


G/C Gulf Coast **H/R** Historical Review

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From the Editors. . . .

For our first issue in a remarkably controversial quincentenary year we bring you four articles on the colonial era along the Gulf Coast. Then, all logic aside, in the fall we will publish the Proceedings issue for the recent Gulf Coast History and Humanities Conference. Its title will be "Discovery and Exploration along the Gulf Coast." Though we are putting the colonial cart before the explorers' horse the articles in the next two issues will be among the best published on the quincentennial theme in the United States this year.

Three of the four articles in this issue were papers presented at the Gulf Coast History and Humanities Conference in Pensacola last fall. Only Dr. Taylor's study of the abortive Republic of West Florida was not, but it fit in so well that we thought the four should stand together. In a surprise twist the United States is the colonial power in Taylor's story as it brushed aside expressions of local sentiment in a "prelude to manifest destiny." All the articles share the common theme that colonial policy was a product of tension. Sometimes it was European-Indian tension, but often it was local colonizer v. imperial authority. Sometimes the colonizer took the more enlightened view, even regarding Indian affairs, as Prof. Denham demonstrates in his account of Denys Rolle. In all too many cases the wisdom of the "man on the spot" is overlooked or discounted, as Grant describes in the saga of Ft. Toulouse, and he is obliged to get along as well as he can on his own. Finally, Edward Cashin introduces us to a colonial official, Henry Ellis, who played a major role, not only as a governor, but also in an official capacity in London. Ellis was successful both in colonial North America and in the metropolis.

The four articles remind us that colonial policy was not as simply formed and applied as some would suggest, and that the changes it brought to North America were often the product of a clash of wills and a lack of understanding of the options available. If the colonial period in the old Southwest and along the Gulf Coast is marked by confused purpose, flawed understanding, and physical hardships, how can we help but find complexity and cross-purposes in the era of discovery and exploration that precedes it? These four articles show us variety in the "colonial experience" and that leads us to expect more of the same as we travel further back in time in our next issue.

Joining the articles are reviews of nearly a score of books on the Gulf Coast. It is gratifying indeed to see so many scholars working on the history of our region. It is worth noting how many of these authors and presses are not domiciled along the Gulf Coast, illustrating our contention that the study of the region should never be limited to those actually residing in the area.

Finally "From the Archives" takes us to the collections of the Historical Pensacola Preservation Board. Besides its sizeable museum operations the Board has a large and diverse collection of archival material focusing on West Florida which many of our readers may find most useful.

So if we begin the anniversary year of Columbus' discovery with an examination of the variations on a colonial theme and then work backwards in time in our next issue, we ask our readers' indulgence. Actually, once you start reading you probably will be too engrossed to ask for anything . . . except, more.

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
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Map by Jerry Dixon

Fort Toulouse and the North American Southeast, 1700-1764

Ethan A. Grant

In the mainstream of American colonial history, the role played by Europeans and their native allies in the present day southeastern United States has been largely neglected or dismissed. While never the central area of contact and conflict, events in the region were an important consideration for policy makers in London, Paris, and Madrid. One location in particular was a focus of attention for the French and the British. This paper examines the impact of Fort Toulouse on regional history from its founding in 1717 until its evacuation in 1764.

The exploration of the mouth of the Mississippi in 1682 by La Salle marked the beginning of a three-way colonial confrontation.¹ At stake was the wealth of the interior of North America, its hides, its pelts; as well as a native population to absorb French and English goods. Also at stake was access to the trade of Spanish America.

In response to the threat of French possession of the Gulf Coast, the Spanish permanently settled Pensacola in 1699. The French, carrying through with their long-range plan for dominance in North America, founded Biloxi in 1699, and Mobile in 1702.² Spain had the additional concern of a British threat from Carolina. St. Augustine had been nearly destroyed in 1702 by an expedition from Carolina under Governor Moore.³ The Spanish crown and the Council of the Indies fully expected continued conflict for control of the region. After the raid on St. Augustine by the English, events in the south remained at a tense but peaceful standoff. While extensive in European terms, the War of Spanish Succession had little affect in North America.

Although there was negligible contact between French Louisiana and Spanish Florida, as the century progressed it became an unspoken assumption that the French located in the southeast were to serve as a shield for New Spain against the English.⁴ A Spanish presence could be found only at St. Augustine, and thinly garrisoned Pensacola and St. Marks.

Spanish and English conflict in North America ended as well, although rivalry at sea brought war in 1739. After a brief expedition to Fort San Diego north of St. Augustine in 1743, the British ceased to threaten East Florida, which was peacefully ceded to the them in 1763.⁵

As Franco-Spanish and Anglo-Spanish rivalries faded, Anglo-French rivalry increased. The English feared the creation of a chain of French outposts encircling their English colonies, limiting both territorial expansion and the Indian trade. Even worse, the French might conquer their colonies.

By 1715 this French objective seemed attainable. From Fort Louisbourg at the north and east to Mobile at the south, the French possessed that string of military and commercial outposts along the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi rivers, down to the Gulf of Mexico. The weakest link was Louisiana, the newest and least developed area of expansion. Without a fort in the interior, Mobile was helpless against English-sponsored Indian attacks.

The French were trying to enter an area which had been an exclusive English trading preserve for at least thirty years. Encouraged by the English from Carolina, the Cherokee and the Creek resisted French efforts to trade, and threatened to destroy Mobile and Biloxi. To secure Louisiana, the French sought a presence in the interior among the Indians.

From the beginning of French occupation of the Gulf Coast, the English had alliances with the Indians against both the French and the Spanish. An effort to trade with the Alabamas in 1704 resulted in the death of a number of Frenchmen in Indian territory. The military commander of Louisiana, Jean Baptiste LeMoyne de Bienville, led an ambitious expedition against that tribe to punish them. Although his native allies gradually disappeared on the way to the Alabamas, he managed to arrive in their territory with nearly fifty French soldiers. The ensuing battle, while inconclusive, did "spread great terror among our enemies as we learned afterwards." ⁶

Bienville, a master of Indian relations, was able to report four years later that the French were at peace with their native neighbors, especially the Alabama. A brief period of conflict in 1709 ended at the request of the Indians. ⁷ By 1716 French goodwill was of sufficient strength to successfully broker with the Alabama and other area tribes for peace with the Spanish. ⁸

The Yamasee War of 1715-1716 gave the French their long-hoped-for opportunity to expand into the interior. The conflict rose in part from Carolina traders whose monopoly of the deerskin trade allowed them to charge high prices. Often an Indian got only enough for rum, but not the necessities of life when he sold his hides. Another problem was the growing practice of traders enslaving their erstwhile trading partners and sending them to the West Indies. ⁹

The Indians knew that French trade goods were of poorer quality and higher price than those of the English, but knew as well that the French were not there to settle, would not convert trade debts to land cessions, and generally would not enslave them. Further, French competition might cause a general reduction in the price of trade goods.

The end of a commercial proprietorship held by Antoine Crozat gave Bienville an opportunity to fulfill the strategic plan of the Ministry of Marine. While governor from late 1716 until November 4, 1717, he acted to accomplish the goal of an interior fort to protect Fort St. Louis at Mobile. ¹⁰

Bienville knew the reports of Alabama hostility to the French sent from Governor Antoine de La Mothe Cadillac to Crozat were erroneous. Cadillac was French-born and ignorant of Indian languages and customs. Bienville was Canadian-born, and spoke many of the native languages.

Further, he had an agent among the Alabama, one Saint-Michel. The latter, while young in years, had spent much time with the Alabamas, and spoke their language. In 1716 Saint-Michel reported to Bienville that the Alabamas were ready to accept French trade, and a military force in their territory. He also spoke of a gold mine in the area. ¹¹

Early in 1717 chiefs from the Alabama tribe of the Upper Creek Confederation journeyed to Mobile and invited the French to establish a fort in their territory.¹² In July of that year a French expedition led by the fellow Canadian son-in-law of Bienville, Lieutenant de La Tour Vitral, set out for the Alabama nation. La Tour, with a detachment of twenty soldiers and an interpreter, began to build a fort on the Coosa River, near its junction with the Tallapoosa. He would remain as commander of the fort until replaced due to illness in 1720.¹³

The lieutenant's arrival was timely. Within a week, a party of British arrived in the area as well. Two months after beginning to build the fort, Bienville reported to France that:

Mr. de La Tour addressed to me, Sir, the letter that I have the honor of sending to you herewith which will inform you that thirteen Englishmen have arrived at the Tallapoosas [who are] neighbors of the Alabamas, to try to make peace with that nation and *with the said other one. There is ground for fearing* that they may succeed since Mr. de La Tour does not have one sou's worth of merchandise to have *presents made to the Indians to oppose* those the English will be able to make them.¹⁴

That shortage was made good by an emergency shipment of trade goods from Mobile and even some borrowed from Spanish Pensacola.

The lieutenant could not have chosen a better site. The new fort sat astride the English "lower" trading trail to the Creeks, and to the Choctaws to the west.¹⁵ It forced English traders to the Chickasaw to the north and west to divert to the "high" trail which passed through Upper Creek lands in the north. To avoid Fort Toulouse, English traders had to travel farther and the potential existed to strangle English trade, if the right Indian allies could be gained.

Given even handed treatment by the Indians, "The fort of Toulouse . . . is the key to the country. It is maintained only because of the neighboring nations, [who by] observing neutrality, do not permit us to harm the English or to receive any harm from them. . . ." ¹⁶

Fort Toulouse, also called the Alabama fort, or the post at the Alabamons, would play a pivotal role in the history of the Southeast from its founding in 1717 until its evacuation in 1764. It would serve a number of purposes. In addition to controlling the trading trails, it was far closer to Mobile than Charleston. The need to shorten distances traveled to trade with the Indians was a motivation for the English founding of Georgia in 1733. The fort represented the southern and eastern prong of a French pincer to surround English America.

Ft. Toulouse functioned as a trading post, an armed embassy among the Indians, a listening post to Carolina and Georgia, and neutral ground for negotiations to settle disputes and conflicts between and among the tribes of the region.¹⁷ The small size of its garrison, never more than the forty-eight reached in 1760, was offset by the unwavering support of the Alabamas. Foreign policy makers in London and Paris could not neglect its presence and importance.

The French took special pains, generally successfully, to keep the good will of the Alabamas. For that reason, regardless of the state of supplies of trade goods and arms in the rest of Louisiana, French governors made sure a fair share was available for Fort Toulouse. Compared to other interior outposts, Toulouse fared well in the price of trade goods to the Indians. The Alabama there paid the same price as at Mobile, a practice unique in the colony.¹⁸ In 1738, twenty-one years after the founding of the fort, the governor of Louisiana, Jean Baptiste Lemoyne Bienville, was able to report to Jerome Phelypeaux de Maurepas, Minister of Marine, that: "The Alabamas have the reputation among the other nations of being men of intelligence and of good counsel. Furthermore, they are of all the Indians the ones most devoted to our interests, and I am convinced that they will act with good faith and severity to frustrate the English whom they do not like and have reason to distrust."¹⁹

Three years later the fort served as an embassy. Although it was to be expected that the French would attempt the extirpation of the Chickasaw for siding with the English, in 1741 the French arranged a meeting at Toulouse of twenty Chickasaw and several Choctaw chiefs to conclude a peace treaty between them.²⁰ Among its other functions, the fort and its proximity seem to have represented neutral territory.

Because the English traded in towns as close as five miles from the fort, the French could get goods which were in short supply from the English through Indian intermediaries, even during war time. The practice reached such an alarming volume after 1758 that the war leader, William Pitt, felt compelled to write a general letter to the governors in America. In it he enjoined army and navy commanders to search out and end such practices, "[On] the Continent of America, and particularly to the Rivers Mobile, and Mississippi, by which [allowing trade with] the Enemy is to the greatest Reproach & Detriment of Government." He ordered the Indian trading scheme to cease immediately and threatened severe penalties for disobedience.²¹

The fort could serve as a haven as well. Eighty Shawnee from the north settled near the fort to seek protection from the Iroquois, who were allies of the English. They "begged" the French to allow them to stay and for a trader to be sent among them, "in order that they have no dealings with the English." They felt safe in a province governed after 1742 by Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil. His father when governor of New France had treated Shawnees fairly.²²

A long-standing trust developed between the French and their Alabama allies. In the forty-seven years that the fort was occupied, the French harmed not one Alabama, and Alabamas harmed not a single Frenchman. One hundred-sixty Frenchmen and their families were settled around the fort when it and they were evacuated in 1764.²³

The success of the French at Toulouse could have served as a guide for their Indian policy in the rest of Louisiana. Unfortunately it did not. Characteristic of the overall foreign policy of Louis XV, effort was sporadic, unfocused, and

inadequate. Maurepaus, Minister of Marine, responsible for both navy and colonies was capable and far-sighted. But he lacked the necessary political and financial support for several reasons.

At the beginning of his reign Louis XV faced a considerable national debt. John Law and the crash of the Mississippi Bubble in 1720 gave Louisiana a bad image with potential investors. Further, the experiment with private administration of the colony left it starved for supplies and men even after its reversion to the crown in 1716. When Louisiana became a royal colony again in 1720, the financial state of France was even worse than before Law and his scheme, and this was reflected in the supply of trade goods in the colonies.

Despite all difficulties, and due in large part to Bienville and then Vaudreuil who were very able governors, Louisiana survived, if only barely. The trust gained in New France from the seventeenth century, and in Louisiana since 1717 allowed at least Alabama support and Choctaw neutrality, even through the naval blockade during the War of Austrian Succession. Those two groups of Indians would buy from the English only when absolutely necessary, even though Indians allied to the English were better clothed and armed.²⁴

This was demonstrated in a speech given to an influential group of Cherokee chiefs. The speaker, Lieutenant Robert Wall, was trying to warn the Cherokee of Tellico, an important village, what to expect if they allied with the French: "I shall conclude this Subject with desiring you to turn your Eyes and behold the unhappy and wretched Condition of the great Nation of the Chactaws who are near neighbors to the French and ask you if you ever saw them well clothed like the Cherrockees? No! They are almost starved and quite naked. . . ." ²⁵

While the English had less severe supply problems than the French, the benign neglect of Whitehall gave them organizational problems. They could not have firm policy direction in their highly decentralized system. In theory the Secretary of State for the South was responsible for Indian policy, in practice this was left to the individual American colonies.

From the day they were founded, the English colonies were seldom able to act in concert even to a direct and common threat. In the early and mid-eighteenth century, Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia were dealing with the tribes closest to them, but without co-ordination. Consequently, both Virginia and South Carolina dealt with the Cherokee, and South Carolina and Georgia with the Choctaw, Creek, and Chickasaw.

To correct the problem, the Crown named a superintendent for northern Indians in 1755, and one for the southern tribes the next year.²⁶ As a wartime measure it worked well in the north, but less so in the south. The central problem was not the office and its authority, but the person chosen.

Edmund Atkin had been involved in political controversy in South Carolina. Although he had been appointed by the Board of Trade, he reported indirectly to the Duke of Newcastle, First Lord of the Treasury; and directly to Henry Fox, Secretary of State for the South. Neither cared for him, and in the context of English politics of the time that meant any assistance he received, such as a salary or supplies, would be slow and reluctant.²⁷

His problems did not end there. Atkin had to deal with each southern colonial governor individually. To a man they were ill-disposed to surrender zealously guarded authority. Further, their interest lie in exploiting the Indians and getting their lands.²⁸ He wanted to reform the deerskin trade and eliminate exploitation of the Indians, and was sincerely interested in their welfare.

This was the situation in the southern colonies in the first years of the French and Indian War in North America. Both of the combatants had a serious problem. Locally, the French had a clear and effective Indian policy. Their action was limited by a government which placed a low priority on supply to Louisiana and by English control of the sea. With a generous supply of goods and arms, they would have been able to take the offensive against the English. In 1757 they even had a fair chance to enlist the Cherokee as their allies.

The English faced no problem in supply, but were unable to present a united political and military front against the French. Despite Fort Toulouse's small garrison, the governor of South Carolina estimated that two thousand troops would be required to reduce it.²⁹ Without fail the British overestimated the strength of the French fort. As early as 1720 letters to the Board of Trade from Carolina used terms such as "formitable" [*sic*] or "daunting" when speaking of plans to remove French influence in the interior.³⁰ Since no one colony could supply a large enough force, no action was taken against Fort Toulouse.

If the war in the north involved active combat operations, the action in the south might most accurately be described as a "cold war." It was very much a process of trade strategies, posturing, feint, and counter-feint, and trying to gain advantage over the other through Indian proxies. Fort Toulouse blocked English activity in the area west of it, and possibly threatened Georgia and South Carolina as well if French regulars arrived in any real strength.

To counter Toulouse the English desired a fort on the Tennessee River, to protect their Cherokee allies and threaten the French outposts at Natchez, Vincennes, and St. Louis. They got their opportunity in 1756 when Old Hopp, the Cherokee emperor, invited the English to build near Tomatley.³¹ It would be called Fort Loudoun, after Earl of Loudoun, commander of English forces in North America until his replacement in December 1757.³²

In response the French continued to woo Tellico, one of the "home" or major villages of the Cherokee. The result was a treaty between the French and some of the Cherokee which would have lessened or replaced trade with the English.³³ Its full implementation would have dealt a serious blow to the influence and importance of Fort Loudoun. Tellico was only about twenty miles from the English fort. A permanent French presence there would have canceled the advantage gained in the Tennessee River basin with Fort Loudoun.³⁴

This never happened for two reasons. First, the French were not able to supply the quantity of goods specified in the treaty. Second, the English still commanded the allegiance of powerful chiefs in the Cherokee nation. Matters continued in that vein in the interior of the southern English colonies. Protracted French occupation of Fort Toulouse came about due to the inability of the English to mount an offensive. Not that Whitehall was unaware of the situation.

In a frequently cited letter from William Pitt to South Carolina Governor Lyttelton, Pitt ordered that after the northern campaign was completed successfully: "If an attack on the Alabama Fort should be practicable to be made . . . that you by all proper and safe Opportunities, correspond with Admiral Boscawen and Major General Amherst on this subject . . . [and] you should use your utmost Endeavors to set to Foot and encourage an Expedition from your Province against the Alabama Fort." ³⁵

The replacement of Henry Fox with William Pitt as Secretary of State for the South in 1757 improved the situation of Edmund Atkin whom Pitt respected more than Fox had. After Pitt pressured Lyttelton of South Carolina and Ellis of Georgia, Atkin mounted a successful diplomatic and trading expedition to some tribes of the Lower Creeks, and negotiated a trading treaty with several towns within twenty miles of Fort Toulouse. Under protection of the Alabama, he even visited the fort, though he was attacked by a Choctaw on his way back to Charleston in 1758. ³⁶

In 1760 the Cherokee raided frontier outposts from Virginia to South Carolina. ³⁷ This was the third year of tension, and serious fighting erupted. The French played a minimal role in this conflict, as Louisiana could provide little beyond powder and ammunition to its Indian allies. ³⁸ War with the Cherokee ended any chance that the English would be able to drive the French out of Fort Toulouse and the rest of Louisiana. Any available troops would have to be employed elsewhere.

