans" supported the usurper Santa Anna during his showdown with President Bustamante, but they despised being administratively linked in 1824 with their neighbor into one province of "Texas y Coahuila," and they quickly opposed Santa Anna's customs houses and border patrols. After belligerent Texicans chased the Mexican troops out of East Texas, Santa Anna sent an army under his brother-in-law to the rebellious province. The Texicans intercepted them and drove them back across the Río Grande in December 1835. Then Santa Anna himself collected a motley army, primarily Indian conscripts, and marched them to Texas—many barefoot—across the frozen plains of Coahuila where the weakest froze to death in a blue norther and snowstorm. Santa Anna did not read a divine message into this uncontrollable circumstance, however.

In the famous showdown in the chapel of an abandoned mission in San Antonio, Santa Anna's army numbering in the thousands defeated easily fewer than two hundred Anglos on the thirteenth day of siege. Bancroft calls the Alamo slaughter a "childish display of vanity to make it appear that San Antonio de Bejar had been retaken
by force of arms with a heavy loss of life on both sides. Mexicans in vastly superior numbers were triumphant in Goliad as well. But in East Texas, at the Battle of San Jacinto, Santa Anna’s forces were only twice the size of the Texians’ army and, in 1836, he did not hold the biological advantages over these Anglos that he had held over the unfortunate Spanish army that landed in 1829. As Santa Anna took a siesta under a shade tree, a small force of highly motivated Texians attacked the Mexican army on April 21, 1836. Shouting “Remember the Alamo!” and “Remember Goliad!” the Texians slaughtered the Mexican army. When they captured Santa Anna the next day, the Texians were holding “el General Presidente,” that is the military dictator who was both the former President of Mexico and its current Commander-in-chief. This provided the pretext for extending the size of Texas to the Río Grande when “push came to shove” in 1847-48. Setting the Texas boundary was the immediate cause of the Mexican War.

General Sam Houston, fulfilling one of the terms of the Treaty of Velasco, released Santa Anna to return to Mexico in the autumn of 1836 to substantiate the Mexican army’s defeat. Santa Anna swore to persuade the Mexican congress to receive the Texas envoy Barnard Bee and arrange to recognize the independence of the former province, which henceforth called itself the Republic of Texas. Instead, after Santa Anna journeyed to Washington to consult with President Jackson, he returned to a Mexican congress which repudiated the fallen hero, who then skulked off to Manga de Clavo to nurse his wounded pride. In March 1836 during Santa Anna’s absence, the president of Mexico (Barragan) had died of “la peste,” and Bustamante returned. In December of that year Spain recognized Mexico’s independence while the Mexican congress ignored the Texan claim to victory and independence, and began to discuss retaliation instead. Mexico’s European ally, England, endorsed this position. France, England’s perpetual foe, opposed Mexico’s course.

In April 1838 Louis-Philippe, King of the French, wished to aid the Texan quest for recognition, but he did not want a war with England or Mexico, which the United States would join by virtue of its Monroe Doctrine. The indirect assistance he offered was to dispatch a squadron to Veracruz to impose a naval blockade on the
Mexican customs houses in the Gulf of Mexico under the pretext of an accumulation of French claims against Mexico. One of those claims dated back to 1828 (four regimes prior to the one in power) when, during a political riot, two Mexican soldiers invaded a French pastry shop, tied up the chef in the back room, and consumed all of his inventory. Bemused by the resulting claim for eighty thousand francs from the loss of pastries on the list of grievances delivered by the country that had so terrorized them during Napoleon’s reign, the Mexicans began to call France’s reparations demands “the pastry claims.” But because the entire federal income derived from the customs collected on foreign imports, the Mexican government felt the economic pinch of France’s blockade immediately.

Yet there was relatively little concern over the siege or the threat of war. Because the French arrived in April, the Mexicans must have thought God’s timing was perfect. They expected “la peste” to devastate the French troops in their harbor during the summer. The Mexicans assumed that those who remained by autumn, or any reinforcements that might join them, would probably fall to the second line of defense: “la tempestad.” Having faith in their impregnable fortress, the Mexicans ignored their uninvited visitors and began to reinforce San Juan de Ulúa...and to stall the negotiations.

“La peste y la tempestad” indeed reduced the French navy by half during the summer. Reinforcements arrived in October: fresh troops with more powerful artillery, and a new commander with expanded authority. In November Rear Admiral Charles Baudin bombarded San Juan de Ulúa. In one day, the French leveled the so-called impregnable fortress, the Gibraltar of America. Although Mexican officials had been ignoring Santa Anna and excluding the disgraced general from negotiations with the French, when he heard the booming of canons from his villa as the French bombarded San Juan de Ulúa, Santa Anna rushed to the harbor to offer his services. When Bustamante permitted him to make an inspection, he wormed his way into the Franco-Mexican negotiations, much to the displeasure of Baudin. At 4:00 A.M. on December 3 the French invaded Veracruz hoping to capture Santa Anna, but captured General (and future president) Arista, instead, much to the disappointment of Prince
Joinville, who exclaimed that Santa Anna had missed the opportunity to be educated in Paris.\textsuperscript{31}

Santa Anna had slipped off into the early morning fog in his nightshirt, but returned just as the French were boarding their ships. Unsheathing his sword, he ran out onto the dock, madly waving the sword in the air. The French responded to this operatic gesture with a charge of grape shot, wounding the unfortunate Santa Anna. His left leg had to be amputated. Perhaps it was not unfortunate, however, because the incident abruptly changed the tide of his (un)popularity. As Santa Anna lay wounded, he dictated his account of “driving the foe into the sea.”

Tuve la gloria de rechazar la invasión, no obstante la sorpresa que lograron, precisándoles a reembarcarse a la bayoneta.... Vencimos, sí, vencimos.... probablemente seá la última victoria que ofrezca a mi Patria... Yo muero lleno de placer, porque la Divina Providencia me ha concedido consagrarle toda mi sangre.\textsuperscript{32}

The Mexican people instantly forgot about the San Jacinto “incident” and Santa Anna returned to Manga de Clavo, dragging his dismembered leg along as a trophy of war.\textsuperscript{33}

Whereas the first half of his career and his rise to power can be explained by invisible biological support, the next stage of Santa Anna’s career was driven by the sympathy the Mexican people felt for the man who sacrificed his leg for Mexico. Mares describes the onerous loss of the leg, which brought Mexico fifteen more years of Santa Anna’s rule: “El artillero de Baudin ignoraba ser el autor de uno de los disparos más costosos de la historia de México, casi tan oneroso como la siesta de San Jacinto.”\textsuperscript{34}

In March 1839 Mexico acceded to France’s original demands for reparations, and Baudin towed behind his frigate, as his trophies of war, the remains of the Mexican fleet when he headed for Galveston. He was received as a hero by the Republic of Texas and became an honorary citizen of Galveston before a brief stopover at Pensacola, where his reception was far cooler, amounting to something like a rebuff. In December 1839 France, which would be the last country to recognize Mexico’s independence, became the first European power
to recognize the Republic of Texas with a treaty of amity and commerce. Other countries quickly followed France's lead.

The July monarchy of Louis-Philippe remained loyal to the Republic of Texas during its nine years of tenuous existence from 1836 to 1845, when Texas voted to join the United States. Citizens of the Republic recognized the importance of the Pastry War in helping maintain its independence.

By engaging the military and depriving Mexico of import duties, its principal source of revenue, France impeded Mexico's attempts to reconquer its rebellious northeastern province, Texas, and avenge the Mexican defeat at the Battle of San Jacinto. In May 1839 Admiral Baudin visited Texas where he was received enthusiastically. His report on the commercial and military potential of the Republic of Texas and the brave and industrious Texians contributed to France's decision to recognize the Republic.35

In December 1845 Texans voted to join the Union. The Republic of Texas was no more. Statehood was accorded in 1846.

EPILOGUE

Forty years after the Pastry War, France had to contend with its own "peste," the phyloxera, an invisible pest which threatened to annihilate the vineyards. Texans were able to reciprocate the assistance extended by France during the years of their Republic. Between 1876 and 1878, François Guilbeau, Jr., a Franco-Texan who had served for a time as French consul in San Antonio, shipped several hundred tons of clippings of disease-resistant wild mustang grapes from San Antonio to his native land. Grafted to the ailing French grapevines, these clippings saved the French wine industry—one last example of biological opportunism!

Notes

I would like to thank Linda Paulson for numerous helpful suggestions for this article.

'Barradas was born in the Canaries and died in New Orleans. (Dates unknown.) According to the Enciclopedia universal ilustrada europeo-americana, his name gave rise to the pun "las
esperanzas de España están en Barradas,” that is, “embarradas.” “The hopes of Spain are [in Barradas/foiled].” All translations in this paper are my own.

1 I do not intend to discount those readers who choose to see microbiology as the implement of divine intervention, but to demonstrate that microorganisms determined the military results.


5 McNeill (p. 211) summarizes the importance of these two diseases: “Both of them became important in determining human patterns of settlement and survival in tropical and subtropical parts of the New World.”


8 Other unfamiliar infections, particularly gastrointestinal infections, led to a high mortality among slaves, according to McNeill, 215. This will not surprise tourists from the U.S. who have crossed the border into Mexico, only to be struck by diarrhea, which informally is called “Montezuma’s revenge.”

9 The dates are elusive. Various laws were passed and not promulgated, withdrawn, or not enforced, etc. Distinctions were made between bringing previously-owned slaves into Mexico and importing slaves to sell. Were Amerindians the same as Africans? When were they emancipated? Mexico eventually installed a peonage system of de facto slave labor which some say exists today in regions like Chiapas.

10 Padre Hidalgo’s “Grito de Dolores” of December 16, 1810, does not actually use the word “independence,” although it initiated the bloody revolutionary wars leading to Mexican independence.


12 San Juan de Ulla is the fort protecting the harbor of Veracruz, the city founded by Cortés by which he laid claim to Mexico. Their survival gave the fort a reputation of being impregnable.

13 So protected in fact that their defense strategy against the French in the Pastry War (1839) was “San Juan de Ulla, la peste y la tempestad.”

14 Conquistadores conquered the New World after Columbus. Reconquistadores, ironically, preceded them. They reconquered Spain from the Muslims who occupied “their” land between 711 and 1212. Both sides thought they were fighting holy wars. The reconquistadores reclaimed Spain for the Christian king.
"One of Barradas’ ships, lost in a storm, was wrecked on the coast of Louisiana. The survivors headed for New Orleans to find transportation to Cuba or Spain. Fifty deaths a day were reported at the end of the summer from “fevers” caught from the fleeing Spaniards. This suggests that they were infected on board ship. “Since death from yellow fever was the usual outcome when a European met the infection as an adult, few sailors had any immunity to the disease.” (McNeill, 214)

17 Rafael F. Muñoz, Antonio López de Santa Anna (Zacatecas, Mexico, 1997), 88. Translation: In Old Town, the soldiers took refuge on the rooftops. The entire country, as far as the eye could see, was a sea. Shanties, cattle, and corpses were floating.

18 ibid. Translation: Cut off from their base camp without supplies, sick and without hope, time alone would have made the Spanish soldiers capitulate. But a victory like that would not be able to satisfy a soldier. Santa Anna is one... He would not be interested in having the plague conquer Barradas. He wanted it to be him.


20 Translation: melodramatic and plagued with lies

21 On January 3, 1833, the “Hero of Tampico” was promoted to “Liberator of the Republic” and “Conqueror of the Spaniards” by the new congress which elected him president on March 30, 1833. Leslie Byrd Simpson, Many Mexicoos (Berkley, LA, 1971), 238.

22 Vícentequi Guerrero was weak in this political position, for which he was unqualified, but he is one of the outstanding figures in the creation of modern Mexico for heroically taking up the mantle (or frock) of Father José Morelos in 1815. (Morelos took over the independence movement when Hidalgo was assassinated, and actually published a declaration of independence.) Guerrero held out for independence in the Mixteca hills surrounding Oaxaca either alone or with a small band of guerrillas for six years. He aroused the admiration of Victor Hugo and other Romantic era writers. Unlike Lord Byron, who gave his life for Greek independence, Guerrero saw his vision to a successful conclusion.

23 Anastasio Bustamante (1780-1853) should not be confused with Carlos Maria Bustamante (1774-1848), who was also a soldier and politician, but more importantly a passionate collector and publisher of historical materials. Bustamante’s collection eventually through divestments and purchases came into the hands of Hubert Howe Bancroft, who describes the man and his collection in detail. Bancroft, History of Mexico (San Francisco, 1885), vol. 5, 1824-1861, 802-806.

24 McHenry, A Short History of Mexico, 104.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., 105.

27 Anglo residents of Texas, while Texas was a Mexican province, were “Texicans.” They became “Texians” as revolutionaries, before becoming “Texans,” as residents of the Republic and thereafter. Hispanic residents were called “Tejanos.” During the Mexican War (1848) which resulted from Texas statehood, the Anglo soldiers sang a popular song beginning “Green grows
the mountain..." Mishearing this phrase, the Mexicans began to call the pale soldiers "gringos." The appellation and the negativity persist.

Among the handful of sympathizers who died together at the Alamo was Jim Bowie, second in command. His Mexican wife, Ursula Beramendi, and their child had died in the cholera epidemic of 1833. She was the daughter of the former governor of the combined province Coahuila y Texas, so detested by the Anglos. The well known illness of William B. Travis, commander of the troops at the Alamo, was not related to the climate. Long attributes his death to syphilis—the disease whose origin is the most disputed among "Columbian exchange" scholars today.

Bancroft, History of Mexico, 168-69.

To further the misery of the French troops that summer, the Mexicans did not permit them to debark for water or provisions, which had to be ferried from Havana. We now know the dangers lurking in the mosquitoes that no doubt accompanied the water casks.

The young son of Louis-Philippe accompanied Baudin for several reasons, including his need for military action. However Mexican historians generally blame the French attacks entirely on his presence: "Francia jugaba a la guerra con un país inerme, como si sólo pretendiera facilitar al aprendizaje del hijo del rey Luis Felipe, el Príncipe de Joinville. José Fuentes Mares, Santa Anna: Aurora y Ocaso de un Comediante (Mexico City, 1959), 158. Translation: France was playing war with a defenseless country as if it intended only to facilitate the apprenticeship of King Louis-Philippe’s son, Prince Joinville.

Ibid., 163. Translation: I had the glory of stemming the invasion, in spite of the surprise that they pulled, of driving them to sea at bayonet point... We conquered, yes, we conquered them.... It will probably be the last victory that I offer to my homeland. I die full of pleasure because Divine Providence has permitted me to consecrate all with my blood.

Santa Anna’s leg became a theme in popular culture. It was first buried with highest military honors. When the general could not meet the army’s payroll, the disgruntled troops disinterred the leg and paraded it abusively through the streets of Mexico City. He had three or four artificial legs. In the US a song called “Santa Anna’s Leg” was quite popular. Among the numerous authors who discuss the leg, James Michener is one of the most dramatic when he describes penniless Santa Anna at eighty-two, with “four differently clad wooden legs hanging from a rack” in his two-room apartment. James Michener, The Eagle and the Raven (Austin, TX, 1990), 192.

Mares, Santa Anna, 161. Translation: Baudin’s artillery man did not know he was the author of one of the most costly losses of Mexican history, almost as onerous as the siesta at San Jacinto [when Texas was lost].


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A Sesquicentennial View of the Florida and Texas Frontier Constitutions

Stephanie D. Moussalli

In 1845, a century and a half ago, Florida and Texas entered the Union. They had both applied for admission in the late 1830s, but the United States Congress had rejected both applications. After years of acrimonious debate, however, and with serious qualms remaining in many parts of the nation, Congress finally voted for an enormous extension of the Union on the southern frontier by creating the states of Florida and Texas. The coincidence of time and place created many similarities in the experiences and beliefs of Floridians and Texans. Their first state constitutions enshrine many of those similarities, from ideas about basic governmental structure to means of handling major controversies over banks, land, and slavery.

A sesquicentennial look at the two constitutions certainly highlights the founders' preoccupation with property conflicts. In Florida banking was the "great moving lever" of the convention, involving the taxpayers' potential and retrospective liability for slaveholders' farming debts, as well as major questions about the inviolability of contracts. In Texas, where "the words 'land' and 'fraud' were almost synonymous," roughly a quarter of the delegates' debates involved which claims to protect and how to do it. At both conventions, a strong undercurrent of conflict pitted slave owners against everyone else in apportioning legislative representation.

However, the focus of this paper is on how the Florida and Texas founding fathers checked and balanced relations between and within the legislative and executive branches of their new state governments. These were less dramatic problems than the property controversies of the time, but the arguments they involved have proved to be the more enduring constitutional issues. In designing the lawmaking and gubernatorial branches for their two nascent states, the
Florida and Texas conventions responded to similar nineteenth-century constitutional trends, but with differences in details springing from their specific pre-statehood experiences.

Although both states’ constitutions were implemented in 1845, they were not actually written at the same time. Florida’s constitutional convention had met in the winter of 1838-39. The delegates finished their work in just five and a half weeks by relying heavily on the models provided by the constitutions of the older states, especially Alabama’s 1819 document. The new state was admitted, then, under a six-year-old, mildly anachronistic constitution.

The first Texas constitution, on the other hand, was for the Republic of Texas, and it had to be produced in the middle of the war for independence. The delegates worked at the speed of light for two and a half weeks in March of 1836, with one eye on the immediate requirements for a national government and the other on their eagerly anticipated status as a state in the American union. The document they produced so hastily was basically the generic state constitution of the 1830s, with “president” and “congress” substituted for “governor” and “assembly.” They tacked on a list of the powers of Congress based on the U.S. Constitution’s enumerated powers, but did not create a national-and-state federalist structure for the infant and temporary nation. Nine years later, the second constitutional convention of Texas had not only the models of other states to draw from (especially Louisiana’s 1845 revised document) in writing its first state constitution, but also experience with its own earlier government design.

Happily for their interested descendants today, the founding fathers of both states provided more records of their proceedings than was the custom on the antebellum frontier. Where many other constitutional conventions simply commissioned formal journals of recorded votes, proposed provisions and final decisions made in full session, the Texas and Florida conventions arranged for some records of their debates to be kept, including some of the debates in committees of the whole. In Florida these records consisted of
whatever interested the reporters of the *St. Joseph Times* and the *Floridian* enough to print in their newspapers. In Texas the records are more complete. On the eighth day the convention hired William F. Weeks to report its debates. Weeks did an excellent job; his *Debates of the Texas Convention* runs 759 pages and is the best primary source available for southern frontier opinions about government structure in the antebellum period.

In basic design the Florida and Texas constitutions closely followed the constitutional trends of the 1830s and 1840s. Each created three branches of government, each had a bill of rights, and each extended the franchise to non-property owners. Eighteenth-century constitutions did not contain all these features, but most states had adopted them by the time Florida’s convention met.

The Florida and Texas conventions also created bicameral legislatures, a feature that was still not entirely taken for granted in the early 1800s. For seventeen years before its convention, the territory of Florida had had a unicameral legislative council, the creation of Congress. The experience had not been a happy one and in the decade before the convention both newspaper editorials and the council itself had frequently urged Congress to allow a second chamber.

Included among the “evils” of unicameralism, according to one territorial resolution, were “[r]ashness and imprudence of legislation, endless change of statutory law, general confusion and chaos of the law, and perpetual fluctuation of the public policy.” A Jackson County grand jury complained that “not only the common citizen, but those learned in the science, cannot determine what the law is.” They caused Judge Henry Brackenridge’s charge to them to be printed publicly:

> The whole body of the law criminal as well as civil, not even excepting the fundamental act which adopted the common and statute law of England, has since been repeatedly repealed, and re-enacted, and partial alterations have been made.... The criminal law, which of all others
ought to have been fixed, has been marked by the same mutable character. Every succeeding year presented us with a new code, which was repealed before the people had time to become acquainted with it; reminding one of the web of Penelope, who undid at night, what she had woven in the day time.\textsuperscript{14}

The remedy to this problem had long been known in America. As Noah Webster had put it a half century earlier in arguing for the proposed bicameral Congress, it lies in “dividing the powers of legislation between two bodies of men, whose debates shall be separate and not dependent on each other.”\textsuperscript{15} In fact Congress had finally granted Florida such a division in 1838, but the first bicameral body had not yet met when the convention was at work. Nevertheless the elections had been held in October, and six of the convention delegates had also been elected to the new two-chambered assembly.\textsuperscript{16}

Thus Florida’s founders were more familiar with unicameralism than were those of Texas and they unanimously rejected it. However, they were simultaneously less familiar with bicameralism, and perhaps that is why they modified it. Texas followed the widespread custom of differentiating the two chambers in a number of ways. Senators represented larger districts and served longer terms than did members of the House. Texas senators had to be at least thirty years old, while House members had to be only as old as voters-twenty-one. The privilege of originating revenue bills was reserved to the House, as the more direct representative of the people.\textsuperscript{17}

The Florida delegates, working from similar provisions in the Alabama constitution, retained the difference in district size but reduced Alabama’s differences in term length and minimum age between the two chambers. Florida’s senators served for two years instead of three, as in Alabama, and they only had to be twenty-five years old, instead of Alabama’s twenty-seven. The Floridians also allowed either chamber to originate any bill, including revenue bills.\textsuperscript{18} They did not differentiate the two houses of their assembly as much
as was customary, although the convention records show that they considered doing so.\textsuperscript{19}

Perhaps the Florida delegates made these changes out of ignorance of the nuances of a bicameral procedure. On the other hand, perhaps they concluded consciously that the essence of the system was the two-step deliberative process. If so, its benefits would accrue without the detailed structural distinctions between the two chambers. After all most of the recently-admitted states had already dropped the U.S. Constitution's strictly geographical apportionment of senators in favor of an apportionment at least partly based on population, i.e., similar to the apportionment for their lower chambers. If such a crucial distinction could be abandoned by the older states, why not details of age, tenure, and procedural precedence?

Turning to the executive branch, both Florida and Texas provided for the people to elect their governors directly.\textsuperscript{20} Far from being unusual in this respect, the two states were simply following the universal practice of every state admitted to the Union after the original thirteen.\textsuperscript{21} Most of the original states' constitutions had not entrusted the people with this task, but as the turn of the century approached and then passed, popular elections became more common.\textsuperscript{22} A few of the old states clung to legislative election still on the eve of the Civil War, usually on the grounds that popular contests would inflame partisan passions.\textsuperscript{23}

It was the Westerners in the old states who pushed for popular election, just as it was the new frontier states which most completely accepted this move to democratization. Neither in Florida nor in Texas is there any record that the conventions considered non-popular selection methods for the governor. However, they did consider a modified version of direct elections, which would have given a significant role to the legislature.

In Texas the original draft of the executive article provided that the candidate with the most votes, even if less than a majority, would be governor. In the case of a tie, presumably a rare event, the legislature would select the winner.\textsuperscript{24} On July 31, Austin delegate
Oliver Jones suggested that the legislature should step in not only in
tied elections, but whenever the popular vote yielded no majority
winner. Otherwise, he pointed out, "one fifth or one tenth, of the
electors of the state, may elect a Governor...." Jones believed that
often no candidate would receive a majority. His proposal would
therefore reduce the popular vote to little more than a primary
election. The people would essentially nominate candidates for the
consideration of the legislature. In those original states which did
allow popular elections for the governor, this was a common means
of muting the democratic voice. On the Texas frontier in 1845,
though, Jones's proposal was rejected without any debate or even a
roll call vote. His colleagues kept the original plan in the final
constitution: only in case of a tie between the front runners would an
election be thrown into the legislature.

The final Florida constitution contained the same provision.
Originally, the executive committee had proposed the less democratic
version—that is, giving the legislature every election which had no
majority winner—in the initial draft. The chairman of the committee
was former territorial governor William P. Duval. Duval was also the
head of one of the two factions whose dispute over banking
completely dominated the Florida convention, and he had powerful
enemies. When fellow delegate and militia general Leigh Read
suggested dropping the legislature's electoral role except in cases of
tied popular votes, a major debate ensued. Few spoke in favor of the
original draft version. In fact the widely respected convention
president, Robert Raymond Reid, urged the delegates to eliminate the
legislature's role altogether and provide for a popular run off election
in case of a lack of a majority. Several important delegates supported
this measure, but the majority apparently agreed with George Ward
that "frequent elections were to be avoided as they tended to
agitation, party spirit, and excitement." Alfred Woodward put it more
colorfully:
Sir, what good purpose will you achieve by sending an election back upon the people at a moment when the blood is hot—the political chaldron boiling over and reason running wild upon the billows of passion! Better far to refer the subject to the representatives of the people, who have taken their seats, under the high sanction of an oath, calm and collected, and in a fit mood to do justice to the people.32

"Vox populi, vox dei," retorted President Reid, adding that storms often "purify and sweeten the air," but his colleagues rejected his proposal, presumably for being too democratic. They also rejected Duval’s version, probably for being too undemocratic, and ended with the tie-vote-legislative-election combination.33

Florida and Texas also conformed to the nineteenth-century trend of creating a relatively strong executive branch. This fits in with the early nineteenth-century movement described by Fletcher Green for the south Atlantic states, and with the Jacksonian movement described by Albert Sturm for the whole nation, towards greater gubernatorial power. In contrast the Revolutionary War generation’s experiences with tyrannical colonial executives had led them to create almost powerless governorships in the first state constitutions. Pennsylvania even dispensed with a governor altogether, substituting a weak twelve-man executive council, and the original national government under the Articles of Confederation had no executive branch at all.34

As the eighteenth century drew to an end most Americans began to feel the need for a stronger executive to balance a sometimes reckless legislative branch. Just as the new federal Constitution created a powerful presidency, new and revised state constitutions created progressively stronger governorships. The trend accelerated in the Jacksonian period. Like most frontier states, Florida and Texas easily accepted the change. At the Florida convention, Calhoun County voters elected the controversial former governor William Pope Duval to represent them, and convention president Robert Raymond Reid then appointed him to head the executive committee, even though Duval had very nearly beaten Reid for the convention presidency.35 Similarly, Montgomery County voters chose former president Sam
Houston as their delegate to the Texas convention, apparently unconcerned that he might dominate the proceedings to the detriment of Texas’s future.\textsuperscript{36}

This is not to say that either the Florida or the Texas founders regarded the governorship with a lenient eye. On the contrary, they had many examples of past and present trouble to teach them caution. Florida’s former governor Duval, for instance, led the pro-bank faction at the convention. The opposing faction largely controlled the proceedings and this group was led by James D. Westcott, formerly territorial secretary and acting governor. The battles between these two titans rocked the Florida convention and affected numerous elements in the new state’s constitution.\textsuperscript{37} As for Texas, Sam Houston had wielded a very busy veto pen whenever he was president. Furthermore, Anson Jones, the president of the Republic during the convention, was widely suspected of having been anti-annexation, a position many Texans in 1845 regarded as quasi-treasonous. A number of the most powerful delegates at the convention, including its president, Thomas Rusk, attempted to remove Jones from power and install a provisional government during the convention although they failed to win a majority of the votes for their idea.\textsuperscript{38} Floridian and Texan founders faced with these personalities could not give free rein to future executive passions. The problem was to find the right balance between gubernatorial power and checks on that power.

Almost every Revolutionary era state had severely hobbled its governor by strictly limiting his patronage powers and forcing him to share power with an executive council. As Jacksonian era states, Florida and Texas dropped both these limitations, but Texas went farther than Florida. Where Florida gave the executive only a few militia officer appointments and the residual power of filling seats vacated during the assembly’s recess, Texas allowed its governor, with the consent of the senate, to appoint everybody from notaries public, to superior and district court judges, to the attorney general and secretary of state. In fact Florida even retained a shadow of the diluted executive council concept by giving the choice of high-level
executive officials to the assembly. The senate and house of representatives were to jointly elect the attorney general, the state treasurer, and the secretary of state.\textsuperscript{39}

Actually the original draft of the Texas executive article had given the power to choose the secretary of state to the voters, not to the governor. This was in contrast to the Republic’s 1836 constitution which had given the president that power. The committee’s proposal to change the selection method caused an uproar. Delegate H. G. Runnels moved to amend the executive committee’s draft and give the appointment power back to the governor.\textsuperscript{40}

In vehement defense of his committee’s version, delegate John Lewis argued that a secretary of state needs the independence conferred by popular election. If the governor appointed him, then the governor would have a cabinet “over whom he may exercise absolute control.” “To invest the Governor of this State with a patronage of that sort,” continued Lewis, “would be to give him altogether too much power.” “[N]ine times out of ten,” agreed committee chairman James Davis, an appointed secretary “would be a mere tool.”\textsuperscript{41}

In response Abner Lipscomb, one of the oldest members of the convention, pointed out how closely a secretary of state and governor must work together and urged the advantages of harmony between them. James Love, an ex-Federalist, argued for the professionalism of an appointed officer as a means of compensating for the rough diamonds likely to be thrown into the governor’s chair by democratic elections. Convention president Thomas Rusk deplored the idea of having campaigns for every office.\textsuperscript{42}

The undercurrent of anti-democratic reasoning in the arguments for appointment sparked the hottest exchanges in this debate. In a day when even ex-Federalist James Love prefaced his speeches with lines like “It is an admitted fact, I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we are all lovers of the people,” the defenders of popular election for the secretary of state had a mighty weapon to wield against their opponents, and they used it. “Is there a man here,” challenged James Davis, “who will rise in his place and say that the people are not
qualified to elect the Secretary of State...? [U]ltimately [we shall say] that they are not qualified to do anything whatever.” “I have more confidence in the character and intelligence of the people,” John Lewis taunted his opponents.43

A host of the other members, elected delegates all, hurriedly declared their own equally profound faith in government by the masses, but insisted the ideal “has nothing to do with the selection of officers for particular situations” in Love’s words. “I am as dear a lover of the people as those who have so particularly insisted upon placing all power in their hands,” asserted former Secretary of State James Mayfield, although “I always have believed that I love them much better than they love me....” But an appointed position would “be taking nothing from the people,” since they would be electing a governor “with that provision in view.” On the other hand an elected secretary would render the governor “manacled” and “powerless to do good.” If the people trust a man enough to make him governor, added Love, they can certainly trust him enough to choose the man “whom he is to consult and advise with as a friend.”44

In an effort to remind more vividly his colleagues of the esteem they should demonstrate for their constituents, the executive committee chairman James Davis made a tactical error:

I know that in many governments the people are incapable of self government, for example, in the government upon our western border. But what is the reason? The want of intelligence, of education, and of virtue. It is not the case with the Anglo Saxon race, that is, the American branch of the Anglo Saxon race. The people of that race have shown their capacity for self government. 45

Unfortunately for Davis the sole member of his committee who had preferred to keep the position appointive was José Antonio Navarro, the only native Mexican-Texan at the convention. Navarro had signed Texas’ Declaration of Independence and helped Sam Houston write the first constitution. He was a hero in the hostilities against Mexico,
a recently escaped prisoner of war, and a highly respected member of the convention.\footnote{46}

Rising to remind the floor that he had so far been silent about his opposition to the committee’s draft, Navarro said through an interpreter that “[t]he want of intelligence of the Mexican people had been thrown into his face. He was very much grieved at these remarks” and he had determined to vote for the appointive method “in consequence of the fact, that the people of the United States, the very people pointed out as excelling in sense and intelligence, conform to the antiquated system of the stupid people of Mexico, in authorizing the President of the U. States to appoint his ministers or the members of his cabinet.”\footnote{47}

The nail in the democratic coffin came with the testimony of delegates familiar with the Mississippi experience of electing the secretary of state. In force since 1832, it was “the most reprehensible notion of that most reprehensible government,” according to the editor of the Texas National Register. A bad case of “ultraism,” agreed a contributor to the Picayune. H. G. Runnels, James Scott, and Isaac Van Zandt all asserted that the Mississippi experiment had been unsuccessful. It caused candidates to spend more on their campaigns than they received in salary, resulting in quietly competent men being ignored. In the end the convention decided without even a roll call vote to let the governor choose his own secretary.\footnote{48}

Just as Texas went farther than Florida along the road of increasing executive power through patronage, so the Texas founders also gave their governor a stronger veto power than did the Floridians. The Texas constitution required the legislature to muster two-thirds majorities in both chambers to override a gubernatorial veto. The Florida document only required simple majorities in both chambers for this.\footnote{49}

Of course to the Revolutionary generation any sort of executive veto was just a tool for recreating colonial tyranny, so thirteen of the fourteen state constitutions written during the first years of the Revolution provided no executive veto power at all.\footnote{50} By the
nineteenth century political opinion held that an assembly’s legislative power should be checked by another arm of the government, and most new states put an executive veto into their first constitutions. On the other hand many of the older states were slow to follow suit, and many of the vetoes that were created were the weak majority-override versions. Only gradually during the antebellum years did the strong gubernatorial veto become commonplace.

Florida’s founders, relying heavily on Alabama’s 1819 constitution, approved a weak veto. Not only the final constitution, but also the original draft of the executive article, allowed the legislature to override a governor’s disapproval by simple majority. By contrast the Texas founders chose the strong veto option, but only after passionate debate. Their own national constitution had given their presidents the strong veto, but the convention’s executive committee was very concerned about gubernatorial tyranny, and its draft of the executive article created only a weak majority-override version.

When the full Texas convention began considering that section of the executive article, William Young immediately moved to amend the override to a two-thirds requirement. Those in favor of this strong veto power supported it on both procedural and partisan grounds. Procedurally, as Francis Moore argued and speaker after speaker agreed, a real veto threat was needed “as a check to rash, improvident and indiscreet legislation.” Moore did not support the effort to remove President Jones from office during the convention. Thus, his willingness to block executive tyranny may have been suspect in some delegates’ eyes. However, convention president Thomas Rusk, a leader of the movement to oust Jones, also supported the two-thirds override requirement. He stated Moore’s position even more forcefully:

The object of this provision is to prevent hasty legislation. The fact is notorious, that one of the greatest evils of a democracy or republican government, is legislating too much. The people are governed too much; there are too many laws.
Partisanship ran very heavily through the Austin convention. Andrew Jackson’s support for annexation and close ties to Sam Houston’s faction in Texas politics had made it almost impossible for any delegate with Whiggish tendencies to publicly admit his affiliation. As John Hemphill, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and Washington County delegate, put it:

Had this [veto] power not existed [in the United States], the system of internal improvement would now have been fastened down upon the country; the land would have been filled with banks, and the party in power would have been for banks instead of the party in the opposition.  

In a convention which was preparing to abolish banking altogether, the wisdom of the American president’s vetoes outweighed the folly of the Texan president’s vetoes. Moore, for example, admitted that President Jones’s motives for some vetoes “may have been bad, very bad,” but insisted that he may still have been acting for the public good in his own eyes. In any event as Isaac Van Zandt, the former minister to the United States, pointed out, “restriction of the veto power is now a favorite principle of the Whig party.” This alone was reason enough to oppose it in many Texans’ eyes.  

“Where do you find the opposition to the veto power? Not in the democracy; but in the party now opposed to democratic principles,” declared Moore, thus stinging the supporters of the weak veto in their most cherished spot. A. C. Horton hopped up to declare that “[h]e came here determined not to be out-democrated by any gentleman in this Convention.” He added that “[h]e had thought heretofore that the principles of the democratic party would be best secured by permitting the majority to govern.” He asked Moore to “elucidate the doctrines of the democratic party” which required “that the minority have to rule.” A difficult point for the other side to answer, and one further pressed by R. E. B. Baylor, who pointed out that some executives with strong veto powers openly “considered
themselves as constituting one-third of the legislative power of the country."{57}

Such arguments were persuasive to Florida's founding fathers, even though the nascent democratic party, a radically anti-banking group, dominated their convention, and Andrew Jackson himself had been their first American governor.\(^5\) Thus Florida's governors were denied the strong veto.