Though an English expedition under Colonel Alexander Montgomery was able to drive the Cherokee off the frontier, success came too late for Fort Loudoun. The fort, far beyond the limits of settlement and population, was starved into submission in August 1761. Despite a promise of safe conduct from the Cherokee, the enfeebled and diseased garrison was attacked shortly after quitting the fort; its commander, Lieutenant Demere, and many of his troops were massacred. ³⁹

By the Treaty of Paris in 1763 the French were required to cede their holdings in the south to the English. Fort Toulouse was of course part of that cession. The chief worry of the French in Louisiana was the safety of the garrison and settlers there. The Alabama were not at all pleased to be abandoned, in their eyes, by their allies and friends of forty-seven years. ⁴⁰

There would be no change of colors at Fort Toulouse. The Alabama would not have an English garrison. They feared poor treatment and reprisal for their years of friendship with the French. The fort which had been among, but never directed against the Alabama, would be occupied only by an English trader after French evacuation. ⁴¹

On January 15, 1764, Fort Toulouse, the last French post in Louisiana was evacuated. The English commander at Mobile had ordered the French to stay. There was a dispute over the disposition of the powder and cannon at the fort. Nevertheless, with growing fear that the Alabama would endanger the French there, the commander of the fort decided possible imprisonment in Mobile was preferable to a potential massacre. ⁴²

From 1717, and especially after 1757, the question of the strength of the fort was of importance. Whether or not Fort Toulouse was impregnable will never be known. The correspondence of the French governors suggests it was not. The correspondence of the English suggests they believed it was. When a force was available to direct against the fort, it had to be used against the Cherokee. In the end, Fort Toulouse was not lost by the French, but given away; a pawn, or rather castle, in the chess game of international politics.

Notes

¹ John Francis Bannon, *The Spanish Borderlands Frontier, 1513-1821* (Albuquerque, 1974), 94.

² *Ibid.*, 109.

³ John Francis Bannon, ed., *Bolton and the Spanish Borderlands* (Norman, 1964), 146.

⁴ Donald J. Lemieux, "The Mississippi Valley, New France, and French Colonial Policy," *Southern Studies* 17, no. 1 (Spring 1978): 53.

⁵ John Jay Tepaske, *The Governorship of Spanish Florida, 1700-1763* (Durham, 1964), 154.

⁶ Dunbar Rowland and A. G. Sanders, eds., *Mississippi Provincial Archives, 1729-1740: French Dominion* (Jackson, 1927, 1929, 1932), 3: 22.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 3: 111, 128.

⁸ Marcel Giraud, *Histoire de la Louisiane Française* (Paris, 1953, 1958, 1966), 2: 215.

⁹ Daniel H. Thomas, *Fort Toulouse: The French Outpost at the Alabamas on the Coosa* (Tuscaloosa, 1989), 7.

¹⁰ Rowland, *French Dominion*, 3: 10.

¹¹ Giraud, *Louisiane*, 2: 148.

¹² Thomas, *Fort Toulouse*, 9.

¹³ Giraud, *Louisiane*, 2: 152, 3: 366.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 3: 222-24. Italics written in the original by La Tour for emphasis.

¹⁵ Patricia Dillion Woods, *French-Indian Relations on the Southern Frontier, 1699-1762* (Ann Arbor, 1980), 52.

¹⁶ Diron D'Artaquette to Maurepas, September 1, 1734, in Rowland, *French Dominion*, 1: 253.

¹⁷ Thomas, *Fort Toulouse*, 32, 42, 49.

¹⁸ Giraud, *Louisiane*, 3: 389.

¹⁹ Bienville to Maurepas, July 15, 1738, in Rowland, *French Dominion*, 3: 720.

²⁰ Bienville to Maurepas, September 30, 1741, in Rowland, *French Dominion*, 3: 721.

Augustine should also be improved as a check against any Spanish threat from Havana.⁴² Thus Ellis's continuing interest in the southern frontier and Gulf Coast was evident.

Perhaps the most important of Ellis's papers was the one entitled "Hints relative to the Division and Government of the Conquered and newly acquired countries in America." Among other topics the document considered the proper government for Canada and the rights of Roman Catholics. It was suggested that Prince Edward Island and Cape Breton become part of Nova Scotia. Georgia should be extended to the St. Marys. Florida should be divided into two provinces, with St. Marks River as the dividing line. The best mode of government for the two Florida would be Georgia's or Nova Scotia's, as these were the two newest and were "the freest from a Republican mixture and the most conformable to the British Constitution." Ellis thus betrayed a pardonable pride in his two provinces.

He went on to describe what should be done in the new West Indian possessions. Although his suggestions were important, the most significant, in that it affected almost all the colonies, was Ellis's suggestion "to fix upon some line for a western boundary to our ancient provinces beyond which our people should not at present be permitted to settle." Such a line would divert population into Nova Scotia or Georgia and the Floridas. Although military commanders in America had halted the sale of western land during the war, Ellis's "Hints" was the genesis of the Proclamation of 1763.⁴³

Shelburne's Board sent their recommendation to Egremont on July 8, 1763. Egremont asked Ellis to study the Board's report and see how it differed from the "Hints." Ellis submitted a paper explaining that the differences were minor. The Board's report, probably written by John Pownall, recommended that Georgia be extended to the St. Johns rather than the St. Marys and that the Chattahoochee, rather than St. Marks be the dividing line between the Floridas. Ellis agreed that the Chattahoochee would be a better western boundary, but maintained that East Florida needed the fertile lands between the St. Marys and St. Johns if it were ever to be a viable province. The territory between the Chattahoochee and the Mississippi would be ample for the province of West Florida.⁴⁴ Ellis's suggestion of a western limit to settlement was not challenged.

Ellis worked so fast on his report that Egremont was able to reply to the Board just six days after its paper was written. On July 14, Egremont informed the Board that the king approved their recommendations. Settlers would be barred from the land west of the proposed proclamation line leaving the Indians undisturbed. However, it would be open to traders from all colonies. James Murray was named governor of Canada, James Grant of East Florida, and George Johnstone of West Florida. Although Egremont wrote that "the king approves the extending of the Limits of Georgia in the Manner you suggest," he really meant the manner which Ellis suggested. Georgia's southern boundary was the St. Marys not the St. Johns. By August 6 Egremont was satisfied that he had finished his American business.⁴⁵

conscious that he knew nothing about Florida. He could have asked Ellis, but John Pownall, Secretary of the Board of Trade, was jealous of Ellis's influence over Egremont. Besides, Egremont did not like Shelburne, and the dislike was reciprocated. Knox commented that Egremont "was guided in all things" by Ellis. Because he had just arrived from America, Knox was asked to provide Shelburne with information about Florida. Knox said that he consulted with Ellis, so it is likely that Ellis's memorandum on advantages found its way to Shelburne by way of Knox.³⁸ The result was an effective defense of the treaty by Shelburne. Henry Fox distributed the loaves and fishes liberally in the House and despite Pitt's three-hour denunciation, the vote was a resounding triumph for the administration, 319-64.

Scarcely had the celebration died down when Henry Ellis made another important contribution to American policy. Drawing directly upon his experience in Georgia, he suggested that Egremont summon the four colonial governors to Augusta to alert the Indians to the displacement of the Spanish and French. Ellis employed the language he used so effectively in his Indian talks to frame the message that the governors should deliver. Fort Toulouse and Tombigbee should be dismantled because of the Indians' old fear of British occupation of their territory. It was essential to have presents to be distributed at Augusta.³⁹ Egremont sent out the orders, using much of Ellis's language. The governors grumbled that Augusta lacked the proper amenities, but they went anyhow and to their surprise found that the Augusta traders had persuaded the Creeks to cede the strip of land between the Savannah and Ogeechee rivers.⁴⁰

After initiating the Augusta Congress, Ellis moved on to other matters of crucial importance. On May 5, 1763, Egremont sent the final treaty to Shelburne at the Board of Trade with three questions. What new governments should be established? What military establishment would be sufficient? How could the colonies contribute to the cost of the military?⁴¹ Protocol demanded that the Board of Trade be consulted on American affairs, but Egremont did not trust Shelburne to send back the right advice. Therefore, he had Henry Ellis draft answers to this question and he sent Ellis's "Hints" along with his questions. It was a curious arrangement.

The memorandum entitled "Hints relative to settling of our newly acquired territories in America" was a thorough discussion of all the new possessions. Ellis suggested granting land in Florida and Louisiana by the same method he used in Georgia.

A second document was a brilliant tour de force with recommendations for the military establishment. After listing the forts which should be retained and the number of men to be stationed in each, Ellis explained the purposes they were to serve. The new subjects in Canada and Louisiana were to be kept in order, and the people of the older colonies "in a state of constitutional dependence upon Great Britain." The forts and troops would also establish authority in the Indian country, prevent encroachments by the French, and protect British commerce. Pensacola and Mobile were important enough for forts and Ellis recommended four new ones along the Mississippi. The fortifications of St.

In order to strengthen the administration Lord Halifax was brought into the cabinet as secretary of state for the Northern Department and Henry Fox enlisted as the government's manager in the House of Commons.³³ Fox had his work cut out for him because Pitt and his friends, including Newcastle who resigned from the council because of its opposition to the German war, were determined to embarrass the ministry by voting against any treaty.

The powerful Duke of Bedford was the king's choice to negotiate terms of peace in Paris. Neither Egremont nor Halifax were friends of Bedford and they forced Bute to agree that anything Bedford decided in Paris would have to be ratified by the council.³⁴ Bedford was insulted but the policy was a good one. Bedford believed that Spain's willingness to permit logging in Honduras was sufficient compensation for Havana. Egremont went to see the king and argued that Bedford should be bound by specific instructions. The king was reluctant, saying he could have sent a boy of ten on such an errand. At that Egremont "flew into a passion," a thing only the most secure of the great lords were permitted to do. Egremont was supported by the council in demanding Florida as compensation for Havana.³⁵

Bedford, though smarting over Egremont's instructions, concluded a preliminary treaty on November 3, 1762. England obtained Florida, and France agreed separately to compensate Spain with New Orleans and Louisiana west of Mississippi. France was permitted to keep fishing rights off Newfoundland, a sore point with Pitt.³⁶

The treaty was a good one but Pitt's influence was such that there was a popular outcry against it. Bute, already unpopular, was blamed for not getting better terms. His carriage was pelted with stones by a London mob. Even the king was hissed by the crowd.

Henry Ellis was called into service at this critical moment. He was asked to list the advantages of the treaty compared to the terms Pitt had been willing to concede. Ellis produced another important document comparable to his memorandum on Havana.³⁷ He listed eleven "advantages which England gains": all of Canada, Prince Edward Island and Cape Breton, Louisiana east of the Mississippi, Florida, logging rights in Honduras, the former neutral islands of St. Vincent, Grenada and the Grenadines, Dominica, also the island of Tobago, Senegal on the African coast, Spain's withdrawal from Portugal, the French evacuation of occupied towns in Germany, and possessions in Minorca. Each advantage was explained and Ellis devoted most of his attention to the acquisition of Florida and Mobile, partly because he was partial to those features of the treaty and partly because the opposition claimed they were poor compensation for Havana.

William Knox, Ellis's friend from Monaghan and Georgia, joined him in England as the treaty was being debated. His journal provides an interesting insight into the politics of the day. William Petty, Lord Shelburne, had been named President of the Board of Trade by his patron, the Earl of Bute. Shelburne was an able debater in the House of Lords and was asked to defend the treaty there. He was aware that Florida would be a point of contention and painfully

France and Spain. Spain was vulnerable in the straits of Florida, through which her commerce from South America passed. Havana, Cuba (or The Havana as it was usually called) was the key to the control of those straits. In Spanish hands, Havana posed a threat to Jamaica, the Bahamas, South Carolina, and Georgia. St. Augustine, the nest of privateers, depended upon Havana. That base, as well as St. Marks and Pensacola, must fall if Havana were taken. Ellis was the first to suggest annexing Florida, a feat which could be accomplished by reducing Havana.

Ellis then proceeded to explain how Havana might be taken. A force from England should stop at Martinique to pick up troops, assuming that campaign would be over in a few weeks. Amherst should detach troops from the northern colonies, necessarily postponing the Louisiana expedition again. There was a landing place fifteen miles east of Havana which could be safely used to disembark troops. The fortress must be invested, by land as well as by sea, with overwhelming superiority in artillery. The hurricane season began in July, so the invasion should be launched before then. Ellis believed that both Spain and France would be ready for peace if the Havana campaign succeeded.²⁹ Egremont embodied Ellis's ideas in his instructions to Albemarle, the general in command of the Havana invasion. The instructions were dated February 15, one month after Ellis's recommendations. Egremont had to act quickly to gain consent of the council, which he did despite the objections of the aged Duke of Newcastle.

It is remarkable how closely Ellis's plan was followed and how well it worked. The conquest of Martinique was completed just in time for those troops to join Albemarle, the landing to the east of Havana was successful, the bombardment by land and sea followed, and Amherst's reinforcements arrived in time for the storming of the citadel on June 30, 1762. The news of the fall of Havana embarrassed Bute and bothered Bedford, both of whom wanted a quick peace. Now Egremont and Grenville demanded compensation for Havana. Henry Ellis used his influence to opt for Florida.³⁰

From the records at the Board of Trade, Ellis collected all the information he could find on Florida dating back to James Moore's invasion of 1702 and including details of Oglethorpe's two attempts. Ellis made the documents available to Egremont and included a map of St. Augustine which he had obtained while in Georgia. He explained that Florida had been a threat to Georgia during the last war and would continue to be a source of trouble as long as Spain possessed the province. Among other nuisances he listed the fact that Spanish governors lured slaves away from Georgia and South Carolina with promises of freedom. "It is certain our succeeding therein," he said to Egremont, "would give great security to our Southern Provinces, as well as our Trade in the American Seas."³¹

Ellis and Egremont were still anxious for a naval campaign against Mobile and New Orleans, but fever played havoc with Amherst's troops and they returned to New York in such wretched condition that the Louisiana operation was canceled.³² The council decided to settle for that part of Louisiana east of the Mississippi River, excluding New Orleans. The right of navigation of the Mississippi was insisted upon.

would not have acquired Florida or the Gulf Coast. Pitt was opposed to the peace not because of the Gulf Coast, but because such a settlement would have left France the fisheries off Newfoundland. He argued that France's fishing fleet was the nursery of its navy. Bedford, one of the few who were willing to stand up to Pitt, answered that France's long coastline, not Newfoundland, was the nursery of the French fleet. When the French minister tried to prod Pitt by hinting of an alliance with Spain, Pitt demanded that the council declare war on Spain or else he would quit. Lord Granville's calm reply reflected the opinion of the council, if Pitt alone assumed the right of advising the king "to what purpose are we called to this council?" He continued, "though he may possibly have convinced himself of his infallibility, still it remains that we should be equally convinced before we can resign our understandings to his direction." ²⁵

Pitt resigned and was placated by a handsome pension and a peerage for his wife. George Grenville, Pitt's brother-in-law, was offered Pitt's place, but he deferred in favor of another of his brothers-in-law, Charles Wyndham, Lord Egremont. Egremont's assets were that he was well-connected, honest, competent, and gregarious. He was known for the lavish parties he and his lovely wife gave at their sprawling country house at Petworth in Sussex. Unfortunately, he knew nothing about America. In fact, only Halifax of the king's chief ministers, was abreast of events there. The king referred to the Mississippi River as the Ganges in a conversation reported by the Duke of Newcastle whose knowledge of geography was not much better. ²⁶

Egremont desperately needed an American expert and Henry Ellis was available. Egremont assumed office on October 9 and the first indication of Ellis's influence was Egremont's letter of December 12, 1761 to Amherst in which he urged Amherst to get on with the campaign against Louisiana. Amherst replied that he had to wait upon the outcome of the Martinique campaign for the necessary troops. Egremont said he was sorry to learn about the delay, "the King firmly relies on your exerting every possible Effort for the success of that enterprize," he wrote. ²⁷ Amherst then put forth a plan to invade Louisiana by way of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. Ellis's opinion of this strategy was already written when Amherst's suggestion arrived. After detailing a number of insurmountable obstacles, he concluded, "I say, my lord, whoever combines all these circumstances of danger and difficulty, must tremble for the consequence of so ticklish an enterprize." ²⁸ On the other hand a naval campaign against Mobile and New Orleans would face no such difficulties. Egremont was convinced and ordered Amherst to prepare for an assault by way of the Gulf of Mexico.

The Louisiana campaign was further delayed by the outbreak of war against Spain. When the terms of the Family Compact of August 15 became known in England, the council acting for the king demanded to know Spain's intentions. Spain sent a haughty reply. Therefore on January 4, 1762 England declared war and Spain reciprocated. Here Ellis played a dramatic role in shaping events. After a conversation with Egremont, he put his suggestions in a memorandum dated January 16. England must seize the initiative rather than react to Spain's moves, he argued. England could not endure a protracted struggle against both

On his way to England Ellis stopped in New York to persuade General Jeffrey Amherst to send troops and northern Indians to help the Carolinians subdue the Cherokees. Amherst assured him that he intended to do just that. Lt. Col. James Grant left New York with a regiment of regulars and a contingent of Indians and by September 1761 had successfully carried out his mission against the Cherokees.²⁰

When Ellis reached London in late February 1761 he found his high-placed friends were preoccupied by one topic of conversation, namely the relationship between the new king, young George III, and the Great Commoner, William Pitt. The king did not approve of Mr. Pitt or of his policies. He called the German war "bloody and expensive" in an address to his privy council.²¹ The remark was a slap at Pitt who was committed to continue sending men and money to assist Frederick of Prussia as long as the war on the continent lasted. The king wanted his close friend and former tutor, the Earl of Bute, in his cabinet and Pitt wanted to keep Bute out. On March 25 Bute was named Secretary of State for the Northern Department. The lines were drawn, Pitt stood for more war and had the public behind him; Bute represented peace and had the king behind him.

Of more immediate importance to the recently arrived Henry Ellis, was the fact that his friend and patron, Lord Halifax, agreed to leave the Board of Trade for the prestigious post of Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. Before he left office he conferred one more favor upon Ellis; he named him governor of Nova Scotia.²² It was Halifax's hope that Ellis would complete the slow work of establishing constitutional government in that province. Ellis's health did not allow him to go to his new post in 1761 and by 1762 he was too valuable as an advisor to be allowed to go. His role as governor was limited to attending Board of Trade meetings when matters concerning Nova Scotia were the subject. When Halifax left the Board, Pitt managed to have the Order in Council of 1752 rescinded, stripping the Board of its power of initiating colonial policy and of appointing colonial officials. Horace Walpole commented that the Board was "reduced to its old insignificance."²³ It remained the repository for colonial correspondence, but could not venture an opinion unless asked by one of the ministers.

Although Ellis did not go to Nova Scotia, he obtained land grants in the fertile Shubenacadie valley. On one of his grants the village of Fort Ellis was settled and named in honor of the governor. Later a family of Ellises began cultivating the land in the Fort Ellis area. A history of the region suggests that there was a connection between the governor and the settlers.²⁴ The people of Nova Scotia were not happy with their acting governor and pleaded for Ellis to come over. In October 1763 Ellis gave up the idea of returning to America and resigned as governor.

The confrontation between George III and William Pitt mounted to a climax in the year 1761. The French signaled that they were ready for peace on the basis of *uti posseditis*. Several members of the cabinet, the Duke of Bedford in particular, welcomed the proposal. In passing, we might observe that if peace had been settled on the principle of each nation keeping what it possessed, England

traders, as well as to the Indians, Ellis learned a great deal about the geography of the frontier, including Louisiana and Florida. The knowledge served him well when he returned to England.

One of Ellis's most important achievements was the settlement of the claims of Mary Bosomworth, the niece of old Emperor Brims. Mary's contention was that the Creek Nation had reserved three sea islands as well as her trading post near Savannah for her use. The British position was that the land belonged to the king of England. Ellis resolved the matter by securing a royal grant to St. Catherine's Island for Mary and compensating her for the other two islands with funds from the sale of those islands. It was essential to secure the goodwill of Mary and her husband Thomas, because the Bosomworths were important auxiliaries in preserving the neutrality of the Creeks in 1760 when the Cherokees went on the warpath. ¹⁵

Two of Halifax's appointees, Ellis and Edmond Atkin, clashed when Atkin, the first superintendent of Indian affairs in the Southern Department, decided to visit the Creek country. Atkin's haughty manner irritated the Indians, and he barely escaped assassination. Ellis refused to give Atkin the authority to suspend trading licenses because he did not believe Atkin would use it wisely. ¹⁶ Ellis was probably right, but without the power to control licenses, Atkin and his successor John Stuart were ineffective in preventing abuses in the trade. Halifax might have intervened, but he respected Ellis's judgement more than Atkin's. Therefore, the governors retained control of the Indian trade.

The heat of Georgia's summers affected Ellis's health and shortened his stay in Georgia. He wrote a letter about Savannah's weather which was read before the Royal Society and published in the Society's *Philosophical Transactions*. ¹⁷ Halifax yielded to Ellis's appeal to be relieved and granted him a leave of absence, at the same time naming James Wright lieutenant governor. Few Georgia governors have had as much praise showered upon them by a grateful people as Ellis experienced. ¹⁸ There were several items of unfinished business which Ellis promised to attend to as he prepared to leave in November 1760. The Cherokees were not yet subdued, largely because French agents kept them agitated. The source of French intrigue was Fort Toulouse of the Alabamas, located at the confluence of the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers. William Pitt's war plans included an offensive by land and sea against Louisiana, but the campaign had been deferred in favor of the conquest of Guadaloupe and was delayed again in 1761 by the offensive against Martinique. Ellis strongly objected to an invasion of Louisiana by land because it would be opposed by the Creeks and Choctaws. He argued instead for a naval campaign against Mobile and New Orleans.

Another problem Ellis intended to address was the insecure southern frontier of Georgia. Ellis had urged William Pitt as well as the Board of Trade to extend the southern boundary of Georgia to the St. Marys River. However, Pitt was not ready to bring on a war against Spain and ordered Ellis to remove a colony of Georgians who established a settlement in the area south of the Altamaha, Georgia's original boundary. ¹⁹

policy and so the colonies drifted into modes of government peculiar to each with little coordination from Whitehall. Halifax was bothered by this kind of careless administration which he considered unconstitutional and fought aggressively for control of patronage and a seat in the privy council. He succeeded in both. The period of salutary neglect really ended with the Order in Council of 1752 which conferred upon the Board of Trade the authority to recommend colonial appointments.⁹ The transformation of Acadia into British Nova Scotia was the first of Halifax's projects. An aggressive military governor, Charles Lawrence, thought to expedite the process by expelling the French who refused to take an oath of allegiance.¹⁰ Despite the urgings of Halifax, it was not until 1758 that Nova Scotians were able to elect a representative assembly. Therefore, Georgia appeared to be the best place to set up a constitutional government to serve as a model for the older aberrant colonies. Georgia was the product of a spasm of humanitarianism on the part of the Parliament of George II and Robert Walpole. James Edward Oglethorpe spearheaded the effort to undertake a unique experiment by which the deserving poor, not debtors, would be given a chance to begin a new life and at the same time produce silk and wine for the kingdom. Landholding was limited, slavery and the use of rum prohibited, and there was no elected government. The people who were transported to Georgia chafed under the Trustees' restrictions and many of them crossed into South Carolina where they were able to acquire land and slaves. The Trustees surrendered their charter in 1751 just as Halifax came into control of colonial affairs. The first royal governor was a mistake. As a favor to Hardwicke, the Lord Chancellor, Halifax appointed John Reynolds to Georgia and gave him ten days to get aboard ship.¹¹ Reynolds was a competent naval officer, but a poor governor. He alienated his council and permitted the House to enjoy unconstitutional liberties. He was recalled in 1756 after only two years and Henry Ellis was sent in his place.

At this point Henry Ellis entered Georgia history, almost as a complete unknown. Georgia historians have been unanimously kind to Ellis. On the basis of his record, it is hard to see how it could be otherwise. His lengthy reports to Halifax and the Board of Trade reveal intelligence and sound judgment. His extensive correspondence with Governor William Henry Lyttelton shows wit and charm.¹²

Governor Ellis did all that Halifax expected of him and in the process laid the foundations upon which subsequent colonial and state governments were built. Aided by William Knox, a neighbor from Monaghan County, who accompanied him to Georgia as provost marshal, he taught Georgians the rudiments of government. With consummate skill he eliminated the factionalism which had crippled the Reynolds administration. Georgia was organized into eight parishes for political as well as religious reasons.¹³

His first conference with the headmen of the Creek Nation was a triumph.¹⁴ The Creeks, who had previously looked to Charlestown for word from the great white father, thereafter sent their talks to Savannah. In his Indian diplomacy, Ellis was careful to use the good offices of veteran traders. By listening to the

way of Hudson Bay. It was typical of Ellis that he wrote a book about his adventure and included all the previous explorations of the northern waters. The scholarly tone of the narrative, with its many descriptions of the native and natural curiosities of the region, conceals the danger from ice, cold, storm, and scurvy. They did not find the passage, but they explored the west coast of Hudson Bay sufficiently to eliminate any further need for searches in that region. ³ Ellis's account of the expedition, published in 1748, dedicated to Frederick, Prince of Wales, made him a minor celebrity. He was inducted into the prestigious Royal Society in 1750, four months after Georgia's founder, James Edward Oglethorpe, was admitted. ⁴ Ellis became a friend of Dr. Stephen Hales, a cleric and scientist who served on the Georgia Board of Trustees, and Ellis volunteered to use one of Hales's new ventilators on his ship. ⁵ As evidence that Ellis's association with Lord Halifax had begun by this time, Ellis's ship was named *The Earl of Halifax*. Halifax was a member of the Leicester House group which gathered around Frederick, the heir apparent, and must have been impressed by Ellis when the young arctic explorer presented himself to Prince Frederick. Subsequently, Ellis brought back tropical plants for Lord and Lady Halifax from his voyages. ⁶

We gain an interesting insight into the age by following Captain Ellis and *The Earl of Halifax*, as Ellis conducted various experiments for Dr. Hales and the Royal Society. He reported on the success of the manually operated ventilators in cleaning the air from the hold of his ship. He lowered a specially designed bucket to test the temperature of the ocean at various depths. He described the behavior of the collection of tropical plants he carried. ⁷ And then we discover that *The Earl of Halifax* was a slave ship and that the educated, urbane Captain Ellis was engaged in the notorious middle passage of the trade in human cargo! How can one write about working for the betterment of mankind, as Ellis did in describing the benefits of his ventilator, while carrying three hundred persons to plantations in Jamaica? In fact, Ellis did justify the system to his own satisfaction and that of most men of his day. Those he purchased, he argued, were already enslaved by African middlemen, some by conquest, others by debt. He described some as begging to be bought so as to escape a worse fate if they were left in the hands of a dealer. He ventured into the interior and professed to be shocked at the little regard for human life of some of the native chieftains. He could and did say that Jamaica was a better place to live than Africa was for the blacks he carried. Besides, and this was the unanswerable argument in his day, if Britain did not engage in the slave trade, her commercial rivals would reap the profits. ⁸ The reform of the slave trade would have to wait until the turn of the century and the conversion of William Wilberforce to the cause.

Meanwhile, Lord Halifax had become president of the Board of Trade in 1749 and was determined to rescue that agency from its ineffectiveness. The Board had no control over colonial affairs, it could not appoint officials or initiate policy. It could only carry on correspondence with colonial officials and provide information to the ministers of the privy council. Patronage rested with the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, who happened to be the Duke of Newcastle. Although very interested in patronage, Newcastle was not much concerned about

Governor Henry Ellis and the American Colonial Frontier

Edward J. Cashin


A peculiar fact about our knowledge of colonial history is that we place those who play their part on the colonial stage in the context of the history of that province. We are not much concerned about their possible impact on other colonies, and we are not at all concerned about their pre- and post-colonial careers. They appear from the great beyond, are more or less important in the history of their province, then return to the oblivion from whence they came. Henry Ellis is a case in point. He is known by everyone who studies Georgia history as the capable and erudite second royal governor of Georgia whose administration was cut short by poor health. He is given credit for getting Georgia's young government straightened out after a disastrous start under his less than competent predecessor, John Reynolds, and he earns high marks for his skill in his dealings with the southeastern Indians. Because of the goodwill engendered between the Creek Indians and Ellis, that powerful nation remained neutral during the Cherokee war of 1760.

Often, and Henry Ellis is again a case in point, historical characters take on different dimensions when placed in the context of their own times. From this perspective we see the world as they saw it and lived it, and find it surprisingly modern in its interrelations. Colonials were not bound by time or place any more than we are.

A useful means of gaining a more complete understanding of colonial history is to associate the subjects of study with the British administrations which appointed them. Most of us are reluctant to make the effort. Intracolonial history is complicated enough, but the world of court politics is a labyrinthine maze. Yet, the reward of such an investigation is a richer understanding of why things happened. If the colonial period was formative in the shaping of our national character, it is useful to know as much as we can about it.

The key element in Henry Ellis's career was his relationship with George Montagu Dunk, the third Lord Halifax. Ellis was Halifax's protégé and in time became, in the words of Joseph Reed, a Philadelphian in London, an "oracle of truth" to whom Halifax listened. In fact, Reed stated that Ellis was Halifax's godson.¹ No evidence of a religious or ritualistic bond has been found, but even if Ellis was not Halifax's godson, the connection must have been close for Reed to say as much.

Henry Ellis was born in the town and county of Monaghan in 1721 when Monaghan was part of Ulster. Ellis's grandfather was one of those English transplants who colonized northern Ireland after Cromwell's bloody conquest. Henry's father Francis was a landed proprietor and left a small fortune to Henry when he died in 1773. Young Henry was well educated and was intellectually curious all his life. He went to sea as a young man and rose quickly from a common sailor to the captain of his own ship.² In 1746 he sailed as the scientific observer aboard the *Dobbs-Galley* in a search for the northwest passage by



Map by Jerry Dixon

- ²¹ Pitt to Governors in North America and the West Indies, Whitehall, August 23, 1760, in Gertrude Selwin Kimball, ed., *Correspondence of William Pitt When Secretary of State With Colonial Governors and Military Commissioners in America in Two Volumes* (1906; reprint, New York, 1969), 2: 320.
- ²² Vaudreuil to Maurepas, February 12, 1744, in Patricia Galloway, Dunbar Rowland, and A. G. Sanders, eds., *Mississippi Provincial Archives: French Dominion, 1729-1748* (Baton Rouge, 1984), 4: 222. Ms. Galloway revised and re-edited the volumes four and five which were left uncompleted by Rowland and Sanders from the 1930s.
- ²³ Thomas, *Fort Toulouse*, 63.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, 52.
- ²⁵ Talk of Lieutenant Wall to the Tellico Indians, Great Tellico, January 11, 1757, in William L. McDowell, Jr., ed., *Documents Relating to Indian Affairs, 1754-1765* (Columbia, 1970), 317.
- ²⁶ M. Eugene Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina: A Political History, 1663-1763* (Chapel Hill, 1966), 326.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, 327.
- ²⁹ Governor Lyttelton to Pitt, November 4, 1758, in Kimball, *Pitt Correspondence*, 1: 387.
- ³⁰ Giraud, *Louisiane*, 2: 170.
- ³¹ Governor Lyttelton to Old Hopp, Emperor of the Cherokee Indians, Charles Town, June 3, 1756, in McDowell, *Indian Affairs*, 115.
- ³² Pitt to Governors of North America, Whitehall, December 30, 1757, in Kimball, *Pitt Correspondence*, 1: 135.
- ³³ Kerlerrec to De Machault d'Arnouville, January 30, 1757, in Galloway, *French Dominion*, 5: 180-81.
- ³⁴ Major Andrew Lewis to Captain Raymond Demere, Fort Prince George, Keowee, September 11, 1767, in McDowell, *Indian Affairs*, 202-4.
- ³⁵ Pitt to Governor Lyttelton, *SECRET*, Whitehall, March 7, 1757, in Kimball, *Pitt Correspondence*, 1: 202-3.
- ³⁶ Edmund Atkin to Pitt, Charles Town, March 27, 1760, *Ibid.*, 2: 268-72.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, xxxi.
- ³⁸ Kerlerrec to Berryer, December 1, 1758, in Galloway, *French Dominion*, 5: 198.
- ³⁹ Kerlerrec to Berryer, New Orleans, June 12, 1760, *Ibid.*, 251-52.
- ⁴⁰ Thomas, *Fort Toulouse*, 64-65.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 66.
- ⁴² *Ibid.*

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Even before royal approval of the Proclamation of 1763 on October 7, Egremont turned to Ellis for recommendation for filling the minor offices in the new territories. Not surprisingly, Ellis named himself Secretary of the Province of Canada, Clerk of Council, Commissary General, and Clerk of Enrollments at a combined annual salary of £1,012, and Provost Marshal of the West Indian Islands. He made his friend William Knox agent of East Florida and another friend, John Ellis, agent for West Florida. Ellis's commission to the Canadian offices was dated April 30, 1763, making him the first civil officer of Canada.⁴⁶

On Saturday, August 20, 1763, the king sent for Halifax and Egremont, his two Secretaries of State, and told them that he was pleased with their administration. On the next day he had an audience with George Grenville, the third member of the so-called triumvirate, and said he had no desire to change the ministers, "he liked them all, he approved of their conduct." After his audience with the king, Grenville called at Egremont's residence. He met the doctor at the door to be told that Egremont had an attack of apoplexy and was beyond recovery. Halifax and Grenville went to tell the king that Egremont died at 8 P.M. that evening.⁴⁷ On September 9, 1763, Halifax took Egremont's place as Secretary of State for the Southern Department and put an Irish lord, Will Hills, the Earl of Hillsborough at the head of the Board of Trade in Shelburne's place. Therefore it fell to Hillsborough and Halifax to complete the drafting of the Proclamation of 1763 for royal approval. At least one official said that the proclamation was in the handwriting of Henry Ellis.⁴⁸

Ellis retained his various Canadian offices until 1768. With William Knox, he was instrumental in drafting the Quebec Act of 1774. After 1768 he adopted the life of a gentleman of leisure and acquired a reputation for his wide range of knowledge. Despite his sometimes precarious health, he lived to be eighty-five and died peacefully in Naples.⁴⁹

Ellis is rightly recognized as an important colonial governor. But it is only following his career after his return to England and in the context of British politics that the full measure of his contribution to the transformation of the colonial frontier becomes apparent.

Notes

¹ Joseph Reed to [Charles] Pettit, London, June 11, 1764, Reed Papers, New York Historical Society; same to same, June 11, 1764, William B. Reed, *Life and Correspondence of Joseph Reed*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1847), 1: 32-33.

² Sir Bernard Burke, *A Genealogical and Heraldic History of the Landed Gentry of Ireland* (London, 1912), 205; William Smith Ellis, *Notices of the Ellises of England, Scotland and Ireland from the Conquest to the Present Time. . . .* (London, 1857-1866), 138, 272.

³ Henry Ellis, *A Voyage to Hudson's Bay by the Dobbs Galley and California in the Years 1764 and 1747 for Discovering A North West Passage* (London, 1748).

- ⁴ Raymond Phineas Stearns, "Colonial Fellows of the Royal Society of London, 1661-1788," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser. (April 1946): 241-42; Sir Archibald Geikie, *The Record of the Royal Society of London* (London, 1912), 344.
- ⁵ Charles Richard Weld, *A History of the Royal Society with Memoirs of the Presidents*, 2 vols. (London, 1848), 1: 504, 516.
- ⁶ "A Letter of the Rev. Dr. Hales, F.R.S. from Captain Henry Ellis, F.R.S. dated January 7, 1750-51 at Cape Monte, Africa, Ship Earl of Halifax," *Philosophical Transactions at Large*, (London, 1751 and 1752), 47: 211-14; Ellis to Stephen Hales, January 7, 1751, Royal Society Library, Carleton House Terrace, London.
- ⁷ Ellis to Hales, January 7, 1751, Royal Society Library, Carleton House Terrace, London; Spencer Savage, ed., *Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of the Linnean Society of London, Part IV Calendar of the Ellis Transcripts* (London, 1948), 8.
- ⁸ Ellis to Lord Hawkesbury, March 27, 31, August 25, 1788, Liverpool Manuscripts, British Library.
- ⁹ For the history of the Board of Trade, see Arthur Herbert Basye, *The Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations Commonly Known as the Board of Trade, 1748-1782* (New Haven, 1925).
- ¹⁰ See Oscar William Winzerling, *Acadian Odyssey* (Baton Rouge, 1955).
- ¹¹ Reynolds to Board of Trade, December 5, 1754, *Colonial Records of Georgia* 27: 32-34; Reynolds to Thomas Robinson, August 2, 1755, Public Record Office, Colonial Office 5/16.
- ¹² Ellis's reports to Halifax and William Pitt are in *Colonial Records of Georgia*, 28; his correspondence with Lyttelton is in the Lyttelton Papers, William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan; Lyttelton's letters to Ellis were recently sold by the present Lord Lyttelton, but he retained copies at his residence, Hagley Hall, Stourbridge, England.
- ¹³ Georgia Commons House Minutes, February 1, 3, 6, 8, 1758, *Colonial Records of Georgia* 13: 265-66; Kenneth Coleman, *Colonial Georgia: A History* (New York, 1976), 224.
- ¹⁴ Ellis to Lyttelton, November 3, 11, 1757, Lyttelton Papers, William L. Clements Library; for the reaction in London, John Ellis to Henry Ellis, March 10, 1759, John Ellis Papers, Linnean Society Library, Burlington House, London.
- ¹⁵ Documents concerning the Bosomworth claims comprise a large part of volume 27, *Colonial Records of Georgia*.
- ¹⁶ Ellis to Lyttelton, October 17, 1758, February 24, 1759, Lyttelton Papers, William L. Clements Library.
- ¹⁷ "An Account of the Heat of the Weather in Georgia. . .," *Philosophical Transactions* 1757 (London, 1758), 50: 754-56.
- ¹⁸ Farewell speeches to and from Ellis are in *South Carolina Gazette*, October 25 to November 1, 1760.
- ¹⁹ Ellis to Pitt, February 12, 1759, *Colonial Records of Georgia*, 28: pt. 1: 184.