In Texas too many influential delegates opposed the weak veto for it to prevail. Convention president Rusk refuted the majoritarian argument by reminding the other side that they were designing a republic, not a democracy. He noted that the legislators each represented "the voters of the different counties," not majorities of all the people. More fundamentally, as James Mayfield, the former Secretary of State, argued, "each of the departments [of government] should have a check or control over the licentiousness of the others." "[T]he only way to disarm [power], and free it from a dangerous tendency," agreed Isaac Van Zandt, "is to divide it." Finally the convention adopted the strong veto without even a roll call vote.\(^5\)

A key element of executive branch design is the governor's length of tenure in office. Here both Florida and Texas simultaneously augmented and diminished executive power. Compared to the earliest state constitutions they both lengthened the governor's tenure. In the ferociously suspicious early years of the Revolution, almost every state had given its governor just a one-year term. The first state to institute the four-year term was on the frontier—Kentucky in 1792—but the custom spread only gradually. On the eve of the Civil War only a third of the states had it, and it was not accepted by a majority of states until the eve of World War II. As executive terms slowly lengthened in the antebellum period, the states adopted the check of term limits instead. Half of the new states entering the Union between the Revolution and the Civil War restricted the re-eligibility of their governors.\(^6\)

Florida and Texas chose to balance the tenure and term limits features differently. The former had a long term but strict re-eligibility
limits, while the latter had a shorter term with milder re-eligibility restrictions:

The Florida document provided that “the governor shall be elected for four years, ...and shall not be eligible to reelection until the expiration of four years thereafter.”

In Texas the formula was: “The governor shall hold his office for the term of two years..., but shall not be eligible for more than four years in any term of six years.”

Actually both conventions reversed the proposals of their executive committees. The Florida committee, chaired by ex-Governor William Pope Duval, had proposed a three-year term with a maximum of six years out of nine—that is, one immediate re-election was allowed. Duval had served as the Territory’s appointed governor for a very long twelve-year term, but he had left office under a cloud of fiscal scandal and suspected embezzlement. His many enemies in the anti-bank faction at the constitutional convention very likely considered this history when they voted to block his proposal to allow gubernatorial reelection.

The Texas committee proposed that the governor serve four years but no possibility of reelection until he had been out of office for another four years. It was H. G. Runnels who moved that the Austin convention reduce the governor’s term to two years, arguing that this “was ample time.” John Lewis pointed out that with the biennial legislative sessions then being planned, the governor “comes into office; he presides over one session, without any previous influence over the policy of the country, and he goes out without doing anything, without any impress of character upon his administration.... You had perhaps as well have no Executive at all.” Runnels reminded Lewis of the principle of separation of powers and denied that the governor “should influence the action of the Legislature in any manner whatsoever.” Lewis responded with the example of the success
of De Witt Clinton’s Erie Canal, opposed by New York’s leaders, but completed because of Clinton’s relatively long time in office. Runnells retorted that the people should have the opportunity to put a stop to a governor’s plans if they were unwise, but he lost the vote that day. However, the support for the four-year period was soft; even the chairman of the executive committee, James Davis, admitted he was wavering. Two weeks later the convention voted again on the question. By a majority of 32 to 21, it reduced the governor’s term to two years.\(^64\)

The Texas convention did ease the re-eligibility limits proposed in the original draft. This may have been a reaction to the Republic’s constitutional prohibition on a president’s succeeding himself, which had resulted in Sam Houston’s stepping aside after each of his terms in office.\(^65\) The presidential door was thus opened to Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar in 1838. Pursuing an imperial dream, he had immediately set out to win a republican empire stretching to the Pacific Ocean. He drove the warlike Comanches west and the peaceful Cherokees north and east, he invaded Mexico with a disastrous expedition to Santa Fe, and he moved the Texas capital west to Austin, on the edge of Comanche lands.\(^66\)

Soon the government was millions of dollars farther in debt than ever, the value of the lands it was distributing in lieu of cash had plunged dramatically and the voters had replaced almost every member of Congress with fiscal conservatives. Still President Lamar insisted that Texas’s problem was an excessively low rate of taxation. At the next election [1841] the people removed him and returned Houston, who had run on a small-government, anti-imperial, pro-US-annexation platform. When Houston left office for the second time in 1844 Anson Jones took over.\(^67\) Although President Jones did not suffer from such vaulting ambition as Lamar, he was widely believed to have opposed and impeded annexation. Many of the convention’s most prominent members sought, during the convention, to remove him from office immediately. These disasters might have been avoided if the popular Houston could have been reelected. Although he was
absent from the constitutional convention in 1845 the delegates must have had the history of his and his successors’ presidential terms in mind when they decided to allow the people to reelect a popular governor.

In the Revolutionary days the designers of the first state constitutions had seen legislatures as the direct and immediate representatives of the people, their shield against executive tyranny. To that generation it was nonsensical to speculate about legislative abuse of power. The people were not likely to abuse themselves, and if they did they would soon rectify the situation. As the next five or six decades passed, however, experience taught a new generation a different lesson: the legislature was just as likely to abuse its power as was the executive. Popular elections alone could not adequately check legislative misconduct. Since governors did not in fact abuse their power more often than did legislators, the executive branch did not require such severe restraints as were once believed necessary.

The founding fathers of Florida and Texas agreed with their generation’s assessment of earlier government designs. They imposed both internal and external restraints on the legislature in the form of bicameralism and the executive veto. They even granted substantial patronage powers to their governors, a move that must have caused some of the Revolutionary founders to turn over in their graves.

Although the Florida and Texas conventions used the executive branch as a tool to check the legislature, and increased the governor’s powers for this purpose, they had by no means abandoned the old fears of executive tyranny. On the contrary, they created more direct elections for governor than did some of the old states. So they joined the antebellum trend of giving the people more control, and the legislature less, over the choice of governor. They also restricted the executive’s tenure of office by forbidding his immediate reelection in Florida and by giving him a short two-year term in Texas.

Texas went farther with these Jacksonian era constitutional reforms than did Florida. Where Florida’s founders struggled with the proper form for bicameralism, Texans simply continued with a system
with which they were already thoroughly familiar. The Florida convention came much closer to adopting the combined popular-legislative method of electing the governor, while at the Texas convention, only a few delegates seriously pushed this rather undemocratic technique. Florida’s founders gave their governors far weaker patronage and veto powers than the Texas governors received, although these were contentious subjects at both conventions.

Probably Florida’s use of a rather old constitution—Alabama’s 1819 document—as its most important model partly explains its less modern style compared to Texas. That state’s document was also written six years after the Florida convention had taken place. In addition Texans had had more experience with designing their own government also had learned from some harsh lessons along the way. The perils of independence had surely motivated a relatively large share of Texans to think seriously about the forms of government they asked. Furthermore the popularity of the Houston-Jackson political faction in Texas undoubtedly smoothed the way for governmental techniques associated with the Jacksonian Democrats which included a strong executive branch.

In Florida close affiliations to the major national parties were just beginning to take clear shape in the late 1830s. The democratic party in Florida was not formed until after the constitutional convention was over. The anti-bank faction which formed it, although dominant at the convention, had experienced major challenges from their well-organized opponents. Florida’s proto-Jacksonian party was neither strong enough nor well enough organized to impose its own views on every constitutional decision.

Sam Houston chaired the committee which wrote Texas’s first (abortive) attempt at a constitution in 1833. After that convention was over, he remarked in disgust, “[a]ll new States are infested, more or less, by a class of noisy, second-rate men who are always in favor of rash and extreme measures. But Texas was absolutely overrun by such men.” No doubt Houston knew best, but if he meant to imply that frontiersmen could not design good republican state governments,
he was wrong. By relying on older states’ models, adopting new trends in political thinking, and making reasonable modifications in light of local experience and local political controversies, the founders of both Texas and Florida created sound republican governments. Beginning in 1845 they worked smoothly and had widespread public support among the people of the new states. It was an admirable accomplishment for “second-rate” frontiersmen.

Notes


5Constitution of the Republic of Texas (1836), in Thorpe, Constitutions, s.v. Although Texans wrote a state constitution in 1833 and a provisional constitution in 1835 (ibid.), the 1836 document was the first to be effectively implemented.


7Knauss, “Reports of Convention,” 129.

8Weeks was hired on July 12 (Debates, 35-36).
Florida Constitution (1839), art. 1, art. 2, art. 6, sec. 1; Texas Constitution (1845), art. 1, art. 2, art. 3, secs. 1 and 2, in Thorpe, Constitutions, s.vv. These constitutions are hereafter cited by state abbreviation, followed by article and section numbers.


FL, art. 4, sec. 1; TX, art. 3, sec. 4.


TX, art. 3, secs. 5, 6, 8, 11, 21, 29, 30.

FL, art. 4, secs. 2, 4, 5, 16; Alabama Constitution (1819), art. 3, secs. 2, 4, 12, 23.


20 FL, art. 3, sec. 2; Tex., art. 5, sec. 2.


23 Ibid., 115-16; Fehrenbacher, *Constitutions*, 16.

24 *Debates*, 23.

25 Ibid., 314, 329.

26 Lutz, “Theory of Consent,” 22; e.g., Louisiana Constitution (1812), art. 3, sec. 2.

27 *Debates*, 314; TX, art. 5, sec. 3.

28 FL, art. 3, sec. 4; *Journal of Convention*, 154.


31 Ibid.; Reid, 177; supported by David Levy (178-79) and Abraham Bellamy (179); Ward, 179.

32 Ibid., 179.


36 *Debates*, 223-30; Marshall de Bruhl, *Sword of San Jacinto: A Life of Sam Houston* (New York, 1993), 316-17. Houston did not in fact attend the convention, as Andy Jackson had died that summer, and Houston and his family did not return until the fall. De Bruhl mistakenly says that Houston’s seat was taken by Charles B. Stewart (ibid., 316); in fact, the convention rejected Stewart’s bid on July 24, so the Montgomery County delegation was effectively reduced from four to three seats (*Debates*, 230).


39FL, art. 7, sec. 2; art. 3, secs. 14, 15, 23; TX, art. 4, secs. 5, 12; art. 5, secs. 16, 19.

40Debates 24, 118; Constitution of the Republic of Texas, art. VI, sec. 10.

41Debates, 119, 118, 122.

42Ibid.: Lipscomb, 70, 120; Love, 77, 121-22; Rusk, 124-25.

43Ibid.: Love and Davis, 121; Lewis, 119.

44Ibid.: Love, 121; Mayfield, 130-31.

45Ibid., 121.

46De Bruhl, Sam Houston, 309, 317.

47Debates, 123.


49TX, art. 5, sec. 17; FL, art. 3, sec. 16.

50Schmidt, "Republican Visions," 16. The fourteenth state, New York, allowed its governor to vote in a council which had a group veto power (ibid.).

51Sturm, "American State Constitutions," 65; Fehrenbacher, Constitutions, 16. Weak vetoes in antebellum years in, e.g., IN (1816), AL (1819), AR (1836).

52Alabama Constitution (1819), art. 4, sec. 16; FL, art. 3, sec. 16; Journal of Convention, 155; TX, art. 5, sec. 17; Constitution of the Republic of Texas, art. 1, sec. 26; Debates, 23-26.

53Ibid., 135, 585.

54Ibid., 138.

55Ibid., 139.

56TX, art. 7, secs. 30, 32; Debates, 135, 142.

57Ibid., 135, 136, 137.

Debates; Rusk, 144; Mayfield, 140; Van Zandt, 141; adoption, 146, 319-20.


FL, art. 3, sec. 2; TX, art. 5, sec. 4.

Journal of Convention, 153.


Constitution of the Republic of Texas, art. 3, sec. 2.


De Bruhl, Sam Houston, 150-51.

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St. Joseph’s Church. Pensacola Historical Society.
The Founding of St. Joseph’s Parish: The Catholic Church and Race Relations in Pensacola, Florida, 1865-1900

Sharon Norris Harmon

At the end of the Civil War the Catholic Church in the United States recognized the need to begin a major missionary effort among the newly freed slaves or lose these potential converts to Protestant evangelists, who were having much success among blacks. At the time of emancipation there were approximately one hundred thousand African-American Catholics, slave and free, in the nation. Of these, 62,500 lived in Louisiana, 16,000 in Maryland, and the rest were scattered throughout the remainder of the country. Pensacola, Florida was among the scattered areas that had a large community of black Catholics, many of whom were Creoles who traced their ancestry to the Spanish colonial period. Parish records at St. Michael’s, which was the only Catholic church in Pensacola, note the confirmation of thirty-seven African Americans in 1868. Such a large number is significant considering that at the end of the Civil War only ten blacks and seventy-two whites had remained in the city following its surrender to the Union Army in May, 1862. By 1875 there were five hundred black Catholics at St. Michael’s, where they comprised one-fourth of the congregation.

In order to retain African-American Catholics nationally and to have the opportunity to gain new converts, the Church had to address the rising aspiration of freedmen for churches of their own where they could assume positions of leadership. In churches where blacks worshipped separately, there was a gain in membership, where they were mixed with whites, there was a loss. Plenary councils of the Church reported that better results were attained where there were separate churches at which the priests gave their full effort to the welfare of blacks. Although Catholic missionary societies in Europe, and even the Vatican itself, kept urging the American bishops to do more for its African-American members, it was neither united nor
St. Joseph's Society. Mrs. Ruby is fourth from the right on the front row. Pensacola Historical Society.
consistent in its efforts. The Diocese of Mobile, to which Pensacola belonged, was hindered in its mission efforts by lack of funds, made all the worse by losses during the Civil War, a shortage of priests, and the frontier conditions of the area. Although most Protestant denominations did establish separate churches for blacks in Pensacola, as late as 1890 there still was no African-American Catholic church in town.

The purpose of this article is to explain why separate churches for blacks was considered to be a progressive idea in the 1890s and to identify the process by which African-American Catholics in Pensacola were able to establish St. Joseph’s Parish and to build a brick church as large as St. Michael’s in the downtown area. The successful construction of St. Joseph’s goes beyond local events to involve two national councils of the Church, the generosity of Mother Katherine Drexel (a Philadelphia heiress who devoted her fortune to supporting black and Indian schools and churches), and the appointment of Jeremiah O’Sullivan in 1885 as Bishop of Mobile. Decades of frustration for African-American Catholics came to an end in 1890, when at the request of a parishioner, O’Sullivan agreed to build a new church for blacks. The parishioner making the request was Mercedes Sunday Ruby, who was president of St. Joseph’s Society for the Colored at St. Michael’s Church and knowledgeable about Pensacola’s black Catholic community. While blacks at St. Michael’s did receive the sacraments, as in other mixed-race churches in the South they had to sit in a separate section of the church and could not take part in activities such as singing in the choir or serving at the altar. Although these restrictions were never formal church policy, O’Sullivan’s reports and correspondence, as well as those of his predecessor John Quinlan, (1859-83) indicate that this was common practice. While Quinlan notes such conditions with some regret, O’Sullivan’s experiences before his appointment as Bishop of Mobile had prepared him to respond more actively to a request from a black parishioner for a separate church. O’Sullivan had been ordained in 1868 by Archbishop Martin John Spalding of Baltimore, who placed a very high priority on establishing churches for black Catholics. O’Sullivan later served as pastor of St. Peter’s Church,
Washington D.C., where he maintained a close association with St. Augustine’s Church, the first church for African-American Catholics in that city, and with its pastor, John R. Slattery, Provincial of the Mill Hill Fathers, an English missionary society dedicated to ministry among American blacks. While O’Sullivan had the motivation to agree to Mrs. Ruby’s request, finding the means to do so in an impoverished diocese was another matter.

When O’Sullivan came to Mobile, the diocese was close to bankruptcy. Shortages of money and priests had precluded Bishop Quinlan from expanding his missions, and his immediate successor, Bishop Dominic Manucy had resigned within six months of his appointment as bishop, in despair of raising sufficient funds. Although surviving records do not tell how he did so, within the first fourteen months of his administration O’Sullivan managed to pay off the existing diocesan debt of fifty-four thousand dollars. Paying off the debt seems to have been his first priority, and once this goal was achieved, he wrote to his friends in Baltimore that he had not yet made any other plans. Since financial problems were not the only obstacle to the growth of his diocese, O’Sullivan turned his attention to the chronic problem of the shortage of priests. Initially, he hoped that Slattery would be able to send several Josephite missionaries to help him, but as late as 1893, there were only five Josephite priests to staff three parishes, one college, and one seminary in the Baltimore area, leaving none available for mission work in the deep South. Physical conditions in the Mobile Diocese were so primitive that O’Sullivan had misgivings about recruiting priests from outside the region. He wrote to one young seminarian that priests accustomed to parish work and the comforts of home would have a difficult time in the Mobile Diocese, where missionaries carried everything necessary for mass in a carpet bag as they travelled from place to place. He cautioned another seeking adoption into his diocese that his was strictly a missionary area, “as much so as a vicariate in Borneo.”

During the first few years of his administration, the only black Catholic churches he had were in small, rural areas near the Alabama
Bishop Jeremiah O'Sullivan. Overbey Collection, University of South Alabama Archives.
Gulf Coast. In Northwest Florida Father John Baasen, pastor of St. Michael’s Church in Pensacola during O’Sullivan’s administration, favored African-American churches in rural areas but not in Pensacola itself. In Molino, Florida, twenty-three miles north of Pensacola, Father Baasen did build a small chapel, Our Lady of Mercy, for blacks in the area. The daughter of a freed slave named Jinny and the wife of a mulatto named Joseph Ruby, whose family had fought for the United States at least as far back as the War of 1812, Mercedes Ruby had grown up in this farming community. It was while O’Sullivan was in Molino on January 12, 1890, to dedicate the chapel that she made her request for a separate church for Pensacola blacks. She found him in a receptive mood, since the services he had preached had been well-received. Although there were only seven communicants that day, the bishop recorded that “the colored people from miles around came to the instructions and showed excellent dispositions.” This reinforced his belief that separate churches for African-Americans would yield new converts for the church. Though bishop of a poor diocese, O’Sullivan would invest over fifteen thousand dollars in St. Joseph’s and it would be one of only two churches he would build. This reflects both his own commitment and the greater emphasis that was being placed upon black missions by the Catholic Church at the end of the nineteenth century.