- ²⁰ Amherst to James Wright, December 28, 1760, Public Records Office, Colonial Office 5/60; William Bull's reports to the Board of Trade regarding Grant's campaign are in Records in the British Public Record Office relating to South Carolina Department of Archives and History.
- ²¹ Lawrence Henry Gibson, *The Great War for the Empire: The Culmination, 1760-1763* (New York, 1953), 56.
- ²² Minutes of Board of Trade, March 17, 1761, *Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations from January 1759 to December 1763* (London, 1935), 180; the appointment received the royal assent on April 14, 1761, Public Record Office, Colonial Office, 324/40.
- ²³ Basye, *The Lords Commissioners of Trade*, 107.
- ²⁴ *The Town of Stewiacke, Nova Scotia*, Centennial Project, 1967, 46-47. Stewiacke is the town nearest the Fort Ellis community.
- ²⁵ Gipson, *The Great War*, 224.
- ²⁶ Charles Yorke to Hardwicke, September 4, 1762, Philip C. Yorke, ed., *The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain*, 4 vols. (1913; reprint, New York, 1977), 3: 413-14.
- ²⁷ Egremont to Amherst, December 12, 1761, July 10, 1762, Egremont Papers, Petworth House, Sussex, England.
- ²⁸ Amherst to Egremont, April 6, 1762, Egremont Papers, Petworth House; Ellis to Egremont, March 3, 1762, Egremont Papers, Public Record office, 30/47/14. The Egremont Papers are in the old Public Record Office at Chancery Lane; most of the colonial office records are at the new Public Record Office at Kew.
- ²⁹ Ellis to Egremont, January 16, Egremont Papers, PRO 30/47/14.
- ³⁰ Richard Rigby wrote to Bedford on September 30, 1762, "Not a single Councillor, not even Halifax, will now consent to give up Havana without an equivalent and Florida, his Lordship thinks, will be the one proposed," Lord John Russell, *Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford*, 3 vols. (London, 1846), 3: 131-33.
- ³¹ Ellis to Egremont, March 3, 1762, Egremont Papers, PRO, 30/47/14.
- ³² Gipson, *The Great War*, 275.
- ³³ Fox to Bedford, October 13, 1762, Russell, *Correspondence* 3: 133-35.
- ³⁴ Rigby to Bedford, September 29, 1762, Russell, *Correspondence* 3: 127-28.
- ³⁵ Rigby to Bedford, September 30, 1762, Russell, *Correspondence* 3: 131-33.
- ³⁶ Gipson, *The Great War*, 309-10.
- ³⁷ Ellis to Egremont, undated, "Advantages which England gains by the present treaty with France and Spain," Egremont Papers, PRO 30/47/14.
- ³⁸ William Knox, "Anecdotes and Characteristics," Lord Lansdowne, July 6, 1785, Knox Papers, 10/35, William L. Clements Library.

- ³⁹ Ellis to Egremont, December 15, 1762, Egremont Papers, PRO 30/47/14.
- ⁴⁰ Edward J. Cashin, "The Crucial Year on the Georgia Frontier, 1763," *Proceedings and Papers of the Georgia Association of Historians*, no. 11 (1990), 16-23.
- ⁴¹ Egremont to Board of Trade, May 5, 1763, Shelburne Papers, 64/505, William L. Clements Library, also in Egremont Papers, PRO 30/47/22.
- ⁴² Ellis to Egremont, undated, "Plan of Forts and Establishments proper to be made and kept up in North America for the security of our Dominions and the Establishment of our commerce with the Indians," Egremont Papers, PRO 30/47/22.
- ⁴³ Ellis to Egremont, undated, "Hints relative to the Division and Government of the Conquered and newly acquired countries in America," Egremont Papers, PRO 30/47/22.
- ⁴⁴ Ellis to Egremont, undated, "Particulars wherein the Report of the Board of Trade differs from the Paper entitled Hints relative to the division and government of our new acquisitions in America," Egremont Papers, PRO 30/47/22.
- ⁴⁵ Egremont to Lords of Trade, July 14, 1763, Egremont Papers, PRO 30/47/22; also in Shelburne Papers, 64/515, William L. Clements Library; Egremont to Grenville, August 6, 1763, William James Smith, ed., *The Grenville Papers: Being the Correspondence of Richard Grenville Earl Temple and the Right Hon. George Grenville*, 2 vols. (London, 1852), 2: 88-89.
- ⁴⁶ The list of appointments in Ellis's hand is in Egremont Papers PRO 30/47/14; Ellis's commission dated April 30, 1763 is in PRO, CO 324/49.
- ⁴⁷ Mr. Grenville's Diary, August 20, 21, 1763, Smith, *The Grenville Papers* 2: 192-94.
- ⁴⁸ Francis Maseres asserted that William Grant of London saw the initial draft of the Proclamation of 1763 and it was in Ellis's handwriting, Francis Maseres to Fowler Walker, November 19, 1767, in W. Stewart Wallace, ed., *The Maseres Letters 1766-1768* (Toronto, 1919), 62-63.
- ⁴⁹ Henry Ellis's will, March 1, 1805, Prob. II, 1450, Public Record Office, London.

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Denys Rolle and Indian Policy in British East Florida


James M. Denham

When news reached Henry Laurens in 1763 of the transfer of the Floridas to Great Britain as a result of the negotiations ending the Seven Years War, the Charleston merchant waxed confident of the business opportunities the new acquisition would bring. Laurens wrote business associate John Knight that "the preliminary articles of the peace promise much advantage to the Southern Provinces." The Floridas would also serve as a buffer against future Spanish aggression. "The accession of Florida," he wrote, "with Pensacola & so much of Mississippi as mark'd out will prove an excellent barrier to us . . . as well as prove a horrible check to the Spaniards & be no small degree of security for their good behavior." But Laurens was more keenly aware of the commercial opportunities, the Floridas would "open a boundless field for new Trade." Many scoffed at Britain's decision to surrender Havana for such worthless provinces as East and West Florida. But despite proclamations of Florida as a "sandy desert" [*sic*], many like Laurens felt that England had "made an honourable peace . . . and believed the people will say so when they cool." ¹

Soon propaganda journals trumpeted the unlimited opportunities for British subjects who would plant indigo, rice, or tap the bountiful supply of pine trees to produce naval stores. Such commodities were always in demand throughout the Empire. Groups like the East Florida Society were organized and favored parties in Britain vied for the large tracts being offered on easy terms by the British government. Entrepreneurs could be granted up to twenty thousand acres by the King in Council if they agreed to settle white families in their tract. Between 1765 and 1775, the government granted 1,653,672.5 acres of land in the province demonstrating that aristocrats were "East Florida mad." ²

Henry Laurens never actually owned acreage himself in East Florida but he maintained close commercial ties to many of the settlers there. Among these was one of East Florida's biggest plungers, Denys Rolle. A member of parliament from Darnstaple, Rolle eventually became one of the province's largest planters.

Rolle's original scheme was to settle two tracts: one on the Altamaha River in Georgia, and one near St. Marks on the Gulf of Mexico, but an absence of agreements with the Indians in both these areas forced him to alter his plans. Instead, Rolle turned his attention to an area nearer to the protective confines of St. Augustine. After much deliberation and procrastination Rolle finally settled on a site near present day Palatka on the St. Johns River. The settlement never prospered, but remained intact throughout most of the twenty-year period of British occupation of East Florida. Unlike most of the province's grantees, Rolle actually traveled to his holdings, often to personally supervise activities at his settlement. Rolle was always trying to acquire more land and by 1783, when the British evacuated East Florida, he had accumulated over eighty thousand acres. Rolle was an energetic, eccentric, and often times bothersome personality



Map by Jerry Dixon

for royal officials to deal with. This was especially the case in his relationship with Governor James Grant, whose goal was to make East Florida a vast carbon copy of South Carolina, "a thriving, prosperous, plantation society."³

Rolle's East Florida enterprise has been covered thoroughly by such writers as Carita Doggett Corse and Charles Loch Mowat, yet one aspect of Rolle's venture has been largely neglected—his numerous dealings with the Indians.⁴ Rolle dreamed of establishing a lucrative trade with the Indians. He made extensive, though unauthorized contacts with Indians both at his settlement on the St. Johns River and during his extensive travels through the British provinces of East and West Florida. Rolle's petition to the Privy Council (1765), along with accompanying correspondence submitted after his first trip to East Florida, contain much information about his dealings with the Indians and offer interesting insight into his feelings with regard to them. Rolle's activities betray a mixture of economic self-interest and paternalism. But they also reflect humanitarian desires to civilize the natives and treat them in a fair manner. An exploration of Rolle's writings and experiences can improve our understanding of English-Indian relations in East Florida.

On August 10, 1764, after a long, unpleasant journey from London, Rolle arrived in Charleston on board the *Two Friends* with fourteen colonists. Soon Rolle left Charleston and took his colonists to St. Augustine where he began his stormy relationship with Governor Grant. After hearing of the unstable condition of the Indians in the area of St. Marks, Rolle's original destination, he decided to find a suitable location along the St. Johns River. Rolle noticed that Grant was unhappy at this decision despite the fact that his grant stipulated that he could settle anywhere in the colony.⁵ Moving twenty-five miles south from Picolata, Rolle finally selected an elevated site on the east bank of the St. Johns River, about twenty miles north of Lake George. Rolle named the settlement Charlotta after Queen Charlotte, wife of King George III, but soon this name was dropped in favor of Rollestown. The village was also known as Mount Pleasant.⁶

As evidenced by broken pottery, bones, and other relics, the spot had been the site of earlier Indian habitation and today is of interest to archaeologists. After supervising the construction of makeshift living quarters, Rolle ventured to James Spalding's trading store about eight miles away. While at the store Rolle made his first contact with the Indians.

The Indians in East Florida were Hitchiti-speaking Lower Creeks and had migrated to Florida in the early eighteenth century from Tidewater Georgia. Inhabiting West Florida were the Upper Creek who came from the forks of the Alabama River. The British soon referred to the Indians in East Florida as Seminoles: though actually the term was merely a corruption of the Spanish *Cimarrone*—wild, untamed, and hostile whites. Soon the designation came to include all the Indians in Florida.⁷

The Indians Rolle met at the trading post were from "Latchaway" (Alachua), the largest Indian town in East Florida, fifty miles to the northwest.⁸ This must have been a tense meeting since a general treaty had not yet been worked

out between Indian Agent John Stuart, Governor Grant, and the Creeks. The Indians at first objected vehemently to any settlement being made along the river and protested that they had heard that "there were several Castles to be built throughout the River." Rolle told them that he would not build a castle on the land he now occupied but asked that he be permitted to make provisional occupation until the conference between the governor and the Indians was held. He promised that he would only raise a small garden and hunt for provisions. He assured them that they would "find him always friendly and endeavoring to be of Service to them; but if [his settlement] was not consented to at the conference he would burn up his Hutts, and go away with his people." ⁹

An agreement between Grant, Stuart, and the Lower Creeks which laid out areas reserved for both Indians and perspective white settlement was not reached until November 17, 1765, and thus Rolle could only hope that his settlements would be confirmed by the treaty. ¹⁰ In the next several months Rolle did all in his power to establish good relations with the Indians in the hope that this goodwill would protect his settlement.

Once Rolle's village was tentatively established the Indians began visiting his settlement. He prided himself on his relations with them. From the outset Rolle was determined not to include rum as a trade commodity. He deplored the practice of Governor Grant and some of the licensed traders in the region of providing the Indians with rum. Rolle recalled an instance when on a return trip from meeting Governor Grant some Indian warriors stopped off at his settlement on the way back to their village. Rolle provided the party with supper and a place to sleep, but was disturbed to find that Grant had given them rum. Rolle remembered that they "drank deeply during the whole Night" and kept the whole settlement awake with their "Singing, Dancing, and Hallowing." Early the next morning one of the warriors named Philoki, a warrior with whom Rolle was to become friends, came into his tent about daybreak and

spoke to him . . . [Rolle] in a freer Manner than at any Time since, being much heated by Liquor, but all in good Temper, desiring his Boat to convey them over the river; on which he got up, and gave the Order for it. The Indians, scarce able to stand, straggled through his Tent, where all his Utensils, Goods etc. lay open, of which he asked them, whether they wanted any Thing; but in the greatest good Humour and Sincerity, said no, acknowledging they had had too much Rum, it was too good and affected their Heads; he got all of them over the River except one, the Long Warrior who was too much intoxicated to go and whom after sleeping entered his tent, and gave him some Coffee to relieve his Headache; and he staid [*sic*] the whole Day, and he put him over the River the Day after.

Rolle said he often saw some of the same Indians and always welcomed them to his settlement. He frequently had the headmen and warriors dine with him at his table and sent the others provisions. ¹¹ Philoki and other Indians often hunted for him, and, as a measure of their goodwill, "sometimes brought him presents of Venison, Honey, Bears-Meat, Buffaloes Tongues and Bear-Skins."

Rolle habitually exchanged these commodities for English trade goods and thus an informal system of barter existed between Rolle and the Indians before any official treaty between the natives and Grant's government had been negotiated.

Rolle based his decision against providing the Indians with rum on a "treaty he had read of, wherein the Creeks had desired the Prohibition of this Commodity to prevent Quarrels amongst the Young Men and the Whites." Rolle prided himself on convincing the Indians that rum was not acceptable as a trade item for skins. In a tone that reflected a concern for their welfare as well as an anxiety with regards to his own settlement, Rolle told them that "while sober, they were Men, and Creeks and White Men were friendly, and knew one another, yet when Rum came we knew not each other; but it made us Women, and we quarreled and fought . . . and therefore," though he kept rum for the use of his settlers, the Indians were not to have any. ¹²

On special occasions, however, when Rolle had several of the chiefs and their squaws to his table, he would sometimes "open up a bottle of Port Wine" and "two or three Glasses were the most he helped them to, and it sufficed." Rolle made every effort to impress upon them that "Rum was an unnecessary and dangerous Merchandise." Rolle was convinced that in the short time after his arrival, the Indians had formed an unreserved trust with him due to his fair and open dealings with them. He recalled many instances when women, coming from nearby settlements in their canoes, brought presents and "staid [*sic*] the whole day" with him without "raising any jealousy" in their husbands. ¹³

Rolle had much advice from Grant and officials back in England on the proper method for handling the Indians. He advocated that the Indians be instructed on the proper "Weights and Measures" and that every "dealing . . . should be as open as possible" with "Understanding clear, and Heads free from Liquor." Rolle also insisted that the Indians "be instructed in our Language to prevent Frauds." Rolle took it upon himself to begin this policy. He even taught the Indians "the Method of weighing with the Stillards, and Measuring by the yard." Rolle also "instilled in them the highest notions of the English Power from the Conquests of the late War" as best he could through the use of maps. ¹⁴

In keeping with his wish to establish an Indian trading store Rolle wrote Governor Grant of a meeting he had with Philoki. Rolle's neighbor claimed that the stores of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Spalding were disagreeable to his people and Rolle claimed that Philoki expressed the hope that Rolle might take over the trade for the area. Two days after Rolle sent his letter, Spalding's interpreter, Barnet, discredited Philoki's request by telling Rolle that "any Indian in Debt at one Store preferred to go to another." Rolle countered these charges, claiming that Spalding and the other Indian Traders were jealous of him because the Indians seemed to prefer him instead of them. Philoki's visit, according to Rolle, was merely a complementary one, but "having three Skins belonging to himself and his Sons, and wanting some Powder and Bullets, he proposed to barter the same." Rolle told him that no store had yet been established on his property and he only had a "just supply" of goods "for the People with me" but, in order to "oblige him and shew the Nature of my intended future Dealings with

them," he let them have them. Finally Rolle asked Grant to respond to a rumor he had heard that stated that an earlier petition sent by Rolle requesting a grant of land to start an Indian store "had been thrown under the table."¹⁵

Grant wasted no time in answering Rolle's letter. Only three days after Rolle sent his communication, Grant addressed a message to Rolle explaining the present Indian policy and answering the other charges Rolle had made against him and his council. Grant wrote that both Wilson and Spalding had been given licenses to trade with the Indians in different places so that they would not interfere with one another. Accordingly Grant wrote:

Each of them will have a Party amongst the Indians, as all Indian Traders have, and that sort of Party work has sometimes occasioned Disturbances; I endeavor to guard against that Inconvenience by keeping the Traders at a Distance . . . Both Wilson and Spalding have given Security [*sic*], to observe their Instructions. I should imagine, from your account, that Spalding has not observed his Instructions; for no Trader is permitted to give Credit to Indians; and Spalding's Interpreter following Philoki was a Irregularity into which I shall enquire Your having an Indian store at Mount Pleasant will be agreeable to me whenever you choose to apply for the License. I wish it was in my Power to put the whole Indian Trade of the Creek Nation into so good hands; but be so good as not to say any Thing about Trade or Settlement to Indians, for I am very cautious

about doing anything about these matters "till the Arrival of the Superintendent, lest I should counteract any Thing which he has settled." Grant also mentioned that he had word from London that the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations were in the process of submitting "final Orders upon it." Grant then turned to the matter of some of Rolle's requests being "thrown under the Table." He begged Rolle not to "give attention to such idle Reports."¹⁶

Rolle soon formed the opinion that Grant's policies were not in the best interests of the colony, its settlers, or the Indians; and furthermore, he felt they kept the colony in constant peril. Despite his continued efforts, Rolle complained that several "Obstacles appeared to prevent" his "Progress towards Civilizing" the Indians. Rolle recalled that one Saturday night "several Indians of the Meanest Rank" came to his plantation. On the next day, Sunday morning, they began to go away on a hunt and Rolle told them they should not go, for Sunday, "was the Day the Whites addressed the Being above." Rolle remembered they stayed and attended "the whole Service, with the utmost Decency and gravity." These Indians later departed and returned to Rolle's settlement "full freighted with the Governor's unhappy present of Rum . . . of which they regaled . . . the whole Night, being in a very gay mood they went to the other end of this Town, and assaulted the House of one of his settlers, where two of his Interpreters" lived. "On finding the Door shut [they] broke it open; but it was only to get the two Lads to come and Drink with them which they did for a small Time." Soon after they went away "but spent the whole Night drinking."¹⁷ Such occurrences were not uncommon at Rolle's settlement and he blamed the Governor's trading policy as the cause of these dangerous revelries.

By late summer 1764 Rolle was still seriously considering St. Marks as a site for future settlement and decided to travel there, make an inspection of the land, meet the Indians, and then make a final decision based on what he found. When Grant heard that Rolle was contemplating a trip to Apalachee, the governor warned Rolle to stay within the vicinity of the fort, until he received information from Grant that "the Limits of the Indian hunting Country had been settled at a general Meeting" between the Creeks and whites. Grant also warned Rolle that despite the fact that the "Indians seem well disposed to His Majesty's Subjects; those at Apalachee have never had much communication with Europeans; they are extremely ignorant of our Manners and Customs, and therefore must be treated with great Delicacy." Grant also told Rolle that Indian Superintendent Stuart had been informed that Rolle would be coming and possibly had "Informed the Indians that some White People might probably come there to look at the Country, and to desire them not to be alarmed upon their Arrival, as they would not settle there without their Consent." Grant told Stuart to "assure them that they would find those White people good Neighbours, if they obtained their Consent to cultivate a Part of the Country." ¹⁸

Before departing for Apalachee, Rolle traveled northward to Spalding's store and secured the services of Barnet as an interpreter. Also included on the expedition were an Indian, a carpenter, and Rolle's personal servant. On his journey toward St. Marks Rolle saw much evidence of the Rum trade. Fraud also was visible as a result of a failure to use the standard "Weights and Measures . . . which the Traders are bound to in their Licenses." ¹⁹ While still at Spalding's store and preparing to leave, Rolle recounted the unhappy experiences of three deaths during an Indian drunken spree. Neatohowki, a nephew of Cow Keeper, "upon an Apprehension of being bewitched, in the Heat of Liquor devised the Death of an old Woman and two Men." The crazed warrior killed one of the men by "Knocking out his brains with a Glass Bottle, and afterwards dragging him by the Tail of a Horse," away "from the Hutts, into the Woods." Rolle discovered the corpse on one of his walks through the forest. "The Indians," claimed Rolle, "avoid the sight of such spectacles and are much afraid of the Spirits of these Victims sacrificed to their Passions." For this reason they "immediately removed their Hutts a Quarter of Mile off, and lighted several Fires every night for some Time. This is the unhappy Effect of our Trade with them." Finally, Rolle observed that, "by this commodity of Rum alone, we may be said to conquer large Provinces, but as Lord Bacon says, not settle them; we dispeople them at the same time we are, in Appearance, flocking the Land with Inhabitants." ²⁰

After a few days preparation the five member group departed for St. Marks. They stayed the first night at the village of Chief White King. Upon arrival they were immediately conducted to White King's tent where the chief and "six or seven stout Indians" cautiously received them. At first the chief objected to their journeying through his land but the travellers told him that they merely intended to journey to St. Marks to board a ship to Savannah. Finally, the

party was served up some "Venison dressed in Bear's Oil, and a Bowl of China-Briar-Root-Soup." ²¹ After supper the group made camp for the night a short distance from the village.

Later that evening several members of the tribe visited Rolle and his party. Later, Rolle remembered, some became "rather crudely inclined, and wanted to open his little Parcels of Clothes and some few Necessaries he had there lying on the Ground." At this point Rolle directed them "by significant motions to sit down and with a Stick, described the River St. Johns, pointed out the Road to St. Augustine, and the Spot of . . . his Settlement." As the Indians became interested, Rolle used sign language to describe his friendship with Philoki, the Long Warrior, the Cow Keeper, and all the Indians he knew. He illustrated this "Friendship" by joining his hands together, pointing to his lips, and then to his heart. He found they understood him, "for they afterwards sat down very quietly, only expressing . . . Pleasure." The Indians invited them all up "to a Dance, which they used on the Arrival of Strangers, and the whole Village joined in it till about Eleven O'Clock." The chiefs came down too "and they seemed to be also in a very agreeable Humour, and sat and discoursed with the Interpreter." Though Rolle was excluded from the conversation by Barnet's impudence, he continued to use sign language. ²²

The next morning Rolle left the Indian village and within four days arrived at St. Marks, where his party was received "very politely by the commandant, Lieutenant Pompillione." Previously, Rolle had asked Pompillione to order any settlers from England that "should . . . put in" at St. Marks "to come round the Cape" to his village on the St. Johns River. Pompillione had already instructed authorities in Pensacola to do the same—and thus it was unnecessary for Rolle to personally travel to Pensacola. Rolle was not impressed with the weakly constructed outpost at St. Marks. The unfinished fort rested on a "small three-cornered Spot of Ground, confined between two Rivers." It was "of no strength," and though it contained about sixty soldiers, Rolle predicted that it would provide little defense from either Indians or intruders. He immediately ascertained that the prospects for settlement in the region were not promising. Not only were formal agreements between the English and Indians yet to be worked out, but the natives' open hostility toward the military inhabitants of the area was also apparent. "The Indians," he noted, were "jealous of the least Garden outside this proposed triangular Fortress—and the Garrison itself [was] in Distress for Provision, having five Days Allowance for seven." Thus Rolle "feared to risk his settlers" in the area, for he felt certain that the Indians would have "obstructed his Passage." Despite these immediate difficulties, however, Rolle was impressed by the future prospects for trade and agriculture in Apalachee. ²³

Rolle soon left St. Marks and returned by way of White King's village. He found the town nearly deserted. The men had gone to meet the Indians of Alachua in a ballgame. Rolle then learned from the women that another reason had "detained them longer abroad." This, noted Rolle, was "the unfortunate Commerce of Rum." In twelve days they consumed eighteen casks at Alachua.

Traveling west from White King's village Rolle "met several of the Savannah Indians on their Return," and "though always in a overheated Condition" he met with the "kindest return; the White King especially seemed much pleased." ²⁴

After returning to his village and reviewing the events of the past twenty days, Rolle prided himself "in the Confirmation of his Prudence and Foresight." He professed a "thorough conviction of the Indian Friendship—and the Enjoyment of the Sight of a most fertile and agreeable Country, part of it the most perfect natural Garden in his Majesty's Territories, and which will hereafter, probably, produce the most beneficial Return to the Mother Country." ²⁵

Rolle soon wrote Grant a letter which gave a full account of his four-hundred-mile trip. Again, the rum trade with the Indians was much to be deplored. Grant's reply expressed sympathy with Rolle's feelings, but hedged on an immediate remedy to the problem. "Rum is hurtful," he conceded, "it is to be hoped Means will be fallen upon to put a stop to that very detrimental, and, I may say, iniquitous Branch of Indian Trade." Grant, however, thought it best at this time not to change the policy, "for fear of counteracting what" Stuart "may have settled; but be assured I have what you point out with Regard to Rum very strongly at Heart." Grant ended his communication with the assurance that Rolle's request for a License to trade with the Indians would be granted if he quickly selected a piece of land and "avoided the Spots, where . . . other Store-Houses are fixed." At that time, Grant claimed, there were only five. ²⁶

On June 22 Rolle and Spalding went north from Rollestown in search of a supply boat from Savannah. After meeting the boat and finding the rum on board only for Rolle, Spalding, much disappointed, left Rolle, who, along with two small boys returned with two casks of rum and other provisions. On their return trip to Rollestown the small party repeatedly received musket fire from the riverbank but managed to make it back to the village. When Rolle and his companions arrived they found a large contingent of Indians anxiously waiting for Rolle and his ship from England. The Indians eyed the two 110-gallon casks of rum but left after receiving some presents Rolle had for them.

This anxious time was made worse because of Rolle's belief that Spalding, jealous of Rolle's friendship with the Indians, might give them rum and encourage them to attack Rolle's settlement to acquire more. All during that week, fearing such an occurrence, Rolle put his settlement on the alert "against Machinations on all Sides, and on this Account buried his Rum Casks & after his Settlers were retired to Sleep, kept two or three Fires lighted the Residue of the Night," and attended them himself to convince the Indians "that if they had any bad Intentions, that the Settlement was on its Guard." In his official account of the affair to the Privy Council Rolle reminded them that this occurrence along with many of the others already mentioned, demonstrated that there was little to "be feared from the poor Indians, if the Whites were not the Instigators." ²⁷

A final incident which illustrated Rolle's policy toward the Indians was demonstrated just before he left East Florida to return to England. Upon hearing of Indian uneasiness north of his settlement, he sent two of his People to Alachua with a small present for Chief Cow Keeper and his wife. Thus, contended Rolle,

it was possible, "to preserve their Affections by all Methods of Endearment, which he did by very inconsiderable trifling Presents; a Guineas worth might be the utmost on the Whole. It is the Method that wrought on them a personal Inclination to serve and assist" me. Thus Rolle felt that if the Indians were given the things "sufficient to civilize them," they would play the role of "sensible Indians, not savage Barbarian." This policy "wrought on Beneficence in such Hearts above the Power of Rum, denied them by" me, "but given by the Governor. . . ." Rolle claimed that the chiefs told him that "though they have had Rum given to them, their Entertainment, as to Provisions, was very indifferent at St. Augustine."²⁸ From this Rolle reasoned that "relieving the necessities of Nature would more infinitely oblige the Indian, than all the Presents of Luxury, and make a more lasting Impression." Rolle was convinced that this policy would best serve English interests in the province. Thus, by "means of civilization, the Indians strength" would be "increased and in the process the British Inhabitant" is served "by diminishing the Number of Wild Beasts and Venomous Insects, [and] the procuring of the beneficial Skin-Trade without the White Settlers entering into that idle Way of Life. This [policy] establishes settlements. That [policy] overthrows settlements."²⁹

It was not long before Rolle made public his plans for future development of East Florida. Rolle's grandiose plans included the construction of a village of artisans. In it Rolle hoped to provide for the "Education of Children, the cultivation of Christianity, free from Enthusiasm, the Civilization of Indians, and the Fidelity of Slaves." Rolle also proposed to build a "Library of Agriculture, Botany, Gardening, Mechanics, and such Learning as appears particularly adapted to the American Planter, and above all, the strengthening of this Frontier Province . . . against any Enemy at a future Time by well stocking it with White Inhabitants." Finally, Rolle castigated Grant and his council for not supporting him sufficiently in his goals.³⁰

Within weeks Rolle left fifty-seven white settlers at Rollestown and set sail for England. He appeared before the Privy Council to make a personal appeal for reimbursement for his losses. In addition to his lengthy petition, Rolle verbally reminded the Council that "the whole Expense of the Civil and Military Government as maintained" in totality by the other country "is very great and without having any material or visible beneficial Effect." The only way for the province to be put on a profitable footing was for the leadership in St. Augustine to pay more attention to the needs of the true colonizers.³¹ Rolle's appearance before the Privy Council did him no immediate good but it did result in a letter from London to Rolle's nemesis, Governor Grant, telling him to try once again to get along with so "bold and useful a colonist."³²

Rolle returned to East Florida in November 1767 with more white settlers but met with no greater success. The riff-raff swept from the streets of London did not easily adjust to the harsh labor necessary to tame the East Florida frontier. Rolle's settlers escaped at every opportunity and he had extreme difficulty enforcing his indenture contracts. But these settlers were of such little value to Rolle that Henry Laurens wrote Rolle's overseer, William Penn, that his master "gain[ed]

most by those of his Servants who do run away.”³³ These escapes led Laurens to complain later that he had “much trouble attending Mr. Rolle” and had “really been a loser.”³⁴ Not until Rolle settled on black labor in the early 1780s did his enterprise approach a money making status.³⁵

Over the remaining years of the British period in East Florida, Rolle continued to pour money into his settlement and by 1782 he had accumulated well over 80,000 acres, of which 495 acres were cleared for corn, 225 for rice, and hundreds of pine trees were boxed for turpentine. The same year Rolle exported tar, lumber, Indian corn, rice, indigo, rye, and even orange juice.³⁶

Although little is known of the day to day operation of his settlement, it is obvious that Rolle kept in constant contact with the Indians. As Grant complained to his superiors in London, Rolle, along with breaking other rules, “keeps an Indian store without leave or license.”³⁷ The fact that there were no accounts of massacres suggests that Rolle’s earlier Indian policies prevailed.

One year before the Peace of Paris (1783) Rolle’s settlement was described as having a “good House of two Fronts to the River and Inland with 5 sashed Windows and two stories.” The village consisted of a “Large square of 10 acres with Negroes Houses rang’d regularly on each side with Garden Lotts behind each, a Church and a Clergyman’s house,” and an “Avenue . . . fronting the Principle mansion cut straight for 8 miles through the woods towards Augustine to the end of” Rolle’s land.³⁸

After the British disaster at Yorktown in 1781, Lord North’s Tory government fell apart and Lord Shelburne, a Whig, emerged from the political wreckage to become Prime Minister. Rolle, also a Whig, hoped that the new government would be more inclined to see things his way. When news reached the colonies in 1783 that the Floridas were to be returned to Spain, Rolle hastily submitted another petition to the Privy Council on September 10, 1783. Rolle claimed his losses as a result of the transfer amounted to £28,488. Of the £19,886 he asked, Rolle only received £6,597 from the Commissioners of the East Florida Claims.³⁹

Along with the money, Rolle was granted property in the Bahamas. He hired a boat, the *Peace and Plenty*, and transported his settlers, slaves, livestock, and all movable property to Exuma Island. Two plantations, “Rollesville” and “Stevenstone,” were established and existed until 1834 when slavery was abolished in the colonies. At that time Rolle’s son, Lord Stevenstone, who inherited the property at his father’s death in 1797, gave all the property to the blacks who still lived on the plantations.⁴⁰

When Rolle and the English withdrew from the Floridas in 1783 and the Spaniards regained control, much had changed in the area with regard to the Indians. Since 1763, the English, with the help of Rolle, and more importantly, British trading firms like Panton, Leslie and Company, had provided the Indians with more sophisticated trade goods than had earlier been supplied to them by the Spaniards. By 1783 the Indian economy rested even more firmly on commercial hunting. Powder, guns, and knives were not luxury items but vital to Indian survival. The natives were hooked on trade and the Spanish soon realized that

a steady supply of trade goods must be the starting point for any Indian policy. Because they lacked the contacts, the credit facilities, and the expertise to conduct the trade themselves, the Spaniards eventually commissioned English trading firms to carry it out under a Spanish monopoly. This policy was far from ideal, but the alternatives were worse. There is little proof of Rolle's financial interest in these subsequent trade enterprises. But his earlier trade relations with the Indians in East Florida was a precursor to this later Spanish policy.

Notes

¹ Henry Laurens to John Knight, February 14, 1763, *The Papers of Henry Laurens* in the South Carolina Historical Society (Charleston, 1966), 3: 253.

² David L. Schafer, "Plantation Development in British East Florida: A Case Study of the Earl of Egmont," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 63 (October 1984): 172; Linda Kay Williams, "Loyalism in East Florida 1763-1783" (M.A. thesis, Florida State University, 1975), 6; Charles Loch Mowat, "The Land Policy in British East Florida," *Agricultural History* 14 (1940): 76.

³ David R. Chesnutt, "South Carolina's Impact Upon East Florida and the Revolutionary South," in *Eighteenth Century Florida: the Impact of the American Revolution*, ed. Samuel Proctor (Gainesville, 1976), 10.

⁴ Carita Doggett Corse, "Denys Rolle and Rollestown: A Pioneer for Utopia," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 7 (1927): 115-34; Carl Bohnenberger, "The Settlement of Charlotta (Rollestown), 1765," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 4 (July 1925): 43-49; Charles Loch Mowat, "The Tribulations of Denys Rolle," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 23 (July 1944): 1-14.

⁵ Denys Rolle, *To the Right Honourable the Lords of His Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council. The Humble Petition of Denys Rolle*, with introduction and index by Claude C. Sturgill (1765; reprint, Gainesville, 1977), 5-6. Hereafter cited as Rolle, *Petition*.

⁶ Bohnenberger, "The Settlement of Charlotta," 46.

⁷ J. Leitch Wright, *Creeks and Seminoles: the Destruction of Regeneration of the Muscolgulge People*, (Lincoln, NB, 1986), 1-6; "British East Florida: Loyalist Bastion," in Proctor, *Eighteenth Century Florida*, 7; also on the origins of the Seminoles see Edwin McReynolds, *The Seminoles*, (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1972), 1-21; Charles Fairbanks, *Ethnohistorical Report on the Florida Indians* (New York, 1974).

⁸ Rolle, *Petition*, 6-7.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁰ The Treaty of Picolata (1765) established formal relations between the various chiefs of the Creeks in East Florida and British authorities. Included in the provisions of the treaty was the formal recognition of peace and friendship among the Creeks and the British, the establishment of a system of gift giving, provisions for the punishment of murders on both sides, and finally, boundaries between Indian and white settlements were established. Robert Gold, *Borderland Empires in Transition: the Triple Nation Transfer of Florida* (Carbondale, IL, 1969), 178-83; James F. Doster, *The Creek Indians*

and their Florida Lands, 1740-1823 (New York, 1974), 1: 22-3; Louis De Vorse, *The Indian Boundary in the Southern Colonies, 1763-1775* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1966), 190-203; Lawrence Gipson, *Triumphant Empire: New Responsibilities Within the Enlarged Empire, 1763-1766* (New York, 1956), 195; John Alden, *John Stuart and the Southern Frontier* (New York, 1966), 230-31.

¹¹ Rolle, *Petition*, 9.

¹² *Ibid.*, 12.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁵ Denys Rolle to James Grant, March 18, 1765, in Rolle, *Petition*, (second section), 18-19.

¹⁶ James Grant to Denys Rolle, March 21, 1765, in Rolle, *Petition*, pt. 2, 20-23.

¹⁷ Rolle, *Petition*, 13.

¹⁸ James Grant to Denys Rolle, September 14, 1765, in Rolle, *Petition*, pt. 2, 1-2.

¹⁹ Rolle, *Petition*, 48-49.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, 50.

²² *Ibid.*, 52.

²³ *Ibid.*, 51-52.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 52.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 53.

²⁶ James Grant to Denys Rolle, June 15, 1765, Rolle, *Petition*, pt. 2, 34-35.

²⁷ Rolle, *Petition*, 56-58.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 60.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 61.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 66.

³¹ Claude Sturgill, Introduction, *Petition*, xxiv.

³² *Ibid.*, xxiv-xxv.

³³ *Ibid.*, xxvi.

³⁴ Henry Laurens to William Penn, December 24, 1767, *Papers of Henry Laurens*, 4: 527-28.

³⁵ On Rolle's difficulties with his white work force see *Petition*, 2-5, 8-9, 20-21, 24-25; Edwin L. Williams, "Negro Slavery in Florida," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 28 (July 1949): 95; Charles Loch Mowat, *East Florida as a British Province, 1763-1784* (Berkeley, 1943), 71.

³⁶ Marsha A. Chance, *The Archaic Through the British Colonial Period at Rollestown Midden, Putnam County, Florida* (Winter Park, FL, 1982), 19-20.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 19.

³⁸ Corse, "Denys Rolle and Rollestown," 134.

³⁹ Sturgill, Introduction in Rolle, *Petition*, x.xvii. For a full account of Rolle's requests to the Privy Council see Wilber Siebert, *Loyalists in East Florida, 1775-1785* (Deland, FL, 1929), 2: 287-97.

⁴⁰ Thelma Peters, "The American Loyalists in the Bahama Islands: Who They Were," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 40 (January 1962): 40, 238-39.

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Prelude To Manifest Destiny: The United States and West Florida, 1810-1811


Robert Taylor

American continental expansions during the early nineteenth century expounded and nurtured many of the themes that would help to define the American experience. In the diplomatic area, this movement saw the origins of the two leading forces on which this expansion was pivoted, manifest destiny and the Monroe Doctrine. A past scholar of this concept, Albert K. Weinberg, saw manifest destiny as a "dogma of supreme self-assurance and ambition—that ambitious incorporation of all adjacent lands which was the fulfillment of a moral mission."¹ While Weinberg's initial thesis has been challenged by historians like Frederick Merk, few argue that the rationale for the growth, at the expense of other peoples, influenced at least a few Americans during the 1800s. But how readily was this drive, or mission, accepted? To answer this question one can look at the various instances when the young United States acquired new territory. The Treaty of Paris in 1783 gave the fledgling nation enough space to absorb new settlers for a time. Soon however attention turned to new lands outside the American orbit.

How such areas came to join the Union sheds some light on how manifest destiny became the creed of these expansionists. One incident, the revolt in Spanish West Florida in 1810 and its subsequent occupation by the United States, stands out. An important process began here, one that would be repeated later in Texas and California. Forces at work in the Baton Rouge districts of West Florida would, in a roundabout fashion, effect the way Americans justified their territorial advances. The West Florida affair also points up the strengths and weaknesses of the first generation of American leaders in conducting foreign policy.