As early as 1866 Archbishop Spalding of Baltimore had made a heroic effort to include measures for “the moral and religious betterment of the former slaves” on the agenda of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore, and he wrote that the time was “a golden opportunity for reaping a harvest of souls, which neglected, may not return.” Spalding wanted the council to discuss topics such as separate churches for blacks, preparation of blacks for the priesthood, special missionaries for blacks, use of vernacular hymns during mass and vespers, and appointing a prefects apostolic, who would be independent of the American bishops and have special charge over black missions.

Busy with other matters, the council did not even address these issues until an Extraordinary Private Session after the council was officially closed. The discussion was acrimonious, with the bishops
particularly opposed to the appointment of a prefects apostolic, since such an official was accountable only to Rome and would be independent of their jurisdiction. The Bishop of St. Louis, Peter Richard Kenrick, went so far as to say that he would renounce the episcopacy if such a priest were sent.\textsuperscript{19}

Amid such squabbling, the only decision reached was to let each bishop handle African-American missions as he saw fit. On a national level there would be no further action until the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore in 1884. In the interim each parish priest, missionary society, or local bishop was left to take whatever action or inaction thought appropriate.

Inadequacies in mission efforts for black Catholics in the United States were among the reasons the Vatican prompted the American archbishops, under the direction of James Gibbons of Baltimore, to call the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore. Once again the black apostalate was on the schema, and this time the presiding Apostolic Delegate was determined to keep control of the agenda. Gibbons proposed to create a committee of four senior archbishops and himself to form a Committee on New Subjects, without whose approval no new subject could be introduced and no new subjects could be taken up until all matters in the original schema had been disposed of.\textsuperscript{20}

Under tighter control than the previous Council, the Third Plenary Council did succeed in taking some action to benefit African-American missions. Its most significant accomplishment in this area was to authorize an annual collection of money to be used for missions to blacks and Indians.\textsuperscript{21} In the first few years of the collection, Bishop O'Sullivan received twenty-five hundred dollars each year for mission work among African-Americans.\textsuperscript{22} Even though the size of the collection decreased during the early 1890s, this income, along with gifts from Mother Drexel, would help make St. Joseph's Church a reality. But why did the idea of separate churches for blacks appear to be a progressive idea within the Catholic Church during the 1890s?

The "progressive" idea of separate churches for African Americans was actually a very slow recognition on the part of the Catholic hierarchy that since the end of the Civil War, most blacks
did not want to attend white churches. Black churches during Reconstruction were an integral part of building a community and often served as a source of political leadership as well. Because keeping blacks in white churches had been a means of social control during the antebellum period, the establishment of churches of their own, staffed by their own clergy, became a part of their quest for self-identity. Baptist, Methodist, and particularly the African Methodist Episcopal Churches quickly attracted many African-American members, and became the first institutions to be controlled by black men in the South. The growth of Protestant churches led by black clergy was of serious concern to the Catholic Church, which could not match the emotional appeal of these denominations nor provide any significant black clerical leadership. Leon Litwack observed that the immediate reaction of former slaves to news of freedom was "to educate themselves and their children, to separate their church from white domination, and to form their own community institutions." Other studies note that black churches were symbols of freedom and that larger buildings reflected material progress. Blacks solicited funds for capital projects and invited whites to their churches. The dedication of the new brick church for St. Joseph’s, for example, was attended by a large crowd which "thronged the streets and opposite sidewalks," but the positions of honor immediately behind the bishop and other clergy in leading the congregation into the new church went to St. Joseph’s Society. It had never held such a place of honor at St. Michael’s.

Because of its formal liturgy, hierarchical structure, and high educational requirements for its clergy, the Catholic Church had more difficulty adapting to the desire of African Americans for separate churches. While in many black Protestant churches oratorical ability was considered more important than theological knowledge, formal seminary education requiring fluency in Latin and extensive training in philosophy and theology was a prerequisite for ordination into the Catholic church, which was very slow in developing black clergy. On the other hand, the successes of Protestants among Southern blacks varied with their ability to fulfill black desire for control of their own churches. Even during the antebellum period, Baptists had
given African Americans more freedom over their religious life than any other denomination; Methodists also granted some autonomy but lost many Southern blacks to the newly emerging African Methodist Episcopal Churches. In 1888 the Pensacola News listed eight black churches, four Baptist, two African Methodist Episcopal, one Methodist, and one Episcopal. Because the pastor of the church had to deliver his announcement to the paper each week, it is probably safe to assume that there were more congregations than those listed. The perennial problem of a lack of priests and money, often combined with a lack of will on the part of most Southern bishops during the Reconstruction period, ensured that the Catholic Church would have difficulty retaining the black members that it had, much less winning new converts.

During Reconstruction there is little evidence that Bishop Quinlan had any major interest in sponsoring evangelization efforts among the black population of Alabama and Northwest Florida. When the topic of the need for evangelization of blacks was discussed at the Second Plenary Council, Quinlan had been less than enthusiastic, commenting that he could “establish nothing for the heretical Negroes, just as he could do nothing for the other heretics.” Rapid population growth in Pensacola by the mid-1870s would cause him to reconsider his decision briefly, but ultimately to do nothing.

Drawn by the availability of jobs, Protestant “heretics,” black and white, had quickly begun to outnumber Catholics in Pensacola. As late as 1850 the city had still been primarily a Spanish-Catholic town, with fifteen hundred Catholics out of a total population of twenty-eight hundred. By 1875 when Canon Peter I. Benoit was making an extensive fact-finding trip throughout the United States on behalf of the Mill Hill Fathers of England, who were planning to establish missions for blacks in this country, there were about two thousand Catholics, five hundred of whom were black, in a population of approximately seven thousand. Benoit describes Quinlan as glad to hear about the Mill Hill Fathers, and quoted him as saying that the bishops and clergy of America had done nothing as yet to evangelize either the Negro or the Americans Indians. Quinlan and Father James Bergrath, pastor of St. Michael’s were anxious that Benoit consider
Pensacola a site for the beginning of missionary work among African Americans, and Benoit was invited to visit the city. He arrived there on April 4, 1875, to explore personally the feasability of the project.32

Benoit commented favorably upon the economic development of the city. He saw “ships of every country lying at anker” [sic] and timber coming down waterways in rafts to be loaded for export. He noted with pleasure the oysters to be purchased for almost nothing, commenting that his bishop, who considered oysters “one of the grandest institutions in the world will be glad to hear of some of our Fathers living at the very sources of the institution!!”33

In spite of an expanding economy, Benoit found problems in the city and at St. Michael’s. He described serious losses from yellow fever, a recurring scourge. The Sisters of St. Dominic, who staffed St. Michael’s school at that time, had lost two members of their community, and three of the four Sisters of St. Joseph at the church in Warrington, eight miles away, had died.34 Another problem, potentially serious in its implication for the success of mission work among Pensacola’s black Catholics, was their poor attendance at a special evening service Benoit conducted for them. Father Bergrath had urged white pew holders to sit in the galleries and give their pews to the blacks for this particular service, a clear indication that St. Michael’s, like other mixed-race churches in the South, had separate sections for the races. In spite of such measures Benoit and Bergrath did not know if the poor attendance indicated lack of interest in the mission or a misunderstanding about the nature of the service.35 Another problem, about which he had been forewarned by Quinlan, was the antipathy of the Creoles, defined in Pensacola as mulattoes of French, or more commonly, Spanish ancestry, toward former slaves.36

In spite of these difficulties, Benoit and Bergrath seemed to be willing to consider proceeding with the mission, but in August, 1875, Bergrath wrote to the Canon that he did not have the two hundred dollars necessary to pay each of the missionaries he might receive. He indicated that Quinlan was busy with other projects and that Pensacola was once again threatened by yellow fever, with thirty people already dead.37 For the next fifteen years there would be no further effort to
develop a separate church for African-American Catholics in Pensacola.

During this time, black/white race relations in the city were relatively good. Plentiful jobs resulted in the growth of a black middle-class community that was cited by Booker T. Washington at the turn of the century as illustrating the economic progress of African Americans since the Civil War. While the local newspaper included accounts of lynchings and beatings in other areas, there are no accounts of similar acts of racial violence in Pensacola during that time. A major theme of the newspaper was promotion of the city itself, and harmonious relations between blacks and whites, as long as the blacks “knew their place,” was part of the image the city wanted to project. On July 31, 1889, in an article entitled “Pensacola’s Colored People,” the Pensacola News summarized its views about race relations in the city. The editors praised the fact the “white and colored people instinctively pursue separate paths to the same goal—human happiness. When thrown together by force of circumstances, the colored man has his rights accorded him, and he in turn feels no hesitation in recognizing and admitting the disparity which placed the white man on a higher social level.” Although the paper rarely was so open about the degree of segregation in the city, this particular article provides insight. Streetcars were integrated, and theaters, like churches, had separate sections for whites and blacks. Some restaurants, barber shops, and saloons were solely for whites, a practice not challenged by blacks, according to the paper. Whites attended parades celebrating Emancipation Day, and the paper did report that the blacks then went to Kupfrian’s Park, a popular site for picnics and parties for all Pensacolians. Further illustrating the patchwork nature of separation of the races in Pensacola during this period, the poorhouse was integrated, but baseball teams were segregated.

Compounding racial ambiguity and particularly affecting Pensacola’s Catholic community was the disdain the Creoles felt for former slaves. Both Quinlan and O’Sullivan considered this to be a major obstacle to evangelization of African-American Catholics in Pensacola and in Mobile. Tracing their ancestry to the Spanish and
French colonists along the Gulf Coast, Creoles had been free and prosperous during the early part of the nineteenth century. In her will in 1823, Maria Carlotta Ruby, for example, bequeathed to her nine children nine lots in Pensacola, four slaves (one of whom had run away) $1738 in silver coins and $1600 in gold doubloons, plus assorted household items. The wording of the will also reflects Maria Carlotta’s devout Catholicism. In 1857, when Creoles were forced by state law to choose a white guardian, many of these proud people left Pensacola rather than submit to such a loss of status.

By the 1870s and 1880s, many of the exiled families had returned and the Creole community of Pensacola still retained a strong sense of racial and cultural identity. Many had established businesses in the downtown area. Richard Gagnet, who served as a member of the executive committee of the Republican Party, was a tailor; Eugene Collins, a butcher; Manuel Quigles and John Sunday were carpenters; John Pons, a barber; and Salvador Pons the city clerk of Pensacola in 1880. Whites, particularly those who were more recent arrivals to Pensacola, did not differentiate between Creoles and blacks, but the Creole community made a great distinction, to the point of refusing to send their children to any public or private school for blacks. Quinlan had told Benoit that the Creoles were not permitted to mix with the whites and they would not mix with the recently emancipated slaves. He said that they preferred their rather humiliating position in the white church, where they were admitted only to certain sections, to a position of leadership in a black church. O’Sullivan later lamented that it was a great evil in the church in Florida and Alabama that “mulattoes in church or school, will not associate with the Negro and the white man will not recognize either.” Although he concluded in his 1887 report to the mission board that he did not know how to solve the problem, he would have to try before he could build a church for African-American Catholics in Pensacola.

Whites in the Catholic Church, like whites in the community as a whole, regarded Creoles as black, and this is how they were listed in the parish records at St. Michael’s. Because of the Creoles’ own strong sense of cultural and racial distinction, practicality required
whites to make some accommodations. Newspapers listed people as white, colored, or creole. Since Creoles were Catholic, their refusal to send their children to school with blacks became a problem for the Bishop of Mobile and the pastor of St. Michael’s to solve in their parochial schools. Seeking a solution, Quinlan turned to Mother Austin Carroll, the superior of the Sisters of Mercy’s mother house in New Orleans. She had handled similar problems in Catholic schools in that city. After working with mulattoes in a sodality in the Notre Dame de Bon Secours Parish in New Orleans, Mother Austin Carroll had learned about Creole determination to keep their own culture and that in New Orleans, like Pensacola, there was segregation between blacks and mulattoes.\(^{46}\)

At Quinlan’s urging, she visited Father Bergrath in Pensacola. He was struggling to keep his parish schools staffed in the face of yellow fever epidemics, lack of money, and intraracial tension. Quinlan also believed that because the Mercies were from New Orleans, they would have more immunity to yellow fever than other orders who had taught in Pensacola. They did later serve as nurses during the yellow fever epidemic of 1882, receiving much praise from the community for their efforts.\(^{47}\) Mother Austin Carroll agreed to staff four schools, which opened on September 8, 1877, two for white children, one for blacks, and one for Creoles.\(^{48}\) After failing to establish a mission church under the Mill Hill Fathers, Bergrath must have been pleased to succeed in solving the school problem. All four schools would continue in operation under the Sisters of Mercy throughout the rest of the century. By 1890 two hundred white children attended the Convent School, which after construction of the new St. Michael’s Church in 1886, was a part of the parish complex on Palafox Street. One hundred African-American children were enrolled at St. Joseph’s School on Baylen Street, and seventy Creole children attended another St. Joseph’s School on Barcelona Street, which was always called simply “The Creole School.”\(^{49}\) Determining which school a black child would attend could be capricious, with the sisters sending lighter skinned children to the Creole School and darker ones to St. Joseph’s.\(^{50}\)
Racial problems in the schools were solved by having separate buildings for the three groups, but the situation in the church itself was more complicated. All races attended the same church, but whites retained all the positions of leadership and excluded blacks from many parish activities. In a letter to Father Fullerton, the first pastor of St. Joseph's, O'Sullivan requested that he be able to "have Colored boys to serve the first Mass & at the dedication," (of St. Joseph's), indicating that they needed to be trained. A newspaper account of a concert at St. Joseph's Hall for the benefit of the new church lists the names of all the participating vocalists and instrumentalists, none of whom had ever been reported in the paper as having sung or played at St. Michael's. That church's programs and special masses consistently had received good coverage, including the names of such participants. This is particularly noteworthy because the director of the St. Joseph's orchestra was Professor Wyer, whose band played for all types of social functions in Pensacola and received high praise when they gave a concert in Jacksonville a few years later. On the program for the benefit was the "Gloria" from Haydn's First Mass, as well as popular music of the day. Clearly, African Americans' exclusion from St. Michael's choir was not because of poor musicianship. This situation, combined with the fact that St. Michael's was overcrowded and its new building was north of town and farther away from where working people lived, prompted Mrs. Ruby to ask the bishop for a separate church for African Americans in January 1890.

After hearing Mrs. Ruby's request, by October O'Sullivan had begun to act. To make St. Joseph's Church a reality he needed a site for the parish, funds for construction, and a priest to oversee the work. He first asked Father Baasen of St. Michael's to look for a site for a new school for blacks, which could serve as a location for a church and a residence as well. Because Baasen did not succeed in doing so, the next year the bishop turned to Mother Austin Carroll with the same request. In addition to looking for a good location for the church, Austin Carroll would also be instrumental in helping O'Sullivan procure much of the money needed for construction. She was a close friend of Bishop James O'Connor of Omaha, who was
the spiritual director for Katherine Drexel, a postulant for the Sisters of Mercy. A Philadelphia heiress, Drexel planned to start a new religious order dedicated to work among blacks and Indians and to use her inheritance to support its projects. After years of struggle to maintain schools for African Americans in the face of poverty and racial prejudice, Austin Carroll thought that the Drexel funds would be a major help in expanding missions for blacks. In August 1889 she suggested that that O'Sullivan prepare a report on the condition of Alabama’s African Americans for her to submit to Bishop O'Connor. During the winter of 1889, O'Connor traveled through the South, trying to improve his failing health and gathering information that would help Drexel plan her projects. Although very ill, he visited Mobile at Christmas and continued his attention to Drexel’s work. After O’Connor’s death the following spring, O’Sullivan, along with many other prelates, would pursue the Drexel funds which would help build St. Joseph’s Church.

Because Drexel money was to be used only in black or Indian missions and because Pensacola was a racially mixed community, O’Sullivan faced a dilemma. Meeting the Drexel criteria for funds would require him to build a segregated church in a racially integrated community. Conflicting accounts about who would attend the new church prompted officials to clarify this issue. Citing “authoritative sources,” on December 3, 1891, the Pensacola News denied that the new Catholic Church was for the exclusive use of Creole and black Catholics and said that if built, it would be for the convenience of those residing nearest it. Because the area included a number of different ethnic groups as well as sailors from around the world, the new church would serve many people. In letters he wrote at the time, O’Sullivan wrestled with this problem. For instance he wrote to Father McCormick, the assistant pastor of St. Michael’s who had been helping him with business matters pertaining to the acquisition of land for St. Joseph’s, that the creoles should understand that the blacks would have a right to the first places in the church and school. To Drexel he noted that it was clearly “understood and covenanted that the church is to be for the Colored people. I assure you I am taking every precaution to secure that the sole aim of the
mission must continue to be for the good of the Colored race." He repeated this same commitment in another letter to Mother Drexel in 1894. In his records O'Sullivan further clouded the racial issue when he wrote that whites might rent pews, but "the colored people must always have the first rights to pews."

In actuality Pensacola's entire Catholic community supported the building of St. Joseph's. Martin Sullivan, the white owner of Sullivan Timber Company, donated all of the lumber to build the first frame church and school, a contribution worth six to eight hundred dollars. When the subsequent brick church was being built, an anonymous letter in the paper simply signed "Stevedore" noted that the church was being built for the "sea-faring, wayfaring brother as well as for themselves," and urged everyone to support the project. The fact was that the cosmopolitan nature of the city in the 1890s made it very difficult for O'Sullivan to meet Mother Drexel's conditions for funds, a situation that he handled with ambivalence in his desire to see the church built.

Once started, construction of St. Joseph's proceeded rapidly. At the end of November 1891 O'Sullivan authorized Father McCormick to purchase the site for the new parish from John Sunday, Mrs. Ruby's brother, for $2350. Housing both the church and the school, the first frame building, which was dedicated in December 1892, was immediately too small. "St Joseph's Advocate," a Mill Hill newsletter, published an appeal for a "friend of the colored race" to come forward to give financial assistance to such a promising parish. The article states that in April 1893, when the Bishop of Mobile gave First Communion to forty-eight children and confirmed fifty-seven adults and children, the children alone filled the church. O'Sullivan wrote the same information in his records and probably sent it to his Mill Hill friends in hopes of finding a donor. He eventually did find his donor in Mother Drexel, whose generosity enabled the work on the new brick church to proceed rapidly. Having already contributed one thousand dollars for the first building, she sent an additional five thousand dollars for the larger structure.

Although covenanted as a church for African-American Catholics, from its beginning St. Joseph's served an ethnically diverse
neighborhood. Parish records at St. Michael’s indicate that most, if not all, blacks and Creoles left by 1892, presumably to attend St. Joseph’s. Before the founding of St. Joseph’s, approximately one-fourth of the baptisms and funerals which note race are of African-American parishioners. This figure agrees with the percentage of black Catholics that Benoit had recorded as living in Pensacola. After 1892 no black baptisms or funerals appear in St. Michael’s records. Also proof that some whites attended the new church intended by northern societies as exclusively for blacks is contained in the parish records of St. Joseph’s, where a “w” indicates the baptisms and deaths of whites. St. Joseph’s cemetery, located at the corner of Pace Boulevard and Jackson streets, has several large areas in which seamen are buried, with the names of their ships noted on the grave markers. When John Holland, a white harbormaster of Pensacola, died in July 1899, his funeral at St. Joseph’s was described as the biggest in Pensacola’s history. Nineteen different organizations, including three black labor unions, sent representatives and the streets were lined with people from all parts of the city.

These activities reflect the cosmopolitan nature of the new parish, which included Creoles, blacks, seamen from many nations, and various ethnic groups who lived in the area. Even after the passage of Florida’s Jim Crow laws in 1906 and the imposition of legal segregation, whites and blacks continued to attend St. Joseph’s. One black parishioner remembers that his family would sometimes sit with the people for whom his parents worked; whites tell about attending because they lived near St. Joseph’s. Throughout the years, the church has opened and closed schools for blacks and Creoles, and has operated an orphanage, a maternity hospital, and a community center.

The importance of St. Joseph’s to its community has justified the hopes of its founders. Although in reality the parish never was exclusively for African Americans, they did assume positions of leadership and received a good education in its schools. The founding of St. Joseph’s parish was the culmination of dreams shared by many American Catholics a century ago. It was the realization of Mrs. Ruby’s desire for a place where she could be a full participant. It was a product of Katherine Drexel’s total commitment to using her
time and fortune for the benefit of those who had been neglected by the Church. It was the place that Martin John Spalding had envisioned for the harvesting of souls. Twenty-seven years after the Civil War ended, it was finally built because Bishop O’Sullivan was able to turn Spalding’s vision, Drexel’s support, and Mrs. Ruby’s dream into a reality.

Notes

1John Tracy Ellis, American Catholicism (Chicago, 1956), 89.
2Parish Records, St. Michael’s Church, Pensacola, Florida.
4Canon Peter I. Benoit, “Diary of a Trip to America, January 6, 1875-June 8, 1875,” 3 vols., Mill Hill Fathers Archives, CB6, CB7, CB8, transcribed copy in Josephite Fathers Archives (hereafter JFA), Baltimore, MD, 174.
8Author’s interview with Father Peter Kenney, S.S.J., July 27, 1995, and author’s correspondence with Elizabeth Loughlin, Secretary, St. Peter’s Church, Washington, D.C.
11O’Sullivan to Gibbons, July 30, 1887, and O’Sullivan to Leeson, August 6, 1887, (Archives of the Archdiocese of Baltimore), JFA.
12Author’s interview with Fr. Kenney; O’Sullivan to Slattery, June 9, 1890, JFA.
13O’Sullivan to Grey, April 6, 1887, and O’Sullivan to Reilly, October 8, 1891, AAM.
14Baasen to O’Sullivan, August 14, 1887, AAM.
Records of the Bishop of Mobile, 1890, AAM.


Ibid., 24.

Father Peter E. Hogan, S.S.J., "Filling in the Background," Josephite News Letter, November-December 1966, January 1967. This is a partial translation of the *Acta et Decreta* of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore, the original of which is in the Archives of the Archdiocese of Baltimore.

Gibbons to Ryan, April 24, 1884, Archives of the Archdiocese of Philadelphia.


Financial Statement of Mission Work among the Negroes and the Indians, 1887-1896, JFA.


Delores Egger, "Jim Crow Comes to Church, The Establishment of Segregated Catholic Parishes in South Louisiana" (M.A. thesis, University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1965), introduction. For detailed information about the policies of the Catholic church regarding the ordination of black priests, see Stephen J. Ochs, *Desegregating the Altar, the Josephites and the Struggle for Black Priests, 1871-1960* (Louisiana State University, 1990).


Lipscomb, page 87 discusses a post-war synod with his priests in which there was no mention of any measures passed regarding evangelization efforts among blacks although all of the records have not been found. Hogan, "Filling in the Background."


Benoit, "Diary of a Trip to America," 174.

Ibid., 166, 173.

Ibid., 175.

Ibid.

Ibid., 178.


Bergrath to Benoit, August 5, 1875, JFA.

39Pensacola News, July 31, 1889.

40Pensacola News, May 21, 1889.

41Pensacola News, August 27, 1891 and September 1894.

42Will of Maria Carlotta Ruby, 1823, in Ruby/Sunday Files, Pensacola Historical Society.


44Census of the United States, 1870 and 1880.

45Benoit, “Diary of a Trip to America,” 172; O'Sullivan Report to the Commission for the Catholic Missions among the Colored people and the Indians, 1887, JFA.


48Muldrey, “Sisters of Mercy.”

49Pensacola News, special supplement, February 1890.

50Author’s interview with Fr. James Flaherty, pastor, St. Joseph’s Church, October 8, 1994.

51O’Sullivan to Fullerton, November 20, 1892, AAM.

52Pensacola News, February 9, 1892 and June 1, 1896.

53O’Sullivan to Baasen, October 1, 1890, AAM.

54Austin Carroll to O’Sullivan, September 21, 1889, AAM.

55Muldrey, Abounding in Mercy, 282-85.

56O’Sullivan to McCormick, November 27, 1891, O’Sullivan to Drexel, in reply to letter of August 21, 1892, AAM, and O’Sullivan to Drexel, June 22, 1894, Archives of the Sisters of the Blessed Sacrament (hereafter ASBS).

57Records of the Bishop of Mobile, December 4, 1892, AAM.

58Ibid.

59Pensacola News, October 18, 1893.

60“St. Joseph’s Advocate,” July 1893, 424 in AAM and JFA; Records of the Bishop of Mobile, April 30, 1893, AAM.
Records of the Bishop of Mobile, December 4, 1892, AAM; O'Sullivan to Drexel, July 3, 1894, ASBS.

Parish Records, St. Michael's Church.

Flaherty interview.

Pensacola News, July 7, 1899.


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With the recent interest in Civil War diaries and memoirs, it is not surprising that the diary of Clara Solomon has made its way into the ranks of Civil War literature. She was Jewish, an urbanite daughter of a merchant father, and a staunch supporter of the Confederacy. This combination helps fill several gaps in our understanding of southern women who confronted the enemy on their doorsteps, or in this case on Hercules (now Rampart) Street in New Orleans, Louisiana.

Clara's diary, "Philomen," begins in June 1861 and ends in July 1862, covering the time from the early days of the war through the first several months of Union occupation of New Orleans. She confides, in writing to her "friend," thoughts and fears unexpressed otherwise. There were other diaries before and after this one, but they have yet to emerge and perhaps have been lost forever.

Clara's early optimism about the Confederate war effort reflected a general attitude of Southerners in the early days of the conflict which supported exaggerated accounts and unrealistic casualty figures. Such exaggeration regarding the Battle of Manassas Junction caused celebration as southern reports erroneously listed federal losses at seven thousand and three thousand for the Confederates. "Our Triumph at Manassas" became a popular song. As false as it may
have been, news of the capture of Washington came on May 6, 1862, when in reality Confederate forces had evacuated Yorktown and suffered losses from advancing Union troops at Williamsburg on May 3 and 5 respectively. Nevertheless, Clara writes, “Washington is taken. The Confederate flag is waving over the Capitol.” Billed as the “hardest fought battle ever on this continent,” New Orleans newspapers registered Shiloh’s losses on April 6-7, 1862, as fifteen hundred Confederates to forty-five hundred Federals. The actual difference was around three thousand, but southern losses were over ten thousand. Clara and others began to realize the gruesome truth all too soon as a constant flow of dead and wounded soldiers flooded into the city.

Later in April Clara underwent an even more startling awakening. “Oh? Never shall I forget the 25th of April 1862,” she woefully writes as Yankees prepared to enter the city. Her anger continued on May 8: “I breathed the air tainted by the breath of 3,000 Federals & trod a soil polluted by their touch.” On May 17 her response to General Benjamin Butler’s infamous General Order No. 28 or the “Woman Order” issued the previous day further revealed her disdain. This attitude was a striking departure from her earlier sentiments of September 25, 1861, when as Union prisoners arrived, she wrote she felt “sorry for them, for many knew nothing [of] what they were about when they took up arms against us.” As the harsh realities finally became apparent, Clara turned to her mother and older sister, Alice, for comfort and strength.

A basic fear of antebellum southerners was the constant possibility of slave insurrections. Clara’s diary indicates such fear in New Orleans generally and her own personal fear on May 8, 1862, as she writes, “I fear more from the negroes than Yankees & an insurrection is my continued horror.” Such fears never came to fruition, but remained nonetheless.

“Philomen” tells the reader a great deal about the Jewish community. The Solomons and many of the businessmen and friends mentioned by Clara were Sephardic Jews with traditions dating to the
pre-1492 Iberian Peninsula. The family maintained their synagogue and celebrated major religious holidays even during the darkest days of occupation. Her spontaneous record of Jews, their lives, businesses, and friendships gives new insight into this area. Her remarks about King Nebuchadnezzar, the Babylonian king who suppressed revolts in Jerusalem in the sixth century B.C., suggests a comparison with the Jewish plight in occupied New Orleans.

Other entries dealt with daily life and struggles, wartime shortages, inflation, school, a family slave, soldiers known by the family, and the life of her family in the absence of her father, Solomon Solomon, a supplier of troops in Virginia. His letters were a comfort to the family even though as early as May 1862 he was selling goods at the front in an inflated currency, and success was questionable. Ashkenazi minimized documentation which makes this edition of the diary uncluttered by excessive footnotes. His succinct, informative introduction adequately prepares the reader for the diary. The afterword gives the reader some sense of completion after this thirteen-month introduction to these individuals, their lives, concerns, dreams, sorrows, and ambitions. This diary is well edited, scholarly in presentation, and a valuable addition to the study of the affects of the Civil War on individuals on the home front and in occupied territory. Scholars or students of Civil War, southern, women’s, or Jewish history will find this diary a worthwhile addition to their library.

Thomas D. Cockrell

Blue Mountain College


It should have been apparent to interested scholars of the time that the most lasting effect of David Duke’s 1991 bid for the
Louisiana governor's mansion—and his failed 1992 attempt to become president of the United States—would be the book market that such a controversial figure would create. Duke himself has not, as yet, capitalized on such a market, but plenty of authors and editors have jumped in to fill the void that the "Blow-Dried Wizard" has left. Among them comes Tyler Bridges, reporter for the New Orleans’ *Times Picayune*, with what is certainly a well-written, if somewhat discursively explanatory history of the rise of David Duke to his prominent place in Louisiana political lore.

Bridges has both reason and qualification to write such a book; besides being an eminently cautious and capable researcher, he served as the *Times-Picayune*’s “point man” on reporting Duke campaign news during the early 1990s. Therefore he was in an interesting position to absorb the “Duke experience” and to chronicle its *raison d’etre*, as he does in the preface while describing his judgment of the gubernatorial campaign:

As Duke campaigned around the state, holding old-style political rallies, I began to realize that the political experts were wrong, that he was not just another candidate.... A few years before, the [Crowley, Louisiana] hall would have filled for [former Governor and 1991 Democratic Duke opponent] Edwin Edwards, a Crowley native son.... But on this evening, Crowley belonged to the former Klan grand wizard. Chants of “Duke! Duke! Duke!” rocked the Rice Festival Building. As I drove home that night, I began to realize that Duke was tapping into a rich vein of frustration among whites. I realized he was becoming the most effective spokesman for disaffected whites since Alabama governor George Wallace nearly a generation before.
What Bridges does well, in the early chapters such as “The Making of a Fanatic” (chapter one), “The Racialist Ideal” (chapter two) and “Propaganda for the Cause” (chapter four), is provide an intriguing personal history of his subject. For example, in the context of Bridges’s larger story, the revelation that Duke was the silent author of both a “black power” manual and a soft-porn “women’s guide” provides amusement for the reader until the conclusion of the passage, at which point one realizes the greater import of such publications:

*African Atto* was a seventy-page manual that purported to teach street-fighting techniques to blacks in preparation for a coming race war with whites. Written under the pseudonym Mohammed X in 1973, the book was salted with misspellings and bad punctuation. In *African Atto*—which was supposedly a translation of “African Attack”—Mohammed X prescribes a series of punches and kicks for blacks to learn that would kill or effectively render their white oppressors helpless. The techniques, which the author said he had learned while visiting a tribe in Nigeria, were described as innate to the soul of blacks. “African Atto can only be effectively used by black people,” Mohammed X wrote. “Just as whites can’t ‘soul dance’ as well as our people, so they can never use this skill as well, either”.... Duke was reluctant to admit authorship of *African Atto* when confronted by a reporter in 1978...[he later] explained that the book...had been written to allow the Klan to compile a list of the radical blacks who purchased it. “I believe very strongly that America is headed for a racial conflict,” he said. “What the book essentially did was to get us the names of the most radical blacks in the United States, so that when the time comes we will know where they are.”

It is in the latter part of the book where Bridges fails to follow through with the pitch after an exciting early wind-up. In the concluding chapters the fine narrative style is still present. However, there is simply no great attempt to enlighten, explain, or even put into some context the reasons Duke got where he did. The political explanations come up lacking; Duke is meagerly treated as *res ipsa loquitur* (a matter that speaks for itself), and the story seems
incomplete in the end. This is ironic, given that in the preface, Bridges criticizes two other biographies of his subject by saying that he "found neither very helpful in understanding Duke," and that one in particular "merely summarized [his] views and described him in action." Ultimately, this is a criticism that is equally applicable to Bridges's book, and those who wish to understand the greater historical or political impact of the subject are pressed to look elsewhere for answers.

What Tyler Bridges has successfully done with The Rise of David Duke is to have crafted an enjoyable biography of a seemingly simplistic—but realistically complex—individual who is important because of his success in bringing a seemingly complex—but realistically simplistic—political and social agenda to the forefront of modern southern life. It is good reading, and recommendable on that basis alone. For those who wish to look beyond vignette and into explanations, however, a selective review of the other available volumes on Duke would produce a better choice for the personal library.

John C. Kuzenski


Garna L. Christian's meticulously documented and cogently argued Black Soldiers in Jim Crow Texas, 1899-1917, examines conditions facing black soldiers stationed at Texas posts during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Christian's narrative documents the inevitable conflict, bloody and frequently deadly, among the soldiers, local police, and residents. In probing incidents from El Paso, San Antonio, Brownsville, and Houston, Christian illuminates larger issues of racism and patriotism, duty and justice, as played out in the lives of black and white Americans in Jim Crow
Texas from the end of the Spanish-American War to the beginning of World War I. In the process, Christian skillfully connects that experience back to the long-standing African-American struggle for freedom and equity and forward to the Civil Rights revolution of the mid-twentieth century.

Black units acquitted themselves with distinction in Cuba during the Spanish-American War. Following that war, they were a significant component of the American military occupation presence during the Philippine insurrection and, again, fought America's designated enemies with skill and bravery. Battle-tested and decorated, black units returned to the United States for garrison duty on the western frontier and along the troublesome Mexican border. Their presence in Texas at the turn of the century, however, threatened a precarious social order. Many of the soldiers refused to comply with local Jim Crow ordinances mandating racial segregation in public facilities, and they refused repeatedly to submit to the verbal and social degradations that were ubiquitous in the lives of black men in the Jim Crow South. The resulting conflict exposed the racist assumptions that drove military policy as, in instance after instance, the government of the United States, and the army itself sacrificed its black soldiers to appease the outrage of local officials and the demands of Texas congressmen.

The stationing of black troops in Texas in 1899 proved to be quite a dilemma for the towns hosting army bases. On the one hand, the South had a cherished military tradition which honored American men-at-arms; on the other hand, most white Texans, like other white Americans of that era, were obsessed with notions of white supremacy. The presence of large numbers of young black men in
uniform and frequently armed exposed the root of the insecurities underlying that obsession. In addition to conflicts with whites, black soldiers clashed with Hispanic-Americans along the Texas-Mexican border. Not the least of the anxieties provoked were sexual, as black soldiers competed for the favors of local Hispanic women in south Texas and demanded service at local brothels. Garna Christian carefully reconstructs the major incidents of that conflict, assembling documentary evidence from a variety of primary sources, to tell the story of clashes in Laredo, San Antonio, Rio Grande City, Del Rio, Waco, and Houston. Often the official records told only part of the story. In each instance Christian supplements that record with eyewitness accounts and private documents that reveal the race-based provocations that the official record frequently ignored.

Christian devotes significant attention, and rightfully so, to the infamous Brownsville incident. In 1906 a deadly clash erupted between black soldiers garrisoned at Fort Brown and local townspeople. The 25th Infantry, a decorated black unit with service in Cuba and the Philippines, was assigned to Fort Brown in the summer of that year. From their arrival, the soldiers were subjected to “taunts from residents and racial exclusionary policies by biased proprietors.” Local law enforcement officers and federal officials exacerbated the volatile situation by brutal and repressive treatment of the soldiers. The details of the conflict itself, painstakingly assembled and told by Christian, matter less than the subsequent parody of justice that substituted for an official inquiry and trial.

The last incident he investigates, the Houston riot of 1917, illustrates an important aspect of the friction between racist fears and the practical desire for the economic benefits of a military base to a growing city. At the outset of World War I, cities throughout the nation competed for military bases and the enhancement of the local economy such bases bring. Houston was particularly aggressive in this regard. It was rewarded with the announcement that the bustling port city would be “the recipient of federal largess” in the form of a major processing center for American troops bound for France. The
assignment of black troops, albeit only on a temporary basis during the construction of the permanent facility, angered the city’s fathers. And a subsequent race riot claimed many lives and elicited blatant racist comments from Houston officials.