A precursor to the annexation of West Florida occurred in the disputed Natchez district between 1797 and 1800. Like the subsequent West Florida case, Natchez had been the center of a long-drawn-out argument over treaty terms and boundary lines with the government of Spain. In the end the Spanish failed to control the large Anglo population residing in the area. This affair created an important legal precedent. An area could be successfully detached from Spanish rule via the infiltration of American settlers, who would then push to join the Union. Such had been the case around Natchez. Indeed, this land hunger would become a useful tool in the American diplomatic arsenal.²

While this tactic proved effective, it was not a major factor in the next American land acquisition. The 1803 Louisiana Purchase doubled the size of the United States with the stroke of a pen, but it did not bring the highly-prized Floridas into American hands. Napoleon's foreign minister, Talleyrand, defined the region as including the province of Texas but excluding West Florida. The wily Frenchman based his interpretation on the Treaty of San Ildefonso which retroceded Louisiana to Spain. The only land east of the Mississippi and below the thirty-first parallel that was included was a triangular tract running from Bayou Manchac down the east bank of the Mississippi, known as the



Map by Jerry Dixon

Island of Orleans. It certainly did not, in his opinion, include any land between the Mississippi and the banks of the Perdido River. France, according to Talleyrand, could not cede or sell territory it did not own. ³

American minister to France, Robert R. Livingston, remained convinced that the opposite was the case, however. He thought the purchase of Louisiana had secured for the United States an area which indeed included the Mississippi to Perdido strip. Both Livingston and James Monroe eventually persuaded Secretary of State James Madison, and ultimately President Jefferson, that the area was indeed already American property. It did not prove difficult to convince the Virginians that something was so when they both very much wanted it to be. Ironically Livingston had much more of a case than he realized. Spanish documents which he would never see proved that after 1763 West Florida had been placed under the control of the Louisiana government. Despite this state of affairs, the American claim to West Florida remained weak. ⁴

With the American flag flying over New Orleans and all of Louisiana, the threat to the free navigation of the Mississippi disappeared. But the Jefferson administration still actively pursued the Floridas due to their strategic location and significance. Florida could serve as a base for the Spanish, or any other European power, in event of war with the United States. Key rivers emptied into the Gulf of Mexico in that part of Spanish territory west of the Perdido, rivers that could be highways for frontiersmen and planters in the newly-formed Mississippi Territory. Spanish influence on borderland Indians and the haven the Floridas provided for fugitives, both black and white, made it a painful thorn in the American flank. Well aware of these facts, Jefferson continued in the hope that he might secure one or both of the Floridas through diplomatic means. ⁵

Initially the president had ignored Livingston's advice for the United States to simply seize West Florida. The minister to France believed that the French, the real power to be dealt with, would hardly protest such an action. Despite Livingston's counsel, Jefferson decided on a more subtle means, and asked Congress in 1806 for a two-million-dollar appropriation for the purpose of expediting negotiations with Talleyrand over the Florida question. In the debate that followed, Senator John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts forcefully argued that such money was not required since the United States in his opinion had already purchased at least West Florida. "I consider it as our own," he told his fellow senators, ". . . we bought and paid for it." In the end President Jefferson's attempt to pry the Floridas from both the Spanish and the French came to nothing. It would be left up to his successors to realize his desires. ⁶

The next opportunity for the United States came late in 1808 when Napoleon seized the throne of Spain for his brother Joseph. By 1810 Madrid and the rest of Spain was in a state of turmoil and bitter warfare. Colonial officials in Spain's still-considerable New World Empire were thrown into confusion as to their allegiance in the struggle at home and faced unrest among their charges. Spanish authority had been badly shaken, and the threat of revolution hung in the air. The two major powers in North America, the United States and Great Britain, seemed to be in the best position to benefit from Spain's distress.

Historian Henry Adams likened them to two vultures who "hovered over the expiring empire, snatching at the morsels they most coveted. . . ." The British hoped to keep the Americans off-balance by denying them Baton Rouge and Mobile. As long as these frontier towns remained in Spanish hands, New Orleans and the lower Mississippi valley were not totally secure for the United States, a state of affairs the British desired. ⁷



David Holmes

*Eron Rowland,
Andrew Jackson's Campaign
Against the British (New York, 1926)*

Newly-elected President James Madison sought information about the Floridas in light of the turbulent situation. He enjoyed first-hand data from former Senator John Adair of Kentucky, who spent some two months there early in 1809. Adair reported that nine-tenths of the population were American in origin, and all but five or six in his view would welcome annexation. The President also learned that the Baton Rouge district contained most of West Florida's wealth and valuable property. The people of this area, according to Adair were "as ripe fruit; waiting the hand that dares pluck them; and with them all Florida." He warned Madison of the presence of British agents in West Florida who promised lowered trade barriers for planter's cotton if the region joined the British empire. ⁸

In April 1810 the adjutant general of the militia of Spanish West Florida wrote to Madison directly and offered the services of his men if the United States wanted to take the area by force of arms. Indeed, the Madison administration was becoming convinced that the time for some action might be near in the face of growing unrest in the Spanish borderlands. In addition Governor David Holmes of the Mississippi Territory in June described similar scenes of near anarchy in adjacent West Florida. In his view the Spanish authorities there were corrupt and demoralized by events. Madison responded to such reports by placing the militia in Mississippi on alert in the event of more internal disturbances of foreign intervention. The governor of Orleans Territory, William C. C. Claiborne, received similar instructions and was called to Washington for consultation. The situation in West Florida was about to take a dramatic turn. ⁹



W. C. C. Claiborne

*Benson J. Lossing,
Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812
(New York, 1869)*

While in the capital, Governor Claiborne suggested that an agent be sent into the Baton Rouge district to ascertain current conditions and sentiments. Colonel William Wykoff, a Louisiana parish judge and planter, received the mission of informing the leaders in West Florida of the good wishes of the United States and collecting needed intelligence. Wykoff was also to remind Floridians of their many common interests with Americans, and that should their section separate

politically from the Spanish empire the American government would have no complaint. However any connection with another European power would have "very disagreeable consequences," and that possibility must be avoided at all costs. Claiborne added to Wykoff's instructions the observation that "nature has decreed the union of Florida with the U.S. and the welfare of its inhabitants demands it." ¹⁰

Subsequently Wykoff journeyed across the Mississippi and met with the principal leaders of what were in fact definite factions among the residents of West Florida. There were four: a pro-United States group in favor of annexation, a pro-British group, a pro-French segment, and those remaining loyal to the Spanish government. The pro-American faction was by far the strongest, the pro-French the weakest. Between the Mississippi and the Pearl River there were about fifteen thousand residents, while the land east to the Perdido was more sparsely settled. People began meeting as early as June 1810 to discuss the future of their province in the face of Spanish disarray. Four West Florida districts, Baton Rouge, Feliciana, Saint Helena, and Tanchipola, sent fourteen delegates to meet at Saint Johns' Plain to devise a course of action. Wykoff suggested to a few of these delegates that such a convention would be well-received by the government of the United States as being in the American revolutionary tradition. This meeting had ominous implications for Spanish authorities, because only three of the men attending favored West Florida west of the Pearl remaining under Spanish control. ¹¹

Spanish officials were woefully ill-prepared to meet this challenge. The fort at Baton Rouge, center of what remained of Spanish power in West Florida, had gaps in its stockade and no outer ditch to deter attack. Gunpowder and rations were in short supply for the tiny garrison, which had degenerated into little more than an armed band. The local governor, Carlos de Lassus, was known to be weak and vacillating. However, he realized that any resistance by his pitiful forces would be foolish and so gave his consent to the organization of what would be known as the West Florida Convention. De Lassus worked with the convention and its chairman, John Rhea, even though this body slowly stripped away his powers as governor. The assembly adjourned shortly after passing a resolution pledging loyalty to the King of Spain. ¹²

The convention was not as solid in its objectives as Governor de Lassus might have thought. Colonel Wykoff reported a serious struggle between advocates of union with the United States and the pro-British faction. The group supporting some sort of relationship with Great Britain was a collection of British subjects, American Loyalists in exile, and a mixed bag of army deserters and debtors who had sought refuge there. The tiny French faction had little influence, for the idea of being dominated by Napoleon was distasteful to both American and British supporters. De Lassus could offer little more than verbal resistance, and hoped that help would arrive from the east soon. But once the movement toward self-government began, it gained momentum in the direction of a complete break with Spain. ¹³

When the convention reconvened on August 13, it proposed measures that in effect would remove Spanish rule in the greater Baton Rouge area. The power to raise and collect taxes, control the local militia, and to create a court system based on English common law passed to the members of the convention. De Lassus balked at this total surrender of his authority, and prepared to launch a counter-revolutionary movement of his own. Unfortunately for the luckless Spaniard, the West Floridians had learned of their governor's planned "treachery" by September 20. The decision was then made to strike first. ¹⁴

Two days later a group of about eighty mounted militiamen moved against the Spanish garrison at Baton Rouge. Since little had been done to repair the dilapidated fort, the issue was never in any real doubt. Led by General Philemon Thomas, a Revolutionary War veteran and local grocer, the rebels stormed the walls shouting "Hurrah Washington." Shots rang out and the commander of the garrison was fatally wounded in the exchange. His men either fled or threw down their arms and surrendered. The only real symbol of Spanish authority between the Mississippi and the Pearl rivers was now in rebel hands, and General Thomas took immediate steps to mobilize the rest of the West Florida militia. He felt sure the hated "dons" would try to regain control with military force at any time. ¹⁵

Within a week of the attack on the Spanish soldiers in Baton Rouge, the West Florida Convention was again in session and on the verge of making a momentous decision. After compiling a list of grievances against the government of Spain, the convention declared West Florida both free and independent. The Republic of West Florida was proclaimed with its capital at Saint Francisville. The new nation would be divided into five districts, each electing one senator and one or more members in a House of Representatives. The West Florida Senate would in turn choose a chief executive, titled Governor, who would serve a one-year term. Also a two-hundred-dollar property requirement was levied on all prospective voters. Most historians have concluded that the little republic was largely a failure from the outset due to the fact that it was never meant to be permanent. However, after examining the constitution of West Florida, one can not help but believe that this document and the government it created were much more than a sham. Just what it might have become had events taken a different course is at least uncertain. ¹⁶

The founding fathers of the Republic of West Florida had some motives that were less than noble, however. This was especially evident in the area of public lands and more specifically land grants. In Article 4, Section 3 of the new constitution, all British and French land patents not established by the Spanish government were declared null and void. This released large tracts of land, much of which was in turn granted to the leaders of the West Florida revolutionary movement. These leaders reasoned that since it was they who had taken all the risks during the revolt the lion's share of the public lands in the new country should go to them as a well-earned reward. Besides the convention delegates were convinced that the United States had lost any claim to the area by leaving it in Spanish hands for seven years after the Louisiana Purchase. American tardiness

had cost the Union any right to dictate how West Florida lands should be disposed of. Leaders of West Florida believed that even if the Republic joined the Union at some later date, it would be the richer for all internal improvements financed by additional land sales. Thus the United States would receive a bonus by annexing a more developed area. ¹⁷

The eventual acquisition by the American government seemed to many to be a logical next step. The convention forwarded a message to the territorial government in adjacent Mississippi hinting that West Florida would not be adverse to becoming "an integral and inalienable portion of the United States." Many in the southern states were eager to make annexation of West Florida a reality without waiting for orders from Washington to do so. Army units were "panting for action," as witnessed by Colonel W. H. Overton. He wrote to his friend Andrew Jackson that he had no idea how anxious frontier soldiers were to assist their countrymen in taking possession of the rich country to the south. "Sir it is the place for making futures" he wrote prophetically. Overton was convinced that if Old Hickory were to see West Florida himself he would move there with little delay. Ironically General Jackson would see Florida much sooner than Overton imagined. ¹⁸

In spite of its grand beginnings, the leaders of the Republic of West Florida soon learned that their small country could not long exist without becoming allied with some larger power. On October 10 they sent the American Secretary of State, Robert Smith, what amounted to conditions for such an arrangement with the United States. First, the U.S. must get Spain to relinquish any claims on West Florida. If the Spanish made any attempt to re-gain the region, the United States must guarantee the country's independence. West Florida also asked for a blanket pardon for criminals and deserters from the American military living inside its borders. Finally, a \$100,000 loan was requested to meet the operating expenses of the republic's new government. If American assurances were not forthcoming, the West Floridians hinted that they might look to some other country for the desired support. ¹⁹

The idea of West Florida looking elsewhere for an ally was taken seriously by the Madison administration. The government may have had a covert role in the creation of the new republic, but it appeared that the offspring was not willing to obey its parent. While the French remained "extremely obnoxious" to all parties, an alignment with Great Britain was not impossible. American leaders were well aware of the still sizeable pro-British faction there and how much it favored establishing a formal relationship with Great Britain. American officials in the borderlands took every opportunity to let it be known that the Floridas should accept no aid from the British. To do so would in their view "relinquish the fruits of a long and bloody revolutionary war." ²⁰

British intervention was not the only factor to be considered. American frontiersmen in the Mississippi and Louisiana territories, wishing to take advantage of apparent Spanish impotence, laid plans for an attack on their holdings in Mobile and Pensacola. At that moment they were organizing one such filibustering expedition for an attack on Mobile from Fort Stoddard. The United States

government, oddly enough, was convinced that such operations jeopardized any future negotiations for the purchase of the Floridas and tried to discourage them. American neutrality would be violated by such activities, and Spain's powerful European allies might retaliate in kind. Any notions of a manifest destiny would have to wait, and the filibusters were restrained. One official remarked that while he was privately thrilled at the independence of West Florida "the work ought to be their own. We have no right to interfere." ²¹

Since West Floridians were under no such restraints, a force of about sixteen hundred men, under the new single-star flag of their republic, began marching eastward at the end of October. Their mission was to seize Mobile and extend their borders to the banks of the Perdido River. One prominent West Floridian, Joseph P. Kennedy, argued before the convention that their fate as an independent nation depended on the speedy capture of both Mobile and Pensacola. He stated this despite the fact that taking the latter would prove difficult, as Pensacola lay east of the Perdido. In Kennedy's view, however, the future cotton city of Mobile should become the new permanent capital of the enlarged republic, thus making the United States government much more eager to come to terms. The residents of Spanish Mobile, having little desire to join the Anglo revolutionaries, were in a state of near panic at the thought of a mob of rough militiamen moving toward them. Spanish officials, clearly uneasy, doubted their ability to hold off the invaders, but in the end they managed to cling tenaciously to the strategic river town. ²²

Similar unrest spread as far as Pensacola, where rumors abounded. The revolt beyond the Pearl in the Baton Rouge districts created understandable tension, pushing a group of local Spanish officers to plot the overthrow of Spanish West Florida's Governor Vincente Folch. Word had it that the attacking force of rebels was due to strike at any moment. At least one American agent living in the town was hard at work trying to induce those Americans residing in Pensacola to rise up against the Spanish and ask for annexation by the United States of all of West Florida. American freebooters to the north in Alabama stood ready to join in. One citizen believed at the time that any effort would have been successful since the population was in the grip of a fever epidemic. "One hundred men could have captured the place with the loss of but few men . . .," he recorded. ²³

Governor Folch had always been troubled by the large concentration of Americans living around Baton Rouge. It was he who had convinced de Lassus not to resist the setting up of the convention in order to buy time. After the revolt began Folch would have gladly led a relief column to crush it, for he knew that, at least, the pro-Spanish faction would support him. But the governor found himself facing two enemy forces, the one marching from Baton Rouge and the other the filibusters aimed at Mobile. Folch decided once again to stave off disaster by contacting the Americans in Alabama and requesting that the regular troops at Fort Stoddard continue to restrain them, as well as restrain the advance of the West Floridians. In return he inferred a willingness to begin negotiations on the transfer of both West and possibly East Florida to American control. ²⁴

President Madison had followed the events in West Florida very carefully, and enjoyed numerous reports from the various American officials and agents in the region. It was clear by mid-October that the United States would have to intervene to insure the territory's becoming American. But any such move raised many questions. For example, could Madison order troops into West Florida on his own authority and without the consent of Congress, then not in session? He turned to his old friend Jefferson for consultation and advice. He wrote that:

. . . the near approach of the Congress might subject any intermediate interposition of the Executive to the charge of being premature and disrespectful, if not of being illegal. Still there is great weight in the considerations that the country to the Perdido, being our own may be fairly taken possession of, it can be done without violence; above all, if there be danger of its passing into the hands of a third and dangerous party. . . . From present appearances, our occupancy of West Florida, would be resented by England, Spain, and by France, and bring on not a triangular, but quadrangular contest. . . .²⁵

Jefferson advised that West Florida should be brought into the American orbit as soon as possible. This was consistent with his efforts to establish a solid claim to the territory during his presidency. Madison decided, with Jefferson's concurrence, to issue a proclamation authorizing the occupation of West Florida to the line of the Pearl River by American military forces. No mention of the revolt or the Republic of West Florida was made in this announcement, only that the area in question had become a "haven for violators of our revenue and commercial laws and slave traders." The general collapse of Spanish authority endangered adjacent American territory, so now the United States would take actual possession. Any delay might lead to the loss of the province, or give encouragement to land speculators already eyeing West Florida lands. "The occupancy of the Territory as far as the Perdido was called for by the crisis," Madison wrote to William Pinckney later, "and is understood to be within the authority of the Executive."²⁶

The president's action established the foundation for the American annexation of West Florida, an act based on the 1803 Louisiana Purchase and not the existence of an independent West Florida state. The proclamation of October 27, 1810, translated all the hopes and arguments of the Jeffersonians into concrete action at long last. It also helped James Madison on the political front. By using American troops the president won the favor of many of the newly-elected "war hawks" in Congress. Young and ambitious men like Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun had long called for a more forceful approach to the Floridas matter. But for the greater mass of the people, Madison's action did not have much of an impact. The reason for this apparent lack of interest was the fact that the proclamation dealing with West Florida and the subsequent troop movements were confidential for a time.²⁷

Orders, appropriately dated October 27, arrived in New Orleans for Governor Claiborne. They directed him to take possession of the prized territory in the name of the United States as soon as possible. Claiborne was also to incorporate the area into the Orleans Territory and establish a new parish court system and re-organize the militia. The people of the area were to enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other inhabitants of that territory. The governor received the authority to use regular troops, and militia from Louisiana and Mississippi, should any resistance to the occupation crop up. However, Claiborne was under strict orders not to attempt any aggression against a Spanish post, no matter how small. The forces moving against Mobile were to be halted by Claiborne, at least temporarily. He was also instructed to be "temperate and conciliatory" in his dealings with the West Floridians.²⁸

When Claiborne and his men arrived in Baton Rouge, they found the town strangely quiet and inhospitable. Residents were upset because of the United States' refusal to recognize their independence or meet convention demands. Halting the raids planned against Mobile and Pensacola only added to that discontent. Claiborne came expecting serious opposition, and had reason to be concerned. West Florida's leaders had denounced the "invasion" of their country and talked about resistance. The chief executive of the Republic of West Florida, Fulton Skipwith, protested directly to President Madison that he would continue "by all means in my power . . . to repel the wanton outrage offered our feelings and assent the rights of my adopted country."²⁹

A former member of the diplomatic service, Skipwith had been elected with the general notion that he would negotiate the annexation of West Florida by the Union on favorable terms. He called for as much in his inaugural address on November 29. Skipwith declared that the blood of West Floridians should and would return to the heart of their mother country. The spirit of immortal Washington "stimulates that return," and "would frown upon our course, should we attempt to change. . . ." Skipwith himself privately had little faith in the American claim via the Louisiana Purchase, but wished to push the border of his country to the Perdido before any agreement was reached. He and the convention were furious at Claiborne's heavy-handed actions which ignored their sovereignty and failed to guarantee their rights. And worse yet, the validity of their land grants were not being recognized by the new masters of West Florida.³⁰

Governor Claiborne received Skipwith at his lodgings after refusing an invitation to call on him officially. He impressed Skipwith with the folly of any resistance, especially since his force had been augmented by five gunboats with the capacity of leveling Baton Rouge if need be. Skipwith answered with charges that Claiborne and his men had insulted the flag and the constitution of the West Florida republic. He would never give the order to strike the lone star flag, but would direct his soldiers not to interfere with American troops in taking control of the town. At about 2:00 P.M. on December 10, 1810, some four hundred Floridians marched out of the old Spanish fort and surrendered their weapons to the Americans. Then the flag of the Republic of West Florida was struck for the last time.³¹

The little republic, which survived only seventy-four days, quickly and quietly faded away. But its demise leaves questions about the nature of American expansion and the concept of manifest destiny. Some would argue that the consent of a people about to be incorporated into the Union must be freely given beforehand. This principal was not followed in the case of West Florida. A legally-elected government was overthrown by American military force. Secretary of State Smith believed that the people of West Florida should not have been fooled by the "expectation that the United States will surrender, for both their benefit, what has been purchased with the treasure and for the benefit of the whole." President Madison never intended to recognize any authority in the disputed area other than American, despite hints to the contrary.³²

Claiborne, after securing Baton Rouge, moved toward the Spanish-held positions around Mobile just as the West Floridians had done before him. In the fluidity of the moment the governor hoped to ease the Spaniards back across the Perdido gently and perhaps even out of Pensacola without a shot. This plan of action ignored official orders to make no hostile movements. However, with the expectation of a change of instructions Claiborne decided to err on the side of boldness. He requested that Folch surrender both Mobile and Pensacola and had three militia companies take positions for a possible siege. Fortunately for the Spanish the attack order never came, and the Americans were eventually withdrawn. News of the abortive actions filtered across the United States, with the editor of the influential newspaper *National Intelligence* being "annoyed with another Burr project against the Spanish."³³

Besieged Governor Folch did not give up either Mobile or Pensacola because his position was much stronger than it had been back in September. Previously he signalled to the Americans that he would surrender the rest of Florida if no reinforcements reached him by January 1, 1811. Folch continued to dangle the possibility of surrendering the peninsula eventually in an effort to save the rest of his province from immediate invasion. He held out the spectre of French agents working to subvert the angry residents of West Florida, blaming France for inciting the September revolt. President Madison moved to take advantage of Folch's difficulties by sending representatives to try to speed up the process by directly negotiating with the Spanish governor. However, with the timely arrival of substantial military and financial aid from Mexico, Folch felt better able to resist any American advances east of the Perdido. Talks with the Americans were at a virtual standstill as 1810 ended.³⁴

While the Spanish stalled skillfully, the British lodged formal complaints in Washington. The British chargé d'affaires sent a protest to the State Department claiming that "by sending in a force to West Florida to secure by arms what before was a subject of negotiations, cannot . . . be considered as other than an act of open hostility against Spain." Secretary Smith responded that no such hostile or unfriendly purpose was entertained towards Spain, the only other power directly involved. The American minister in London was instructed to give "whatever explanations which may comport with . . . frankness and the spirit of conciliation" to the British government. In the end Great Britain chose not

to make an issue of the affair, the unsettled state on the European continent being a major consideration. The Madison administration breathed a sigh of relief after the apparent securing of West Florida to the Pearl River without the feared four-way war.³⁵

Public opinion on West Florida was for the most part favorable. The Alexandria, Virginia *Gazette* reported the President's actions seemed to meet with "general approbation" in the vicinity. Thomas Ritchie's Richmond *Enquirer* reasoned that the idea of an independent state remaining in the West Florida region was simply preposterous. "Florida must one day be part of the U.S.," the newspaper editorialized, because "nature had ordained the event." In regard to the possibility of Spanish retaliation against American interests at home and abroad, the *National Intelligencer* warned the government of Spain not to be pushed into action by her allies that she would later regret. This pro-administration organ promised that Spain would experience nothing but discomfort if it tried to regain what it had already lost. Many Federalist journals railed that Madison's policy was unconstitutional, unfair to the Spanish, and likely to lead to war with Great Britain. The *National Intelligencer* answered such charges by stating that the "British faction" always appeared ready to provide arguments against the United States in any controversy with a foreign power, except France. The newspaper argued that East Florida should be taken as well, if only for its strategic location. "Power, placed there," said the newspaper, "will control the commerce of the Western World."³⁶

In December 1810 the Congress took up the question of the occupation of West Florida and its ramifications. One senator remembered that "all parties had agreed we ought to have the country. They only differed as to the mode of acquiring it." At times the debate did become bitter with partisan attacks. Madison's second annual message to Congress on December 5 opened the argument. It touched on the West Florida matter, and Madison offered his explanation for intervening:

The Spanish authority was subverted, and a situation produced exposing the country to ulterior events which might essentially affect the rights and welfare of the Union. In such a conjuncture, I did not delay the interpositions required for the occupancy of the territory west of the river Perdido, to which the title of the United States extends and to which the laws provided for the territory of Orleans are applicable. With this view, the proclamation, of which a copy is laid before you, was confided to the governor of that territory to be carried into effect. The legality and necessity of the course pursued assure me of the favorable light in which it will present itself to the legislature, and of the promptitude with which they will supply whatever provision may be due to the essential rights and equitable interests of the people brought into the bosom of the American family.³⁷

War hawks in both houses championed the President's cause. Henry Clay argued that the United States had a right and a duty to take over any adjacent area that was plagued with anarchy. He admitted that the Madison administration would have preferred a negotiated settlement with the Spanish, but circumstances

precluded such an outcome. Senator John Pope, also from the Kentucky, echoed his colleague in arguing that the United States was only taking possession of property it had already bought and paid for. However, their oratory proved insufficient to silence critics of the government's actions in West Florida.³⁸

One Republican let it be known that he did not favor President Madison's handling of the whole affair. Albert Gallatin, former Secretary of the Treasury, had always dissented on American policy toward the Floridas, and made his thoughts known in a series of blunt letters. He greatly feared that any aggression against Spanish territory would unite the European powers against the young United States and make any future diplomatic activity much more difficult. Gallatin also raised the issue of the sectional connotations of the occupation. He believed that "the object in question was a 'Southern one,' and will, if it should involve us in a war with Spain, disgust every man north of Washington." Increasingly the opposition to the occupation of West Florida would be along sectional lines, with the bulk of it coming out of the Federalist-dominated New England.³⁹

This Federalist counter-attack was led by Senator Timothy Pickering, and centered on a bill to incorporate West Florida into Orleans Territory. Pickering offered a letter from Talleyrand that denied the validity of the American claim to the area through the Louisiana Purchase. This strategy backfired, for Pickering received a vote of censure for revealing a document that was still classified secret. The baton passed to Senator Outerbridge Horsey of Delaware, who flatly stated that West Florida was not included in the 1803 treaty. What right did the United States have, he reasoned, to annex a place that still had a functioning local Spanish government? Finally, if this request to take West Florida was granted, East Florida would be the next on the annexation agenda. Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts threatened secession if the Union was to be saddled with these new potential slave lands secured by force of arms.⁴⁰

In the House, debate touched on all these issues, plus the question of boundaries. One member asked whether or not all of West Florida was to be included in the annexation. Should the United States be satisfied with the Pearl River as the border? It was decided that since West Florida had not existed officially in Spanish geography and was in reality a British creation dating from their tenure there, the matter of territorial limits was left for later. "This was a question of British and American geography on one side and Spanish and French on the other." Along with the Senate it voted to annex that part of West Florida that ran from the Mississippi to the Pearl. But the Madison administration considered this only the first step in a process that would soon garner the rest of the Florida peninsula for the United States.⁴¹

In January 1811 Madison asked Congress to pass a resolution declaring that the United States could not and would not allow the rest of Spanish Florida to pass into the hands of any new foreign government. In a message to both houses dated January 3 the president stated that "the intimate relation of the country adjoining the United States eastward of the river Perdido" made it essential for it to remain in Spanish hands until such time as they could become American. Such a resolution passed on January 15 and set an important precedent in the

origins of the no-transfer principle of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. Geographic and economic necessity dictated the eventual possession of all of Florida, and Madison helped lay the foundation for what would finally come to pass in 1819. ⁴²

West Floridians were unwilling to wait for that day as part of the Orleans Territory. The expatriate Americans living there wanted no part of what they perceived to be French-dominated government in New Orleans, so they petitioned Congress to set up a separate territorial government. This request was quickly refused. Subsequently another petition was filed asking to be joined with the Mississippi Territory to the north, an arrangement which the Mississippians naturally preferred. In the end the area was divided between both territories. Baton Rouge and the parishes west of the Pearl went to what would become the state of Louisiana, while the eastern portion to just short of Mobile Bay went to Mississippi. In the spring of 1812 American General James Wilkinson finished the effort by moving against the old Spanish fort in Mobile, which surrendered without a fight. Thus ended the second Spanish period west of the Perdido. ⁴³

When the West Floridians staged their September revolt, the Spanish minister in Washington inquired as to what steps the government of the United States would undertake to punish those Americans participating in or assisting the action. The rebels received very special treatment, for the United States paid all damage claims arising from their insurrection. An act of Congress setting up a process to deal with any such claims for damages or unpaid bills of the defunct Republic of West Florida was approved in 1814. By 1848 all claims were paid in full, totalling some \$41,000. Enthusiasm for manifest destiny then sweeping many parts of the nation made the West Florida affair seem trifling and insignificant, but without it the war hawks of 1846 would have had a weaker ideological argument. American thought on expansion in 1810 was in a state of transition. In 1803 territory had been something to be bought or gained by treaty. Seven years later territory was something that could be taken. But a legal rationale, no matter how flimsy, must exist before such action could be carried out. Andrew Jackson's 1818 invasion of East Florida was justified on the grounds of the doctrine of "hot pursuit," but its legality was much weaker. By the 1840s the will of an Anglo-Saxon God was more than enough reason for expansion. American leaders learned in West Florida that the future belonged to those who dared to grasp it. ⁴⁴

Notes

¹ Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansion in American History* (Gloucester, MA, 1958), 28. For another view of manifest destiny see Frederick Merk, *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History* (New York, 1963).

² Isaac J. Cox, *The West Florida Controversy, 1798-1813* (Gloucester, MA, 1967), 62-63. See also Stanley C. Arthur, *The Story of the West Florida Revolt* (St. Francisville, LA: St. Francisville Democrat, 1935), 128-29.

³ Julius W. Pratt, *A History of United States Foreign Policy* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1955), 100-101; Wanjohi Waciama, *Intervention in Spanish Floridas: A Study of Jeffersonian Foreign Policy, 1801-1813* (Boston, 1976), 204; Henry E. Chambers, *West Florida and its Relationship to the Historical Cartography of the United States* (Baltimore, 1898), 50.

⁴ John A. Logan, Jr., *No Transfer: An American Security Principle* (New Haven, 1961), 99; Samuel F. Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States* (New York, 1965), 182.

⁵ Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny*, 47; Julius W. Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812* (New York, 1925), 62, 63.

⁶ Samuel F. Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1949), 121; Clifford L. Egan, "The United States, France, and West Florida, 1803-1807," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 47 (January 1969): 31, 231, 251. See also Dumas Malone, *Jefferson The President: Second Term 1805-1809* (Boston, 1974), 54, 93, 395.

⁷ Henry Adams, *History of the United States of America During The Administration of James Madison* (New York, 1890), 305; Marshall Smelser, *The Democratic Republic 1801-1815* (New York, 1968), 107.

⁸ Irving Brant, *James Madison: The President 1809-1812* (New York, 1956), 173-74.

⁹ Philip C. Brooks, "Spain's Farewell to Louisiana, 1803-1821," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 27 (1940-41): 31-32; Rembert W. Patrick, *Florida Fiasco: Rampant Rebels on the Georgia-Florida Border 1810-1815* (Athens, GA, 1954), 9; James B. Smith, *The Plot to Steal Florida: James Madison's Phony War* (New York, 1983), 57.

¹⁰ Clarence E. Carter, ed., *The Territorial Papers of the United States* (Washington, DC, 1938), 9: 883-884 (hereafter cited as *Territorial Papers*); Waciama, *Intervention*, 14.

¹¹ Brant, *Madison*, 124, 175-76; Waciama, *Intervention*, 151.

¹² Cox, *West Florida*, 390-91; Chambers, *West Florida*, 28.

¹³ Peter Zahendra, "Spanish West Florida 1781-1821" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1976), 301; Brant, *Madison*, 179.

¹⁴ Waciama, *Intervention*, 158-59.

¹⁵ Henry E. Sterkx and Brooks Thompson, "Philemon Thomas and the West Florida Revolution," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 39 (April 1961): 379-80; Cox, *West Florida*, 399; Patrick, *Florida Fiasco*, 10-11; Adams, *History*, 306-7; Charlton W. Tebeau, *A History of Florida* (Coral Gables, FL, 1980), 104.

¹⁶ James A. Padgett, ed., "The West Florida Revolution of 1810 . . .," *Louisiana Historical Quarterly* 21 (January 1938): 77; Merk, *Manifest Destiny*, 6-8.

- ¹⁷ *Territorial Papers* 9: 898; James A. Padgett, ed., "The Constitution of the West Florida Republic," *Louisiana Historical Quarterly* 20 (October 1937): 889, 891; Cox, *West Florida*, 416, 353; Grady Price, "The United States and West Florida, 1893-1812" (M.A. thesis, University of Texas, 1939), 173.
- ¹⁸ Walter Lourie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, eds., *American State Papers: Foreign Affairs* (Washington, DC, 1836-1861), 3: 396 (hereafter cited as *American State Papers*); John S. Bassett, ed., *Correspondence of Andrew Jackson*, (Washington, DC, 1926-1935), 1: 205.
- ¹⁹ *American State Papers* 3: 396.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, 6: 116, 130.
- ²¹ *Territorial Papers* 6: 130-31; Waciuma, *Intervention*, 166.
- ²² *Territorial Papers* 6: 129; Padgett, ed., "West Florida Revolution," 99; Pratt, *United States Foreign Policy*, 75-76.
- ²³ Waciuma, *Intervention*, 171; L. M. McAllister, "Pensacola During the Second Spanish Period," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 37 (January-April 1959): 312-13; Padgett, "West Florida Revolution," 91.
- ²⁴ Patrick, *Florida Fiasco*, 11; David H. White, *Vincente Folch, Governor of Spanish Florida, 1787-1811* (Washington, DC, 1981), 99, 101-2.
- ²⁵ W. C. Rivers, ed., *Letters and Other Writings of James Madison*, (Washington, DC, 1865), 2: 484 (hereafter cited as *Writings of James Madison*).
- ²⁶ *American State Papers* 3: 397; *Writings of James Madison* 2: 488; Dumas Malone, *The Sage of Monticello* (Boston, 1981), 87.
- ²⁷ Brant, *Madison*, 184-85, 188-89; Cox, *West Florida*, 489; W. P. Cresson, *James Monroe* (Chapel Hill, 1946), 242.
- ²⁸ *American State Papers* 3: 397.
- ²⁹ Padgett, ed., "West Florida Revolution," 148.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, 79, 127, 131. See also Robert A. Rutland, *The Presidency of James Madison* (Lawrence, KA, 1990), 60.
- ³¹ *Territorial Papers* 9: 93, 911-12; Cox, *West Florida*, 504-5.
- ³² *American State Papers* 3: 398; Sterkx and Thompson, "Philemon Thomas," 385-86; Merk, *Manifest Destiny*, 220.
- ³³ *Territorial Papers* 9: 906-7; Waciuma, *Intervention*, 188; *Washington National Intelligencer*, December 12, 1810.
- ³⁴ *Territorial Papers* 6: 147; Zahendra, "Spanish West Florida," 302; Tebeau, *History of Florida*, 105.
- ³⁵ *American State Papers* 3: 399-400.

³⁶ Washington *National Intelligencer*, December 20, 25, 29, 1810; *Richmond Examiner*, December 12, 1810; *Alexandria Gazette*, December 13, 1810.

³⁷ Charles Gayarre, *History of Louisiana* (New Orleans, 1903), 4: 244; Edwin Williams, ed., *The Addresses and Messages of the Presidents of the United States . . . 1789-1846* (New York, 1848), 1: 285.

³⁸ Waciuma, *Intervention*, 202.

³⁹ Raymond Walters, Jr., *Albert Gallatin: Jeffersonian Financier and Diplomat* (New York, 1957), 260-61.

⁴⁰ Logan, *No Transfer*, 117; Waciuma, *Intervention*, 203; John S. Kendall, ed., "Documents Concerning the West Florida Revolution, 1810," *Louisiana Historical Quarterly* 17 (January 1934): 89-90. See also Rutland, *Presidency of James Madison*, 67.

⁴¹ *Annals of the Congress of the United States* (Washington, DC, 1853), *Eleventh Congress*, 3d sess., pt. 1, 387.

⁴² *American State Papers* 3: 395; Bemis, *Diplomatic History*, 186; Logan, *No Transfer*, 122.


⁴³ *Annals of the Congress, Eleventh Congress*, 3d sess., pt. 1, 514, *Twelfth Congress*, 1st sess., pt. 2, 2158-59; McAllister, "Pensacola," 315.

⁴⁴ *Territorial Papers* 6: 146; James A. Padgett, ed., "The Documents Showing that the United States Ultimately Financed the West Florida Revolution of 1810," *Louisiana Historical Quarterly* 25 (October 1942): 943-44. See also Robert A. Rutland, *James Madison: The Founding Father* (New York, 1987), 214-15.

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Book Reviews

Barry Jean Ancelet, Jay D. Edwards, and Glen Pitre. *Cajun Country*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1991, xxiv, pp. 249, index. Cloth, \$29.95. ISBN 0-87805-466-9/Paper, \$14.95. ISBN 0-87805-467-7



Cajuns have for years attracted a great deal of interest from scholars, the media, and the general public, accompanied by an almost equal number of misconceptions about their culture. *Cajun Country*, an ambitious and comprehensive look at past and present Cajun folklike, is a valuable addition to the literature on this ethnic group. Although similar (and frequently more detailed) information on many of its topics is available in other sources, this work brings together scholarship on a wide variety of genres in a format that is interesting and accessible to a wide readership.

An introduction by Barry Jean Ancelet reviews past studies and traces the development of Cajun culture from its Acadian roots. Ancelet introduces many

issues which recur throughout the book and are central to discussion of Cajun traditions: ethnic identity and mainstream Americanization, the concept of "Creolization," multiculturalism, and the idea of culture as an ongoing process of adaptation, among others.

The book's twelve chapters, organized into four broad sections (History, Social Institutions, Material Culture, and Performance) describe the development and significance of a variety of Cajun folklike genres. Although the book is primarily concerned with living traditions, the importance of history in shaping cultural traditions—what Ancelet calls "the residue of the past in the present" (p. 110)—is emphasized throughout by repeated references to both historical and modern perspectives.

Part I (History) lays important groundwork as it follows the emigration of the Acadians from seventeenth-century France and their settlement first in Nova Scotia and later in Southwest Louisiana. Cultural blending occurred as the Acadians adapted to new environments and lived in proximity to other ethnic groups. Acadian settlement patterns, social organization, and folklike during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are detailed, with descriptions of traditional occupations, clothing, tools, and gatherings such as "boucheries" and house dances, customs, and crafts. Comparison with these same traditions today illustrates the role of cultural adaptation in the "transformation of tradition" (p. 63).