Such attitudes sum up the struggle Garna Christian documents in *Black Soldiers in Jim Crow Texas, 1899-1917*. Black American soldiers during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were called upon by their country to fight, and were decorated for doing so with valor. Yet, these same men were expected upon returning to the United States to accept the degradation of segregation and submit docily to verbal and physical abuse. More importantly, as soldiers of the United States, they were indoctrinated with the sanctity of the American creed. After all, that was what they were fighting for in Cuba, the Philippines, and France. Yet, they also saw that creed ridiculed and debased on American soil.

Garna Christian’s *Black Soldiers in Jim Crow Texas, 1899-1917*, makes an important contribution to understanding the dynamic evolution of racial attitudes, between forces determined to maintain an oppressive social order and those equally determined to resist its strictures.

Frederick J. Simonelli Mount St. Mary’s College, Los Angeles

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When C. Vann Woodward published his 1938 biography of the agrarian Tom Watson, he shattered the idea of a politically “solid,” white post-Civil War South and urged the point that conflict rather than consensus represented the rule in southern politics. Ever since, scholars have been developing deep, detailed case studies of this Woodward thesis. Sheldon Hackney’s *From Populism to Progressivism*
in Alabama (1969), Roger L. Hart's *Redeemers, Bourbons, and Populists: Tennessee, 1870-1896* (1975), and Steven Hahn's *The Roots of Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation of the Georgia Upcountry, 1850-1890* (1983) are some of the well-known examples of these state level investigations. Strangely enough, other than a 1951 work by Albert D. Kirwin, which gives scant attention to opposition politics, there has been until now no in-depth study of opposition politics in the state of Mississippi.

As "the flagship state of the solid south," Mississippi elected only Democrats to Congress in the eighty years after 1884. Yet, Stephen Cresswell in *Multiparty Politics in Mississippi, 1877-1902*, holds that Mississippi, though truly a one-party state, still had viable opposition parties. To prove this point he examined the rise and fall of numerous opposition parties in the state including Greenbackers, Republicans, Prohibitionists, and above all, Populists. A good bit of Cresswell's book focuses on the Populists, whose fortunes rose and fell with the fluctuating price of cotton in the late nineteenth century and the increasingly restrictive suffrage requirements in Mississippi.

What brought about the rise of the opposition parties in Mississippi in the late nineteenth century? Cresswell agrees with Steven Hahn and Gavin Wright that the rise of a merchant class and the development of railroads in the more rural areas of the state brought small farmers reluctantly into the cash economy of the day, and began the classic struggle among small farmers and merchants and creditors. Where farmers once only had to fight bugs, rain, and poor soil, writes Cresswell, now they were faced with a human threat
as well. To fight this new and more oppressive system, farmers were willing to elect anyone who promised to protect their interests in the state. Enter the Greenbackers.

With an 1878 outbreak of yellow fever, low cotton prices, together with an oppressive crop lien system and a high land tax, the small farmers looked to a new party to serve their interest and relieve their burden. So named for its support of expanding the money supply in the nation, the Greenback party was sympathetic to the agrarian cause and received much support for it. Made up of old Confederates, former Whigs, and a large number of blacks, the Mississippi Greenback party advocated many of the same reforms the Populists would advocate a decade later. Among these reforms were unmolested voting, and end to the convict-lease system, a graduated tax, and severe penalties for corruption in elected office. Cresswell finds that by 1880 the Greenbackers had seventeen seats in the state legislature and enjoyed the support of eight newspapers. The party declined in power and popularity, however, because the Democrats used color line politics and a well-organized party press to pin a radical label on the Greenbackers and to turn many white farmers back to the Democratic party.

Though the Greenbackers were as good as dead by 1889, writes Cresswell, the adoption of a new state constitution in 1890, that eliminated the black vote with severe suffrage restrictions, including the “Australian ballot” and literacy requirements, gave impetus to a new party—the Populists—as did sinking cotton prices which were by 1894 the lowest they had been since 1848. As the start of a special legislative session in 1894 twenty-two Democrats switched allegiance to the Populist party. Sympathetic to agrarians, these legislators wanted to curb state expenditures, restrict nepotism in government, and levy privilege taxes on large incomes and inheritances. Cresswell finds that although the Populists had the help of a bad economy, terrible cotton prices, and a not-so-Democratic president in Grover Cleveland, they lost all seven congressional races in 1894. Nevertheless, the party gained strength and looked to the election of
1896 for true success. This was not to be, however. As Cresswell points out, split allegiance to William Jennings Bryan and Tom Watson doomed Populist hopes in 1896. With little enthusiasm for a Bryan presidential bid, local races suffered badly. The Democratic machine in Mississippi also did its work, writes Cresswell. Most damaging to the Populists was the Democratic tactic of co-opting issues brought up by the opposition. Damaging, too, was the roller coaster economy: in 1895 cotton prices rose just enough to soothe agrarian fears and to diminish Populist attraction. By 1902 every Democrat who ran for congressional office in each of the seven districts won one hundred percent of the vote, thus ending an era of opposition politics.

Cresswell’s book is a thorough study of opposition politics in a state that typified the solid South. Through meticulous research Cresswell has joined J. Morgan Kousser in attacking the thesis of V. O. Key by finding that in Mississippi the establishment of disenfranchising laws and a state constitution laced with suffrage restrictions did not, in fact, represent a fait accompli. Just as important, this study shows that at the local level, the level where politics mattered most to the small farmers, opposition parties wielded great influence and truly were a threat to the hegemony of the Democratic party. Stephen Cresswell has provided us with a much-needed and well-researched study of the conflict of southern politics, Mississippi style.

Gordon E. Harvey Auburn University


Professor Cronenberg’s intent in Forth to the Mighty Conflict: Alabama and World War II is to explicate the “profound effects of World War II on Alabama and the contributions the people of the
state made to Allied victory over the Axis powers.” The author does an excellent job of accomplishing his purpose and has produced a book that is suitable not only for the scholar of the Second World War but the novice also.

Forth to the Mighty Conflict is well organized and provides excellent coverage of Alabama’s role in World War II. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are particularly enlightening: chapter 5, “Producing for Victory,” covers Alabama’s industrial and agricultural contributions during the conflict; chapter 6, “Governing Alabama,” analyzes wartime politics in the state; finally, chapter 7 deals with Alabama’s prisoner-of-war camps. Although the book is quite thorough, several details could be explained better. For instance, the old Officer’s Club at Fort McClellan still exists and now houses the Public Affairs Offices, but that is not made clear in the text. Further, Cronenberg states that “for several years after the war, American and Bundeswehr representatives conducted memorial services on the third Sunday of November at the small, inconspicuous cemetery on the base.” This statement would lead the reader to think that the services had been discontinued, when in fact they are yearly events still held today. (This reviewer attended last year.)

One problem that an author encounters in writing a book of this type is to integrate Alabama’s wartime effort with the larger American role. This is the strongest part of Cronenberg’s book whether on the home front, in the Pacific, or in Europe the author does a masterful job of weaving the saga of Alabama and its people into the story of the American/Allied victory.
The work of the state docks and the port of Mobile receives special attention. ADDSCO (Alabama Drydock and Shipbuilding Company) built twenty liberty ships and over one hundred T-2 tankers, as well as converting twenty-eight hundred vessels for the various service branches—a major contribution to the war effort. Other cities—Gadsden, Aliceville, Auburn, Tuscaloosa, Birmingham, and Selma also contributed to the Allied victory in a variety of ways. From weapons and munitions production to local victory gardens and war bond drives, Alabamians did their part. Cronenberg substantiates his conclusion that during the war, “most Alabamians bore their sacrifices with dignity.”

The author quotes liberally from veterans’ interviews and memoirs which enliven the text. In the chapter “Capturing the Pacific” the author effectively uses Eugene Sledge’s book, With the Old Breed. (Sledge is a retired professor from the University of Montevallo). Other people, including some who achieved sports fame, are mentioned as well: Ralph “Shug” Jordan served in North Africa, and Bob Feller was a chief petty officer on board the USS Alabama. Such quotes and anecdotes greatly enhance the readability of the text.

Cronenberg has done prodigious research in both primary and secondary sources, relying heavily on oral histories, interviews, and memoirs. Several important secondary sources, such as Spector’s Eagle Against the Sun, Costello’s The Pacific War, and Brophy and Fisher’s Unites States Army in World War II have been consulted as well.

Forth to the Mighty Conflict fills a much needed void in the history of our state. Until its publication, there had been no book that dealt exclusively with Alabama and its role in World War II. Cronenberg’s work is scholarly, meticulously researched, and well-written. Yet the style is plain and straightforward, which makes it easy reading for the amateur historian. This reviewer recommends Forth to the Mighty Conflict for the library of any serious military historian, as well as for college and high school libraries.

Joseph T. Robertson Gadsden State Community College

Full-length biographies of eighteenth-century Spanish soldiers who served in the Americas are exceptionally rare. While a great deal about military careers may be extracted from official dispatches, service records, applications for promotions and honors, and from other official documents, few officers left behind detailed personal diaries or sufficient correspondence to explain their motivations or their relationships within the colonial societies they served. Although the family letters of Francisco Bouligny have been lost, Gilbert Din discovered a wealth of correspondence, catalogued genealogical materials, and many letters in which key figures of Spanish Louisiana expressed their personal views. Because of the special nature of Louisiana and of Bouligny’s myriad roles that spanned almost the entire history of Spanish rule, the author’s use of a broadly based biography to treat a complex central character also casts important new light upon other developments in the frontier province. At the same time, Din’s declared objective to write a three dimensional biography became difficult when during certain periods Bouligny left behind only a faint trail in the surviving documentary record. During these years, Din drew upon other sources to fill in the blanks. In the process, he added detailed background about general themes and appended many “must have,” “would have,” and “probably” references that were not completely successful in fleshing out Bouligny’s participation.
A professional Spanish army officer from a family of French origin, Captain Bouligny arrived in Louisiana in 1769 after service in Cuba to take up a commission in the new Louisiana Infantry Battalion. Like many ambitious metropolitan officers assigned to what rapidly became tedious duties in isolated frontier provinces, Bouligny married locally into a good Louisiana family, purchased real estate, and speculated in business ventures—in this case the buying and selling of slaves. At the same time he maintained a burning ambition to advance his military career and to hold high political office culminating with a provincial governorship or captaincy general. Although Bouligny lacked the patronage connections essential to obtain rapid promotions, he served as adjutant major and then sargento mayor or chief administrative officer of his battalion. Such duties marked successful career advancement and kept officers within the proximity of senior commanders and bureaucrats. Bouligny’s opportunity to emerge from obscurity occurred with the outbreak of the American Revolution. In response to a pressing need for information on the Province of Louisiana, Bouligny prepared a lengthy report that impressed the Minister of the Indies, José de Galvez.

Galvez appointed Bouligny to the office of lieutenant governor of Louisiana in charge of settlements, commerce, and Indian friendship. Unfortunately, the Minister of Indies also named his nephew Bernardo as governor. Almost from the beginning, the two officers disagreed on a variety of issues and commenced a corrosive relationship that damaged Bouligny’s future career aspirations. While Din has identified a negative side to the personality of Bernardo de Galvez, Bouligny also exhibited an irascible temper and pure folly if he thought that he could emerge victorious in any dispute involving the powerful and nepotistic Galvez clan. Indeed, Bouligny punctuated his career with petty quarrels often against superiors and pursued litigation over contentious issues concerning real estate and other business interests. While Bernardo won battlefield victories and fame and rose meteorically in rank to become Conde de Galvez, Captain General of Cuba, and finally viceroy of New Spain, Bouligny’s
military and political career stagnated. Although he was successful in secondary roles that might have satisfied a less ambitious man, Bouligny had to devote his energies to business, real estate speculation, and his family. Using detailed records that are available in Louisiana, Din traces Bouligny's successes and failures as an important resident of New Orleans and as an active officer.

Although his personal fortunes fluctuated, Bouligny outlived the Gálvez family members who had retarded his advancement. During the 1790s he rose to command the Infantry Regiment of Louisiana. Din traces Bouligny's different missions in pursuit of escaped slaves, as a builder of frontier posts to retard the penetration of American settlers and traders, and as an active defender of the Spanish colony during the French Revolution. Throughout his professional life Bouligny struggled tenaciously to attract recognition from the Spanish imperial regime that would produce the promotions that he desired. On each occasion when he seemed eligible for the governorship of Louisiana, others with better political connections managed to edge him out. Although in 1800 Bouligny earned his final promotion to army brigadier when he was sixty-four years of age, he died before he received the royal dispatch from Spain. Notwithstanding his own frustrations, Bouligny had achieved many successes in Louisiana and earned almost the highest possible military rank open to an officer in colonial service.

In addition to tracing the career of a most active eighteenth-century Spanish army officer, Din's study expands our knowledge of significant aspects of Louisiana history during the Spanish period. Bouligny recognized the inherent dangers of American settlement and was effective in his diplomacy with the Indians. Although he blamed Bernardo de Gálvez for obstructing his career advancement, through his longevity and tenacity Bouligny overcame his lack of patronage and a temperament that from time to time landed him in trouble with associates and superiors. While he flirted with power as acting governor and often appeared to have achieved the difficult career leap that would bring him high political office, in the end he had to be
satisfied with a provincial army career that allowed time for numerous business activities. Din's carefully researched study casts important new light upon many aspects of the history of Spanish Louisiana, and it is a most welcome addition to the literature on the Spanish army in the Americas during the era of Bourbon reforms.

Christon I. Archer

University of Calgary


William Johnson, a prominent member of Natchez's free black community, kept a diary from 1835 until his death in 1851. As William L. Andrews notes perceptively, Johnson wrote from the "distinctive perspective...of both a participant and an observer, an outsider who courts a place on the inside, a southern man of property who knows that...he was born to be a southern man's property." Easily the most extensive diary of a free person of color in the antebellum South, Johnson's work was first published in 1951, in a volume amply footnoting and indexing the people and events Johnson described, augmented by an introductory biography, and subsequently expanded into The Barber of Natchez, published in 1954.

Hogan and Davis's editing stand well the test of time. Readers in the 1950s may have dwelt most on Johnson's depictions of
Natchez and the planters who patronized his barber shop, and the diary remains invaluable for those purposes, ranging over everything from elections to elopements to encounters on the field of honor. But contemporary African-American historians can also find much here, by listening to Johnson as actor in and observer of a community of free people of color, not only in Natchez, but also in New Orleans and the lower Mississippi valley in general. First and foremost, the diary records Johnson’s entrepreneurial drive to succeed as barber, investor, and planter, but nowhere is Johnson more provocative than when he confronts slavery and race, here illustrated by two examples.

Historians have long sought to interpret the phenomenon of slaveholding by free people of color. Did black masters primarily own kinfolk for benevolent purposes, as Carter G. Woodson argued, or did they exploit slaves to demonstrate solidarity with and avoid persecution by a white slaveholding regime, as James Roark and Michael Johnson have recently contended? (See Carol Bleser, ed., In Joy and In Sorrow: Women, Family, and Marriage in the Victorian South.)

Johnson’s diary provides support for both hypotheses. Johnson himself bought and sold slaves not related to him, as part of a life in which he courted patronage from powerful whites. But he also urged the emancipation of slaves hired to him whom he deemed worthy. Moreover, he recorded instances of free people of color holding relatives as nominal slaves to avert possible expulsion from the state following manumission. In 1841 Mary Leeper bought her son on credit from a white slaveholder, who in turn promised to manumit the boy. Leeper paid all but fifty cents of the purchase price, retaining control of her son as a slave, along with the ability to activate the promise of freedom as circumstances dictated. Of course Mary also remained dependent on her former master to make good on this informal agreement. Only with the “insider” account of a William Johnson can we get such a penetrating view of the intricacies that could inform free black slaveholding.
But Johnson was also an “outsider” as a free black in a slave society. Here, the diary makes compelling reading for students of the cultural construction of race. Johnson was murdered by a neighbor, Baylor Winn, whom he had bested in a dispute over property boundaries. Winn escaped punishment, because he successfully asserted his whiteness in a court hearing, thereby rendering Johnson’s dying declaration and testimony by other free people of color inadmissible as evidence against him.

We know this story thanks to the labors of Hogan and Davis, but another story unfolds in reading Johnson’s account of his dispute with Winn. Portraying himself as a peaceable man seeking only his rights, Johnson nonetheless wrote angrily of Winn, not as a white owed at least outward deference, but as “an overbearing old Colord [sic] Gentleman,” who “will be found out So before Long, if he fools much with me.” Winn threatened Johnson’s life more than once, but Johnson pursued the issue, eventually obtaining a court-ordered survey that found in his favor. Then, Johnson stepped in and offered Winn a generous compromise settlement, which Winn accepted. A few weeks later, with no further provocation, Winn shot Johnson.

Had Johnson exposed Winn as “Colord” or intimated that he might do so? Winn, descended from a Virginia family regarded there as free blacks, could not have taken such a threat lightly. Or did Johnson’s whole stance, first suing Winn as an equal and then asserting power over him as the giver of a compromise offer, figuratively “blacken” him, provoking Winn to demonstrate his whiteness by employing the white male perogative of violence?

Here again, the diary takes us beyond mere speculation. Johnson knew of Winn’s violent tendencies, but remained confident that Winn would do him no harm. Johnson thought he knew that Winn was “colored” and, as such, could not claim a white man’s right to public violence, other than against people clearly subordinate, such as children or slaves. Johnson, ordinarily extremely astute in his recognition and manipulation of the social and cultural limits imposed on his life by race, died because he misjudged the liminal and
enigmatic status of Baylor Winn, and the imperatives to which he responded as a result.

These are only two of dozens of compelling readings of race and southern society that can be derived from William Johnson’s diary. Louisiana Southern University Press and William L. Andrews are to be applauded for this splendid new edition. Both general readers and scholars of southern history will welcome this chance to reacquaint themselves with the barber of Natchez.

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At a time when the phrase “Information Overload” has become a buzz word, Garland and a few other publishers have tried to assist researchers by creating theme collections combining previously published as well as new work about subjects of general interest to social scientists, including race and ethnicity.

Kenneth L. Kusmer notes in his brief introduction to volume four of Black Communities and Urban Development in America, 1720-1990 the importance of the 1877-1917 period for African Americans. The Compromise of 1877, ending Reconstruction, was for blacks a betrayal. The years following were the nadir of their fortunes. These circumstances, as Kusmer indicates, compelled African Americans to pursue a dual strategy of developing their own community resources while simultaneously pressing for their right to participate equally in the larger society.

Kusmer arranged the articles he selected about this period geographically. Part I of volume four contains articles about African-
American urban history in the South. Part II is devoted to black urban development outside the region. The only exception to Kusmer’s geographic division is his inexplicable decision to place an essay about Texas in the non-South section—an odd flaw in an otherwise clean, understandable schemata.

The southern and non-southern sections of the book are quite similar. They contain about the same number of articles (fifteen vs. eighteen) and are of comparable length. All of the articles except one have been published previously, most of them since 1960. Likewise, the majority of the essays in each section are about single cities, although a few articles in both examine topical subjects which affected black communities in many locations. A survey of the contents of these books will reveal their strengths and establish the basis for a critical evaluation.

Articles about generic topics in the South include John Kellogg’s demographic examination of black urban clusters in postbellum Lexington, Atlanta, Durham, and Richmond, as well as Zane Miller’s quantified survey of black urban development in Birmingham, Louisville, New Orleans, Savannah, and Richmond between 1865 and 1920. Also included is an analysis of the conflict between African Americans and the police in the urban South written by Howard N. Rabinowitz, a comparison of southern black elites and their northern counterparts, and a study by August Meier and Elliott Rudwick about the African American boycott of Jim Crow streetcars in the early twentieth century. To these broad essays are added single-city articles that form the bulk of the southern section.

Atlanta is the focus of three authors, while New Orleans and Baltimore each merit two. Dale A. Somers explores relations between African Americans and whites in the Big Easy during the latter nineteenth century. Claude F. Jacobs describes the growth and function of black benevolent societies in New Orleans during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Bettye Collier-Thomas is the author of both Baltimore essays. The first centers on the efforts of blacks to improve their educational facilities and opportunities in the
face of stiff white opposition. Her second article, the only previously unpublished piece in the book, is about a little known precursor of the NAACP, the Baltimore Mutual United Brotherhood of Liberty, founded in 1885 by local activist Reverend Dr. Harvey Johnson.

The second part of the volume deals with black urban development outside the South. It is also composed of several thematic essays and more numerous single-city studies. The theme essays begin with the classic study by August Meier, “Negro Class Structure and Ideology in the Age of Booker T. Washington.” Ideology is also central in Seth M. Scheiner’s article, “The Negro Church and the Northern City, 1890-1930.” The remaining theme essays focus more on material considerations. In one of the oldest articles in the collection, published in 1913, George Edmund Haynes describes with alarm the increase in urban racial segregation, analyzes the consequences, and proposes concrete measures to assuage the situation.

Chicago and New York dominate the single-city studies with four entries each. A reprint of Alzada P. Comstock’s 1912 article focuses on housing problems that blacks had in Chicago in the early twentieth century. Labor conflict and racial violence in Chicago during the Progressive Era is the subject of William M. Tuttle, Jr. Christopher Robert Reed treats the activities of the NAACP in that city during the same time period. An interesting, suggestive analysis prepared by Mark H. Haller establishes connections between African Americans in organized gambling and the entertainment industry and politics in Chicago between 1900-40.

New York City is featured in an article by Herman D. Bloch that traces the exclusion of African Americans from an increasing number of occupations from 1860-1910, while Seth M. Schreiner describes the circumstances that resulted in severe housing discrimination against blacks from 1880-1910.

Other non-southern cities receive considerably less attention. The ghettoization of Cincinnati’s black residents during the 1870s is described in a study by Paul J. Lammermeier. A similar process
which took place in Los Angeles between 1890-1930 is charted in Lawrence B. DeGraff's article. Quintard Taylor traces the migration of African Americans into the Pacific Northwest following the Civil War and describes their settlement in the region until 1910.

This collection of over thirty essays conveniently gathers from a wide variety of sources much valuable information about African Americans in urban settings from the end of Reconstruction to World War I. Nevertheless, since all but one of the articles have previously appeared elsewhere, little new information is presented. The book thus succeeds more as a research guide than as an addition to the scholarship about African-American and urban history.

The editor's selection strategy favored large cities at the expense of smaller ones about which some very good work has been done. Even with respect to major cities, his choices are occasionally questionable. The amateurish Schuler piece on the Houston race riot of 1917, for example, does not compare to the high quality of Robert V. Haynes's "The Houston Mutiny and Riot of 1917" which appeared in the mid-1970s, or "On the Edge: The Houston Riot of 1917 Revisited," a 1991 essay by C. Calvin Smith. Moreover, Kusmer's privileging of larger cities forced him largely to ignore sizable sections of the country—New England, Virginia, the Carolinas, the Midwest, the Upper Midwest, the Southeast, and most of the Gulf Coast.

It is also true that while the material presented covers some subjects quite well, others are slighted. Ample attention, for example, is paid to relations between blacks and whites, but there is little about the relationship African Americans had with Hispanics, Asians, and other groups. The same can be said about gender issues; an androcentric focus predominates. Economic and political issues are thoroughly examined but scant attention is given to important cultural developments such as ragtime and jazz which originated precisely in urban African-American communities during the book's time period. Finally, the addition of an index would have enhanced considerably the usability of this research guide, and information should have been
included about the contributors, many of whom are not well known. Notwithstanding these criticisms, this volume and the series of which it is a part will undoubtedly assist researchers in their continuing exploration of the black urban experience.

Howard Beeth


The Spanish missionization of La Florida has been the subject of several studies such as Gannon's The Cross in the Sand, Geiger's The Franciscan Conquest of Florida, and Boyd, Smith, and Griffin's Here They Once Stood. Despite the several decades that have elapsed since these studies, The Spanish Missions of La Florida attests to the continued growth of scholarship and the breadth of efforts directed toward documenting the impact of Franciscan mission-aries on the native populations of Florida.

The investigators contributing to The Spanish Missions of La Florida focus on a variety of topics that include architectural design of mission complexes, Spanish and Native American material culture, health and disease, demography, subsistence, and culture change. One constant theme permeates the book; that archeology and ethnohistory offer substantial information for examining the change from an
indigenous lifestyle to one encouraged by the Spanish government and
the Franciscan missionaries.

Several chapters are oriented toward the delineation of mission
complex architecture and the specific contributions of archaeological
investigations to enhancing current knowledge of material culture at
mission sites. David Hurst Thomas, for instance, provides a discussion
of the exemplary research conducted over a fifteen-year period at the
mission site of Santa Catalina de Guale on St. Catherine's Island,
Georgia. Other chapters illustrate that the architectural similarity of
Spanish mission complexes often is intertwined with variability of
building materials, layout, size, and the material culture contained
within them.

Chapters by Deagan and Hann examine the regional implications
of the mission process. In particular, Deagan elaborates on the mission
system as a frontier for the Spanish administration centralized in St.
Augustine. Exploring the various roles of the missions as economic
outposts and social conduits for the enculturation, migration, and
intermarriage that affected St. Augustine, she suggests that the
missions held profound consequences for the demographic patterns of
St. Augustine from the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries.

Bio-archaeology, health, disease, and demography are reported in
two chapters by Hoshower and Milanich, and Larsen. Of particular
interest in the chapter by Hoshower and Milanich is their assessment
of the feasibility of conducting on-site bio-anthropological research
with reburial following immediately. Larsen points out that a general
decline in health occurred for native populations as a result of
changes in demographic patterns, nutrition, and infectious diseases
associated with the mission process.

Scarry and Reitz present the evidence for diet based on the
archaeological recovery and analysis of plant and animal remains.
Scarry notes that there appears to be homogeneity in the exploitation
of plant foods within the mission system and underscores the
importance of plant remains as a vehicle for interpreting social issues
such as status and the role of native women in Spanish households.
In her analysis of diversity in the animals that were utilized as dietary staples, cattle, for instance, appear to have been a predominant dietary item only in the missions in the Appalachee region.

*The Spanish Missions of La Florida* is an important volume for those interested in the Spanish colonization of the southeastern United States. Comprised of several studies of mission period sites, and the biological and cultural impact of the Spanish interaction with native populations, it contains discussions of the major research of the past two decades on the missionization of *La Florida*. This book is pertinent for anyone interested in Spanish missions or the implications of culture contact.

**Literature Cited**


Dale L. Hutchinson

East Carolina University

Birmingham's role as an example of New South industrialization as well as its historical racial patterns and problems proves to be an irresistible lure to scholars; and so it is to Henry McKiven, whose present work began as his 1990 Vanderbilt University doctoral dissertation. The author concerns himself with "explaining the social origins and consequences of Birmingham's system of race and class relations" without assigning causation to either. He offers a relatively sophisticated analysis of the role skilled, unionized white workers played in establishing a privileged place for themselves on the shop floor, in the neighborhoods, and at the voting booth. As the economic foundation of their power waned after the introduction of machinery in the steel industry, white workers relied on the racial caste system they created to shield them from loss of social position.

McKiven posits that skilled white metalworkers came to Birmingham to establish a "workshop town" that gave them opportunities for advancement based on relegating black labor to the most menial jobs in the industry. The town's boosters promoted just such a view of the New South industrial experiment at Birmingham. According to both groups, the dream of a workingmen's republic in which white skilled labor allied with white capital was dying in the industrial North, but could still be had in the post-bellum South.
Attaining this goal meant recreating an industrial version of the old *Herrenvolk* democracy of the slave days based on white supremacy.

Birmingham’s skilled white workers, almost all unionized, interpreted the notion of a workshop town quite differently than did booster/capitalists. Mine, mill, and foundry owners thought of themselves as Birmingham’s natural leaders to whom workers owed unquestioning allegiance. Skilled workers knew better. As long as the iron industry remained technologically backward in Birmingham, production depended upon their knowledge and ability. White workers played this trump card against management when it came to deciding who was to control black laborers. Until the Magic City’s shops mechanized, skilled white workers were able to control the amount of production, the work flow on the shop floor, and the hiring of unskilled black laborers.

Neither the shop owners nor their skilled white workers really wanted to fill unskilled jobs with African Americans. Owners thought that blacks were shiftless and lazy and had to be closely supervised. Skilled workers feared that black laborers could be used by owners to gain control of production in a divide-and-conquer strategy similar to that used in northern foundries. Both sides wanted to hire whites as unskilled laborers, but too few applied. Consequently, the unskilled labor force was disproportionately black.

White workers struggled to parlay their position in the factories into social and political power in the community at large. Residential pattern and social life mimicked and reinforced the segregation found in the workshops. McKiven demonstrates how the producer mentality of skilled white workers affected all aspects of their lives. He notes correctly that skilled workers thought that a loss of power and autonomy in one sphere would lead to a loss of power and autonomy in all others. Therefore, workers joined the political fray against owners and their middle-class allies throughout the era. At first they had some success in establishing a Democratic machine led by David Fox and Sylvester Daly. It battled against employers who sought both
state aid for themselves and the power to control workers' lives away from the job.

However, industrial modernization changed everything after 1900. Importation of the most modern steelmaking machinery and technological upgrading throughout Birmingham's machine shops deskill the industry, creating jobs for semi-skilled "operatives," most of whom were lower-paid, unorganized black workers. Owners did exactly what skilled white workers had feared: they used semi-skilled black workers to wreck the "workshop town" that white workers had created for themselves despite opposition from their bosses.

At this point, McKiven describes the open-shop drive from 1903 to 1920 and the corporate welfare schemes that mill-owning corporations directed in admirable detail. He examines the changes that occurred in Birmingham's demographics to 1920 as corporations built new plants on the edge of town with company housing for their workers. He also explores the impact of these changes on city politics. The innovations on the shop floor, in Birmingham's residential patterns, and in the consequent political rifts within the enfranchised white community, as employers tried to bust white unions and unions tried to extend their control over newly-created jobs, all set the stage, according to McKiven, for the "perverse way Birmingham has always epitomized the national [racial] experience."

Dr. McKiven has written a fine monograph that makes a significant contribution to the history of Birmingham, especially to the history of the complex interplay between race and class that has turned those at the same socio-economic level into bitter enemies. *Iron and Steel* is the story of errors committed, but mainly it is the story of opportunities missed.

Unfortunately, the author also fell into the latter trap. McKiven rightly treats Birmingham as an anomaly in the South before 1900, because it is the site of heavy industry, and in the nation as a whole because its industry was technologically backwards. However, after 1900 Birmingham was no longer exceptional. Its open-shop drive was part and parcel of industrial trends across America. Its Citizens'
Alliance performed the same function for U. S. Steel in Birmingham that it did in other unionized towns. Its corporate welfare was the same as that in other states (which McKiven does point out). Finally, Birmingham’s “Progressive” politics, aimed at establishing middle-class dominated city-governmental systems in place of the patronage dispensed by the working-class Democratic machine, were the same as that practiced in cities from Brooklyn to Galveston. A more thorough examination of how Birmingham fit into these national patterns would have strengthened Dr. McKiven’s conclusions. It would have expanded his audience from those interested in southern historical monographs to those interested in national trends.

Martin T. Olliff
Auburn University


It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of rivers in the history and development of the American South. From earliest days, rivers have served the people along their banks as highways, sources of food and power, and as places of recreation. Though channeled, dammed, and exploited by man, the rivers remain capable
of inflicting harm, as witnessed by the great Mississippi River floods of 1993. The destiny of communities along the Mississippi River and the Gulf Coast remain inextricably tied to the streams that attracted settlers in the first place.

Two recent publications explore the importance of rivers in history. *Cities of the Mississippi: Nineteenth-Century Images of Urban Development* by John W. Reps is a handsome volume with hundreds of color plates. Reps examines the efforts of artists and view makers to depict the towns and cities along the Mississippi River from 1803 to the present. By way of introducing the images themselves, he explains who the image makers were and how they actually worked. His analysis of the making of bird’s-eye views is particularly useful for historians and preservationists.

The bulk of the volume consists of the pictures themselves, with accompanying contemporary travelers’ descriptions of the communities. Balize, or Pilot’s Town, at the mouth of the Mississippi River is the first image in the book, a painting, c. 1830. In 1822 a German duke described Balize as a “few wooden houses that stand on piles in the midst of the water and slime, between high reeds.” There are also depictions of New Orleans, Baton Rouge, Natchez, Vicksburg, Memphis and so on up the Mississippi River all the way to St. Cloud, Minnesota. Of especial interest are modern aerial photographs which the reader may compare with the nineteenth-century views.

The story of the Alabama River system, which includes not only the Alabama River itself, but the Coosa, Tallapoosa, and Cahaba rivers as well, is described by Harvey Jackson III, in *Rivers of History*. Jackson is a talented and dynamic storyteller, and his book
is a warm portrait of the rivers and the people who have inhabited their banks.

The Coosa and Tallapoosa begin in the northeast quarter of the state and join to form the Alabama River at Wetumpka. The Cahaba River begins in suburban Birmingham and joins the Alabama at Cahawba in Dallas County. The Alabama itself flows from Wetumpka to the Tombigbee cutoff, "an inglorious end," not far from Fort Mims in Baldwin County. As a result, Mobile features only incidentally in this narrative.

Jackson's tale encompasses not a little of the history of Alabama, from the first Indians to their wars with the whites, the era of King Cotton, Civil War, Reconstruction, and the economic exploitation of the "loafing streams." Indeed, Alabama Power Company's efforts to tame the rapids of the Coosa and Tallapoosa is a story that Jackson asserts "goes unappreciated to this day."

Modern industrial development of the rivers and attendant problems with pollution are treated with balance and care, but the reader comes away with a sobering sense of what has been lost. The Cahaba, still in a relatively natural state and undammed, is threatened by pesticides and waste treatment plants. The Alabama Department of Environmental Management is portrayed as at best inept and at worst in complicity with major industry in pollution of the rivers. Fundamentally, the problem lies in the fact that Alabama's rivers are regarded as economic rather than natural resources. Jackson contends that only when Alabamians demand stricter management will things improve.

Irrevocably altered by man and bent to his purposes, Alabama's rivers still provide scenes of breathtaking beauty. Harvey Jackson has given us an engaging, well-written history of these streams and the people who have struggled with them.

John Sledge                 Mobile Historical Development Commission

These three essays which are the revised texts of a lecture series Tindall gave at Georgia Southern University in 1992. They have as their general theme the changing ethnic composition of the South. Though once ethnically diverse, the population of the southern colonies in British North America, became more and more homogeneous as time passed. Since World War II, because of new immigrants moving into the South, the population is shifting back towards ethnic diversity. Thus, Tindall concludes, "the conviction grows that the region is at a new juncture in its history." In his first essay Tindall gives a short and concise introduction to immigration to the South during the last three hundred years. While in colonial times the mixture of American Indians, blacks, Scots, Jews, and Germans, together with Spanish and French settlers on the fringe of the southern colonies, formed a polyglot population, this composition had changed profoundly six decades later. The influx of white settlers put ever increasing pressure on the Indians, until President Jackson finally evicted them from their ancestral homelands. The spread of cotton production in the South stepped up the demand for black slaves. Except for southern towns and areas such as San Antonio, Texas, few immigrants made their way south. This made the southern white population predominantly native-born. With little foreign immigration two southern melting pots emerged—-one black, one white. They produced, what Tindall names in his second essay, the Ethnic Southerners, or "home grown outsiders in the nation."
Searching for reasons for the appearance of distinctive southerner, Tindall sketches out short portraits of those who sought rational explanations for regional differences. In the first two decades of this century Frederick Jackson Turner, after the disappearance of the frontier as a shaping force of the nation's past, explored the concept of sectionalism as a permanent feature in American history. Not much later a group of writers, known as Vanderbilt Agrarians, set out to defend the values of a traditional, more rural oriented South. In the 1930s sociologist Howard Odum became known as the main proponent of the regional school at North Carolina. While the New Deal’s attempts to fight poverty in the South were still at least partly based on an Odumesque vision of regionalism, the course of outward events put regionalism into hibernation. It took some time after the Second World War until interest in regionalism re-emerged, this time focusing on regional culture. Drawing upon the work of cultural geographer Wilbur Zelinsky and David Hackett Fisher’s not recent study Albion's Seed, Tindall suggests that cultural differences in the United States represent a transplanted European regionalism, brought to the New World by the first immigrants who settled in a certain region and later adopted by their descendants and other newcomers. “Regional” melting pots came into existence and continued to bubble. This might explain why Southerners were distinctive and different from people of other regions of the nation.

Only since World War II, as Tindall notes in the third essay, has new immigration to the South accounted for ethnic diversity, having its source not only in external immigration but also in internal migration. While Asians came to settle in the greater New Orleans area, Florida became known not only for Miami’s Little Havana but also for its high share of foreign-born inhabitants. At the beginning of this decade, the latter was twice as high as the nation’s average. Yet, the changing face of the southern population has been explored by only a few historians outside the circles of immigration research. How do the immigrants of today, for example, preserve their own language while they adapt themselves to the necessities of their new
home country? How do they vote? And, above all, what role does nativistic reactions to the renewed immigration play in contemporary politics? Such questions become, as Tindall asserts, more and more important in the post-New South.

Tindall's essays offer no new material, but do cover in relatively few pages the important facts in a readable and sometimes humorous style. They are a good introduction to the field of southern immigration history.

Martin Lorenz-Meyer University of Hamburg, Germany

*Mobile Customs House.* Mobile Public Library.
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*Slave Manifest. National Archives.*
From the Archives . . .
Local History in the Records of the Bureau of Customs, Mobile, Alabama

Clifton Dale Foster

In 1921 noted historian Samuel Eliot Morison proclaimed Massachusetts customs house records as, "the most important existing source for commerce, fishing, shipping and shipbuilding, since 1789." Morison was one of the first to recognize the great informational value of U.S. Customs Service records. Since then scholars have published numerous studies based on these records, ranging from local histories to complex quantitative analyses. Genealogists have long known the value of Customs Service passenger lists in researching family histories. Treasure hunters routinely scour wreck reports to trace the voyages of gold-laden vessels hoping to pinpoint the final resting place of sunken riches. These records document the daily operations of customs houses and are also a major source for information on domestic and foreign trade. With Customs Service duty stations in every United States port, these records give us a glimpse into an otherwise obscure past.

The largest collection of Customs Service records for Mobile, Alabama is located in the National Archives. They date from 1806 to 1936 and comprise some 550 linear feet. They are described here because they contain valuable information that has scarcely been used by writers of Mobile's history. One reason for this may be that, until now, no published inventory of these records was available. Yet this is one of the largest single collections of historical documentation concerning Mobile's early history.

The customs house served an important function in Mobile, housing not only the Customs Service but also the post office, U.S. Depository, and other federal offices. Thus, these records contain a
wealth of information on one of the South's leading ports and commercial trade centers. They document imports and exports, passenger arrivals, the domestic slave trade, Prohibition, seamen's service, Chinese laborers, wartime events, operations of the Marine Hospital, shipwrecks, lighthouse operations, and much more.

The first customs district located in what later became Alabama was established at Fort Stoddert along the Mobile River on February 24, 1804. At that time, the city of Mobile was occupied by the Spanish, as was all the territory south of Ellicott's line (thirty-first parallel). Lieutenant Edmond Pendleton Gaines was the first Collector of Customs, replaced in 1810 by Dennison Darling. Addin Lewis is credited with being the first Collector of Customs for the city of Mobile, although he was actually appointed to the post while Mobile was still under Spanish rule. During that period American goods imported or exported through Fort Stoddert still had to pass through Spanish held Mobile. The Spanish commandant there collected a customs duty of twelve and one-half percent ad valorem.

When Mobile was captured by American General James Wilkinson in 1813, the customs collector occupied the second story of an old Spanish building at Government and St. Emanuel Streets. Beginning in 1822 Blakely maintained its own collector, Frederick Miller, until that port was absorbed into the Mobile District in 1831. In that year, a new customs house was erected on the southwest corner of St. Francis and Royal Streets. By 1850 the building had become so dilapidated that Congress authorized the construction of a new customs house on adjoining land. Construction of this formidable granite structure began in 1854. The Collector of Customs occupied the building in 1856.

During the Civil War the customs house at Mobile was seized by the State of Alabama and later transferred to the Confederate States of America. Although the port was under Union blockade during the conflict, the customs house still operated on a limited basis, primarily as the headquarters for a Confederate ordnance battery. Thaddeus Sanford, Collector of Customs for Mobile, left the
city in May, 1862 for Montgomery, leaving a deputy in charge of the customs house.

The war had relatively little effect upon the operations of the Customs Service outside the South. After the conflict ended, the Mobile customs collector resumed his duties with the United States Customs Service. Although some additional duties were assigned, little organizational legislation was enacted which affected the Mobile District until 1913 when it was reorganized to include all ports in Alabama and along the Mississippi Gulf Coast. The Collector of Customs continued to operate out of the antebellum customs house until 1964 when it was demolished to make room for an unsightly thirty-three story bank building.

The records described below are selected archival inventory entries for Mobile Customs Service records housed in the National Archives and Records Administration. Due to the voluminous amount of records available, a complete inventory is not feasible here. Entries were selected which contribute significant new information about Mobile's history and the operations of the customs house. In some instances, multiple archival series are described in a single entry.

These records are part of Record Group 36, Records of the Bureau of Customs. They presently reside in the National Archives Building (Archives I) located at Seventh Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW in Washington, D.C. Research inquiries by mail can be addressed to Archives I Reference Branch, Textual Reference Division, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. 20408. Telephone inquiries can be directed to (202) 501-5385. E-mail inquiries can be addressed to inquire@arch2.nara.gov. The National Archives also maintains an informative World Wide Web site at http://www.nara.gov.

Selected Inventory

Copies (handwritten and press copies) of letters sent from the Collector of Customs, the Superintendent and Engineer at Fort Morgan, the Lighthouse Inspector's Office, and the U.S. Depository at Mobile. Letters were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, Auditor of the Treasury, Commissioner of Navigation, the Bureau of Statistics, other government officials, foreign officials, and private individuals regarding the work of the customs house, accounts, shipping, statistics, and various other matters.

Letters Received. 1832-1923. 240 vols. 52 linear feet. (Series 1546).

Letters from the Secretary of the Treasury, foreign consuls, Bureau of Statistics, Auditor of the Treasury, other government officials, and private individuals to the Collector of Customs, the U.S. Depository, the Custodian, and other customs house offices. Also included are circulars from the Treasury Department, decisions, vouchers, and receipts. Arranged chronologically.

Correspondence Regarding the Revenue Cutter Service. 1821-1905, 1914-17. 4.5 linear feet. (Series 1547).

Letters, records, reports, and vouchers concerning the operations of the service. Mobile was the homeport of the revenue cutter Alabama. Arranged chronologically.

Correspondence and Reports Regarding Prohibition. 1910-29. 15.5 linear inches. (Series 1548 A).

Letters, vouchers, and daily reports of agents dealing with the enforcement of Prohibition. Daily reports contain information on surveillance, informants, confiscations, and arrests. Arranged by name of agent and thereunder chronologically.

Correspondence and Papers of the Collector's Office. 1815-1930. 5 linear feet. (Series 1549 D).
Letters sent and received and other records concerning shipping and the duties of the office. Correspondence with the Treasury Department, various government offices, and private individuals. Arranged chronologically.

Correspondence and Records of the Superintendent of Lights. 1838-1880. 10 linear inches. (Series 1550).

Concerning personnel and appropriations mostly. Includes oaths of office, salary appropriations, and letters concerning employees. Also includes reports on lighthouse operations and accounts.

Record of Vessel Entrances and Clearances. 1837-1926. 80 vols. and unbound papers. 8 linear feet. (Series 1555, 1555 A-1555 E).

Daily registers of foreign and American vessels engaged in foreign and coastal trade that entered and cleared the port. For each vessel is given the date entered or cleared port, rig, nationality, name of vessel, origination or destination, number of crew, and a brief description of cargo. Records for subports are included. Quarterly abstracts are available for the years 1837-40.

Slave Manifests. 1820-60. 6 linear feet. (Series 1556, 1556 A).

Manifests for slaves entering or leaving Mobile via seagoing vessels. Each manifest shows the name of vessel, port of origin, berth, name of vessel master, name of slave, sex, age, stature, class, and name of shipper or owner with their place of residence, usually state or county. Outward slave manifests also give destination of vessel. Manifests are arranged by inward voyages and outward voyages and thereunder chronologically.

Cargo Manifests. 1811, 1818-1918. 169 linear feet. (Series 1557).

Manifests for foreign and domestic cargo entering and leaving the port. Gives name of vessel, nationality, rig, tonnage, master, origination or destination, where built, owner, where registered, and
number of passengers. Also gives a description of cargo, by whom shipped, to whom consigned, and consignee’s residence. Manifests are often accompanied by supporting documentation such as licenses, permits, bills of health, and other documents. Arranged chronologically.

Copies of Cargo Manifests - Fort Stoddert. 1806-11. 1 vol. 1 linear inch. (Series 1557 A).

Handwritten copies of cargo manifests for goods entering Fort Stoddert. Manifests are usually for vessels of small size such as a schooner, perogue, canoe, or pack horse. Gives vessel name, origination or destination, rig, master, tonnage, description of packages and contents, shipper’s name and residence, consignees, and date. Arranged chronologically.

Passenger Lists. 1820-1905. 2 vols. and unbound papers. 8 linear inches. (Series 1558).

Gives name of vessel, port of origin, name of vessel master, and usually type of vessel. Also shown are names of passengers, age, sex, occupation, country or city of residence, and the country or city in which they intend to become residences. Arranged chronologically. Microfilm copies of abstracts of Mobile passenger lists for 1832-52 can be found in Copies of Lists of Passengers Arriving at Miscellaneous Ports on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts and at Ports on the Great Lakes, 1820-1873, National Archives Microcopy No. 575, Roll 4.¹³

Shipping Articles. 1830-87. 8 linear feet. (Series 1561).

Lists of crew members for vessels engaged in coastwise trade. Gives names of crewmen, station, age, height, wages, birthplace, time of service, name of vessel, vessel origination and destination, and master’s name. Arranged chronologically by date of voyage.

Crew Lists. 1823-1903. 27 linear feet. (Series 1561 A).
For vessels engaged in foreign trade. Gives vessel name, master, vessel origination or destination, names of crewmen, place of birth, residence, citizenship, age, height, complexion, and color of hair. Arranged chronologically.


Required after May 1, 1875, to be kept by the captain or owner of any vessel subject to hospital tax. The time-book was used in the assessment of marine hospital taxes which were taken from the wages of officers and seamen. Gives name of vessel, names of seamen, rating, date of hire, date of discharge, time employed, and remarks (wages or tax collected). Arranged alphabetically by name of vessel, each volume relating to a single vessel.

Records of Imports and Exports. 1811-1917.

Data on imports and exports are disbursed throughout numerous series in the collection. These include Abstracts of Tonnage Duties (Series 1562), Register of Tonnage Entered and Cleared (Series 1562 C), Impost Books (Series 1563), Record of Imports (Series 1564), Invoices of Imports (1564 A), Entry of Merchandise (Series 1564 C), Statements of Imports (Series 1564 D), Record of Exports (1567), and Abstracts of Import Duties (Series 1574), among others.

Bonds for Vessels in Spanish Trade. 1847-59. 2 vols. 3 linear inches. (Series 1566).

Bonds to insure that merchandise exported would not land in Cuba or Puerto Rico, and that a certificate from an American consul would be produced. Gives names of exporters and a description of goods exported. Arranged chronologically.

Wreck Reports. 1875-96. 2 vols. 2 inches. (Series 1569).
Gives date, name of vessel, rig, nationality, master, value of ship and cargo, destination, locality of wreck, cause, and other information about the nature of the ship, cargo, and wreck. Arranged chronologically.

Records of the Marine Hospital. 1837-78. 1.5 linear feet. (Series 1572 A).

Includes correspondence, diet lists, certificates of examination, and supply proposals. Arranged chronologically.

Daily Time Record–Fort Morgan. 1861-62. 1 vol. 1 linear inch. (Series 1580).

Gives name of employee, occupation, date, number of days worked, if transferred or discharged, and amount paid. For slaves, the roll lists name of slave and owner, and amount paid to owner. Arranged chronologically.

Stubs of Licenses Issued to Businesses at Mobile. 1864-65. 1 vol. .5 linear inches. (Series 1587).

Kept by Confederate officials. Gives date, name of businessman to whom license was issued, kind of business, and amount of license fee. Arranged chronologically.

Civil War Diary. 1862. 2 vols. 1 linear inch. (Series 1605).

Kept by L. R. Evans, Captain of Artillery (CSA) on ordnance duty in Mobile at the Confederate customs house. It chronicles the daily events at the customs house. One volume concerns lists of ordnance. Some pages have been torn from one volume.

Letters and Records of the Army of Mississippi and East Louisiana (CSA). 1861-64. 5 linear inches. (Series 1605 A).
Letters, telegrams, orders, and other papers received by Captain L. R. Evans, Chief of Ordnance (CSA). Also includes requisitions for ordnance and ordnance stores.

Oaths of Amnesty. 1865. 3 linear inches. (Series 1610).

The oath of amnesty was required of each ex-Confederate to vow that he was loyal to the United States. The oath was to defend the Constitution and abide by all laws made during the "rebellion" with reference to the emancipation of slavery. Arranged chronologically.

Records of Chinese Laborers Deported. 1898-1903. 1 vol. and unbound papers. 3 linear inches. (Series 1615).

Descriptive lists of Chinese laborers in transit through the United States. Gives names of laborers, age, occupation, residence, height, complexion, color of eyes, date arrived in Mobile, on what vessel, and destination. Also included are letters and oaths concerning Chinese laborers and merchants. Some photographs are included. Arranged chronologically.

Portage Books for the steamer Electra. 1911-1912. 11 vols. 9 linear inches. (Series 1617 B).

Record of expenses for supplies and wages for each trip. Arranged chronologically.


Contains three documents: a slave manifest dated June 8, 1826, one letter from the customs house at Blakely dated September 15, 1824, and one letter dated May 26, 1821 from Andrew Jackson to the Collector of Customs at Mobile. According to a note accompanying the documents, they were received with a letter from
the Collector at Mobile addressed to the Bureau of Customs, dated May 8, 1958.

Sketch of Marine Hospital at Mobile, Alabama. ca. 1927. 1 sheet. (Series 1617-G).

Architectural drawing of the front side of the hospital building.

Notes

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3. Of the scholarly histories of Mobile, only Arthur W. Bergeron's, Confederate Mobile (Jackson, Miss.: University Press of Mississippi, 1991) makes substantial use of the records of the Bureau of Customs.

4. Gaines is generally credited as the first Collector of Customs at Fort Stoddert although Captain Peter Schuyler was commandant of the fort when the district was established in 1804. Gaines served under Schuyler until 1806 when he was at that time appointed commandant. See James W. Silver, Edmund Pendleton Gaines: Frontier General (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1949), 8-11. Records of the U.S. Customs Service Public Affairs Office list Gaines' appointment as temporary collector on July 3, 1804 and as permanent Collector of Customs on November 22, 1804.


6. The collection district of Blakely included the Alabama, Middle, and Tensaw Rivers, plus the waters of the east side of Mobile Bay, and rivers emptying into the Gulf of Mexico. Few customs records exist relating to the Blakely operation. Some marine records for Blakely are available in the National Archives, Records of the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation (Record Group 41).

Additional records for the Confederate Customs District of Mobile can be found in the Treasury Department Collection of Confederate Records. For a description of these records, see Carmelita S. Ryan, ed., Preliminary Inventory of the Treasury Department Collection of Confederate Records (Record Group 365) (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Service, 1967).


The District of Mobile was reorganized to include “all of the State of Alabama and all that part of the State of Mississippi lying south of 31° north latitude, with district headquarters at Mobile, in which Mobile, Birmingham, Gulfport and Scranton shall be ports of entry.” Congressional Record. 62nd Cong., 3rd sess., 1913. Vol. 49, pt. 5, 4703.

For a complete inventory of the Mobile customs house records, see Clifton Dale Foster, “Inventory of the Records of the Bureau of Customs, Mobile, Alabama District, Record Group 36 (NNFJ 82-008),” (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Service, 1982, typescript). For a description of the records for all customs districts, see Forrest R. Holdcamper, “Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Bureau of Customs (NC-154),” (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Service, 1968, typescript). Both of the above inventories were compiled as in-house research documents and were not published in the National Archives’ preliminary inventory series.

Other records relating to the Customs Service in Mobile can be found in the General Records of the Treasury Department housed in the National Archives. For a description of these records see Carmelita S. Ryan and Hope K. Holdcamper, eds., Preliminary Inventory of the General Records of the Treasury Department, Record Group 56 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Service, 1977). The Alabama Department of Archives and History houses an unprocessed collection of 42 cubic feet of records from the Mobile Collector of Customs. These records date ca. 1870-1931 and contain largely financial accounts of the customs office in conducting the daily business of the port. The Southeast Regional Office of the National Archives also houses a small unprocessed collection of customs records from Mobile in the Maritime Records collection. These records date ca. 1845-1970 and comprise some 30 cubic feet. The collection contains primarily vessel inspection and licensing documentation.

Additional passenger lists dating between 1838 and 1863 can be found in the Mobile Municipal Archives. For a description of these records see Clifton Dale Foster, Tracey J. Berezansky, and E. Frank Roberts, A Guide to the Mobile Municipal Archives (Mobile, Ala.: Mobile Municipal Archives, 1986). These passenger lists were transcribed in Lucille Mallon Connick’s, Lists of Ships Passengers, Mobile, Alabama, 2 vols. (Mobile, Ala.: Lucille Mallon Connick, 1988 & 1989).

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