The three subsequent sections focus on modern folklife, with frequent references to historical roots as a key to understanding traditions. Topics include the organization of the Cajun family, religious rituals and festivals, folk medicine, folk law and justice, folk architecture, foodways, music, games, and oral traditions.

As with any work of this scope, presentations vary in quality and depth. Some subjects are touched upon only superficially, while others receive closer attention. Folk architecture is well represented in a comparatively long discussion by Jay Edwards, accompanied by a number of useful illustrations and photographs. Likewise, the rural Mardi Gras runs which are a unique and culturally important part of French Louisiana traditional culture are documented and interpreted in great detail, while other less distinctive traditions are mentioned briefly.

Among the most entertaining chapters are those which liberally mix stories with discussion. For example, "Folk Law and Justice" consists largely of anecdotes of famous fights, feuds, or lawbreakers, while effectively communicating the Cajun's sense of appropriate behaviors and repercussions. The discussion of oral traditions (which seem to be narrowly defined as storytelling here) similarly makes use of many examples of jokes, tall tales, Pascal stories, and other genres of tales. Texts of a number of narratives and songs collected in Cajun French are printed in double columns with the original French version and an English translation side by side. This is an admirable device which recognizes the critical importance of the Cajun French language in oral traditions.

The chapter on folk medicine is surprisingly cursory for an area with a rich folk healing tradition (or so it seems to someone with a strong interest in this topic). Perhaps unintentionally, it imparts an impression that traditional medical practices are largely a thing of the rural past. A tendency to use "homeopathic medicine" interchangeably with "herbal medicine" is misleading, too.

The book's organization occasionally leads to overlapping subject groupings. As a result, some topics are repeated in different chapters while others are omitted. The Material Culture section in particular seems thin. Folk architecture and foodways alone are represented here, while other material traditions (for instance, crafts) are addressed elsewhere or not at all.

The principal authors' work is supplemented by research and expertise from a number of other noted specialists in Louisiana folklife who served as researchers or co-authors. This cooperative effort enhances the scope and scholarship of the project but may be confusing to readers interested in identifying the individual voices of the authors (especially as authors and other contributors are named in the book's acknowledgements but not in the index). Likewise, the lack of citations may prove a disadvantage to scholarly readers. However, an interesting bibliographic essay (in addition to a standard bibliography) arranged by subject matter provides informative notes and sources for further reading.


Cajun Country is generally very successful in presenting a great deal of carefully researched information in an interesting way. Although it is not primarily a theoretical work, the authors (to various degrees) combine interpretative commentary with description and examples, and certain significant ideas about

culture pervade all of the presentations. And, not least importantly, the book conveys the message to a wide audience that folklife is current, relevant and worth conserving.

Carolyn Ware

Eunice, Louisiana

Eric Arnesen. *Waterfront Workers of New Orleans: Race, Class, and Politics, 1863-1923*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, xii, pp. 353. \$39.95. ISBN 0-19-505380-X



Although essential to nearly all forms of manufacturing and transport in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century America, the common laborer has been largely neglected by historians. He was the “human machine” who performed back-breaking, often dangerous toil, using only his muscles and the crudest of tools. Engaged in highly seasonal work, often physically mobile, he has not been easy to trace. Given the disproportionate number of blacks in this category, studying the common laborer provides a major opportunity to investigate both the hostilities and the possibilities for solidarity between black and white workers. In this carefully researched, though narrowly focused monograph, Eric Arnesen provides

an important contribution to understanding some aspects of the lives of a major group of common laborers—the dock workers of New Orleans. His focus is on their unions and their workplace struggles. Crescent City dock workers built not only the strongest unions in the region, but also an interracial labor movement that represented “one of the few significant exceptions to the rule of white supremacy in the Deep South” (p. 255).

Arnesen fully describes the complex and hierarchical division of labor that characterized waterfront work in New Orleans, a major port for cotton, sugar, molasses, lumber, and other agricultural commodities. The ten to fifteen thousand dock workers, largely unskilled, were divided into a multitude of occupations. Yet, except in isolated sections, as when Arnesen describes the black roustabouts, who labored on the steamboats, and their “rough living” (p. 104), these workers do not really come alive in the pages of this book. We learn nothing about their neighborhoods, their families—even whether they were married or single—their religious outlooks, how they coped with the danger that pervaded their work, or with the aging process—certainly a major concern for laborers whose jobs depended on brawn. The ability to organize or to sustain a strike cannot

be fully understood if one ignores community and family networks, patterns of seasonal migration, conceptions of masculinity, etc. Nor does Arnesen devote much attention to exploring the backgrounds of the leaders of the dock unions.


The book is principally concerned with the biracial union movement forged on the waterfront, which for most of the four decades from 1880 to 1923 seems to have given New Orleans' dockers more influence over working conditions than those of other ports. It was "likely" (p. 41), according to Arnesen, that New Orleans' unions were able to eliminate the humiliating "shapeup," symbol of worker powerlessness and subordination. The biracial alliance involved whites and blacks sharing in decision-making, agreeing to divide work between them, and joint participation in strikes.

This biracial alliance was institutionalized in two central labor bodies on the docks—the Cotton Men's Executive Council (1880-94) and the Dock and Cotton Council (1901-23). These joined the dockers together even as they continued to be organized into racially separate locals. Arnesen underlines the limits of both racial and occupational cooperation on the docks. The councils' presidents were always white. The cotton screwmen, the "aristocrats of the levee," and the longshoremen often failed to display solidarity with the weaker groups on the waterfront, like the roustabouts, teamsters, and railroad freight handlers. For a time in the 1890s, an intensified white racism and a severe economic depression broke the alliance apart. Yet it was revived, not to die until the dockers' power was destroyed by mechanization and the post-World War I corporate offensive against labor. Unlike the case of Populism, where white farmers' racism short-circuited a biracial alliance, these urban workers sustained one.

Arnesen perceptively analyzes the reasons for the long-term persistence of this alliance: the realization by whites that the unskilled nature of dock work and the racially divided labor market required cooperation with blacks; the capacity of black dockers to organize rendered their elimination from the waterfront impossible, and the relative sympathy of the city's Democratic machine permitted unions to thrive.

This book contains a wealth of information on workplace conflicts and unions on the New Orleans waterfront, and provides important insights into race relations in the South. However, because of its lack of context and its devotion to detail, which makes many sections tedious to read, it will appeal primarily to specialists in labor and African-American history. It is hoped that this study will lead historians to examine other industrial and commercial sectors in the South in which unskilled labor was heavily concentrated, such as railroads, mining, and the docks of other southern ports. This will permit us to gain a fuller sense of the circumstances which sustained and impeded alliances between white and black workers.

Helmut Blume. *The German Coast During the Colonial Era, 1722-1803: The Evolution of a Distinct Cultural Landscape in the Lower Mississippi Delta During the Colonial Era, With Special Reference to the Development of Louisiana's German Coast*. Translated, edited, and annotated by Ellen C. Merrill. Destrahan, LA: German-Acadian Coast Historical and Genealogical Society, 1990, pp. 165. \$15.00. ISBN 0-9628160-0-0



Because its historical background differs so markedly from that of the surrounding colonial-era settlements and because its "first families" still constitute a sizable portion of South Louisiana's population, the German Coast (present-day St. John the Baptist and St. Charles parishes) has been a source of continuing interest for Louisiana historians. Yet, surprisingly few historical works have focused on the subject, and, unfortunately for monolingual English historians, many of the leading works on this topic have been published in German. The substantial body of interdisciplinary works dealing with the area, published over the past thirty years by German scholars, have consequently been underutilized by Louisiana and Gulf Coast historians. Indeed, only one

American historian, Reinhart Kondert, a fully bilingual German-American, has used them extensively. Regional colonialists have instead contented themselves with using Henry Yoes III's very superficial *A History of St. Charles Parish to 1973* (1973), or J. Hanno Deiler's poorly written and badly dated *The Settlement of the German Coast of Louisiana and the Creoles of German Descent* (1909), supplemented by occasional references to the area in Marcel Giraud's five-volume *Histoire de la Louisiane Française/History of French Louisiana 1954-1991*.

Merrill's translation of Blume's *The German Coast During the Colonial Era*, first published in Germany in 1956, is therefore a real contribution to Louisiana and Gulf Coast historiography. Blume's work constitutes perhaps the best historical overview to date of the settlement and development of the German Coast during the colonial period. He traces the recruitment, migration, and settlement of French Louisiana's German colonists. He recounts in vivid detail their ceaseless battle against the elements and the river, as well as their often antagonistic relationship with the local Indians. Despite adversity, the industrious Germans, and their increasingly numerous French, Canadian, and African neighbors, gradually transformed the local subtropical wilderness into one of the most productive

agricultural areas in the Mississippi Valley. Indeed, by the time of the Louisiana Purchase, the German Coast had become the center of the rapidly developing plantation system on the Mississippi above New Orleans.

Though Blume's treatment of the German Coast's development is commendably broad in scope and replete with details regarding the German settlers, *The German Coast in the Colonial Era, 1722-1803* is not flawless. Much of the writing is expository with little or no interpretation. In addition, Blume's vision is unfortunately myopic. He often overemphasizes the importance of local factors, while failing to place them in larger, colonial, and imperial contexts. For example, he overstates the importance of the largely moribund indigo industry to the German Coast while almost completely ignoring the region's role as a truck farming center, providing the colonial capital with critical supplies of farm produce, poultry, pork, and dairy products. Perhaps because of his preoccupation with economic matters, Blume also fails to analyze such fundamental issues as the long-term impact of the *German* population on the German Coast. By the end of French rule, they had become a minority of the white population in their own parishes. The author also ignores the question of social, economic, and cultural interaction between the Germans and their non-Germanic neighbors. Neither does he discuss the extent to which German culture was transformed by such interaction, nor how much of their mother culture survived by the end of the period under discussion.

Overshadowing the writer's deficiencies are those of the translator. Merrill's translation of Blume's German text is commendably polished and readable. She received the Eighth National Textbook Company Award for Building Community Interest in Foreign Language Education. But her efforts to render the work's numerous and lengthy French quotations are consistently less than satisfactory. Errors abound in these translated quotations. But, fortunately, these translations, appearing as bracketed passages, follow italicized quotations which have been preserved in their original, eighteenth-century French, allowing scholars to use the unadulterated version.

Despite its shortcomings, the work is a valuable addition to the growing body of literature on colonial Louisiana. Louisiana and Gulf Coast historians, economists, genealogists, and demographers should include a copy in their home libraries.

Carl A. Brasseaux


University of Southwestern Louisiana

William O. Bryant. *Cahaba Prison and Sultana Disaster*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1990, vii, pp. 190. \$21.95. ISBN 0-8173-0468-1

William O. Bryant has written about a Civil War incident which deserves to be well known. Cahaba prison was a major Confederate prison camp for the Western theater.

Established sometime during the summer of 1863 the prison, occupied until the war ended in 1865, began as an unfinished warehouse located on the bank of the Alabama River, near the site of the first state capital. During the last

months of 1864 and early 1865 the prison had nearly three thousand inmates, making it the most densely crowded facility in the Confederacy. Its two best known commanders were quite different men. One was a well-respected, compassionate officer who had a distinguished career after the war. The second was a mean-spirited, military martinet who disappeared following his final parole in May 1865. The prisoners lived in extremely crowded conditions, often endured inadequate food supplies, and had limited medical care. Several inmates formed a gang which preyed upon weaker fellow prisoners. A small group participated in an abortive mutiny for which the entire population suffered punishment. All prisoners experienced devastating floods which caused many deaths at Cahaba.



The author has also investigated the *Sultana* disaster. This was a severely overcrowded civilian steamboat carrying newly released Federal prisoners of war. The disaster, which occurred on April 27, 1865, was almost ignored by the press due to the assassination of Abraham Lincoln and the end of the war.

Bryant covers both of his subjects thoroughly. His primary documentation comes from the *Official Records of the War of the Rebellion*, five volumes of memoirs (one of which bears the same title as the volume under review), and a recent monograph on the *Sultana* disaster. Given the paucity of primary sources, the author had to speculate and make educated guesses about many questions. In most

cases his conclusions are quite reasonable. The author is also very conscientious about explaining discrepancies in memoirs. There are several points, however, which deserve much more discussion than they received. For instance, the prison was called "Castle Morgan" by guards and inmates. The origin of that name is never adequately explained. The two commanders Bryant discusses were given those positions at least six months after the prison was established, but there is no information on their predecessors, if any. On the other hand there are several issues which Bryant comments on at length. Bryant is perhaps overly concerned about the discrepancy in the number of deaths reported at the camp by Confederates and later by Union observers who reviewed the prison. He notes that neither figure corresponds with the number of burial sites in the Cahaba cemetery. Although only one case of gangrene was reported in prison hospital records, the author describes in detail the treatment for that condition first devised by physicians in Napoleon's army. Another digression into the design of steam engines used on river boats, however, is interesting and relevant to the story.

The book is arranged topically which seems the most logical approach given the short time span during which the prison existed. In several cases the author could have dealt with one of the topics in straightforward chronological manner but chose not to do so. This can be confusing for the reader. For instance, in the chapter "The Town and Its Prison," Bryant opens with a discussion of Cahaba in the 1860s then turns to the prison before May 1864. He then jumps back to the town before 1860 and ends with the prison after July 1864. A chronological narrative would have been much simpler and easier to follow.

Occasionally the author makes incorrect or misleading generalizations. When comparing the population from which the military was drawn in the North and the South, Bryant implies that the North began recruiting black soldiers early in the war effort. He also claims that Grant's policy of not exchanging prisoners was the major factor in forcing the South to open prisoner of war camps like Cahaba. However, according to the author's documentation, this policy was only in effect from August 1864 until early 1865 and so could hardly explain the Confederacy's prison problems. Finally the author refers to Louisiana in 1862 as "the fallen Confederate state." New Orleans fell to the Union in April of that year, but the state remained active in the Confederacy until May 1865.

The layout and design of this volume are excellent. There is a useful index and an excellent bibliography. The illustrations, although few, are well chosen and nicely reproduced. The type is easy to read. The University of Alabama Press is to be commended for printing this and all its books on non-acidic paper.

Cahaba Prison and Sultana Disaster reminds its readers of places and events which should not be forgotten. It deserves a wide reading. Certainly this volume should be found in all academic and most public libraries in the South.

Bruce Turner

University of Southwestern Louisiana

Joseph G. Dawson III, ed. *The Louisiana Governors: From Iberville to Edwards*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990, pp. 297. \$29.95. ISBN 0-8071-1527-4

For a sweep of almost three centuries, Louisiana governors, have been the central force in Louisiana politics. Whether colonial French or Spanish, territorial, or state governors, they have used the office and their political powers for the area's and for their own personal and partisan advantage. They have had at times an extraordinary influence on Louisiana, both good and bad, and often possessed more power than the governors in most American states.

This book is a collection of essays and sketches of those Louisiana governors, written by a notable and impressive gathering of contributors, all authorities in their areas. Dawson has edited their contributions to give an excellent flow of narrative descriptions and a biographical vignette of each governor. Most of the governors have at least four pages; Huey P. Long, a controversial giant in Louisiana politics, has eight. Included with the selection on each governor is a small picture.

As a collective effort, the authors' "goal was to bring together essays that give an objective introduction to and an interpretative analysis of Louisiana's governors." The distribution of space is reasonably even. The governors of the French and Spanish colonial periods collectively have 79 pages. The territorial and state governors of the nineteenth

century have 113 pages (there were more of them), and the state governors of the twentieth century have 85 pages. One of the most valuable features is the short bibliography at the end of each governor's essay providing an ample reading list for the interested reader. At the end of each sketch, the contributor who wrote the essay is identified.

One of the most helpful sections is Dawson's sixteen-page introduction, in which he discusses the roles of the governors. The footnotes which he provides (there are not many footnotes in the remainder of the book) and the bibliography which he gives at the end of his introduction, along with his incisive narrative are valuable.

The treatments of such topics as the Louisiana legislature, Louisiana elections, the Mississippi River levies and flood

control projects, the city of New Orleans, and African-Americans in Louisiana politics are particularly welcome. The book is also very well indexed.


For readers interested in the Gulf Coast region, the book is of particular value, raising many interesting questions within a single, closely integrated volume. Mississippi and Alabama should be so fortunate.

Harral E. Landry


Texas Woman's University

Frank de Caro. *Folklife in Louisiana Photography: Images of Tradition*. Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1990, pp. 213. \$24.95. ISBN 0-8071-1633-5

Frank de Caro's book is a good introduction to the subject of Louisiana folk cultures and to the state's long standing documentary tradition. Folklife is important in Louisiana, particularly the southern part of the state, because so many of its citizens have not melted into homogenized, mainstream America. Despite the inevitable inroads of tourism, television, and commercialism, plenty of country Cajun and funky urbanity continue to flourish along the bayous and in New Orleans. De Caro explains Louisiana's main cultural features and subdivisions as he illustrates the principal subjects and eras of folklife photography. He points out that since the late nineteenth century, the state has been seen



as a significantly different or unique place, as an alternative to the rest of the United States. This perception has been shared by a variety of photographers from Arnold Genthe, who photographed the French Quarter in the 1920s, to Mark Sindler who documented Vietnamese immigration in the 1980s. Considered in this context, the book is an informal, enjoyable survey of Louisiana and Gulf Coast cultures and sub-cultures. There are, as one would expect, plenty of jazz and Cajun musicians, alligator hunters, and Mardi Gras riders who have attracted the photographers. But de Caro has also included many other interesting but less colorful subjects: trappers, a corn-shuck bag maker, filé grinders, gamblers, quilt and violin makers, oyster fishermen, a garlic vendor, and St. Amico parade participants. What is evident in virtually all of these pictures is the way in which Louisiana's cultural vitality and diversity have inspired photographers, so that they wanted, in Don Sepulvado's words, to photograph "the great people of Ebarb," rather than such conventionally "great" photographic subjects as Gandhi and Hemingway.



It is perhaps unfortunate that Frank de Caro's *Folklife in Louisiana Photography* is not intended to be a general history of photography in Louisiana. Because of his focus on folklife and traditions—on ordinary people engaged in relatively traditional, non-industrial work and communal activities—other photographic genres are almost completely excluded, for example, formal portraiture, architectural, and art photography. Thus, the book does not have any of Frances Johnston's New Orleans architectural work or Ernest Bellocq's Storyville portraits, and it has only one of Clarence John Laughlin's surreal pictures.

De Caro's book is, however, an accessible, worthwhile introduction to the history and some of the significant subdivisions of documentary photography. He has solid, comprehensive chapters on early regional and romantic documentarians like Fonville Winans, who compared Louisiana to "deepest Africa" and himself to "Bring 'Em Back Alive" Frank Buck; on the great Farm Security Administration and Standard Oil of New Jersey documentary projects of the 1930s and 1940s; and on the more self-consciously anthropological and folkloristic photographers who have tried systematically to record the state's cultures from Native Americans in the 1900s to Zydeco musicians and hog butchers in the 1980s.


The book is also enjoyable because de Caro has a lively eye and has consistently included photographs which are interesting in visual terms as well as because of their significance as examples of folklife or documentary photography. He has made good, sensitive selections from the huge Farm Security and Standard

Oil of New Jersey archives at the Library of Congress and the University of Louisville. Further, he has an excellent four-page sequence of Ralston Crawford's great pictures of New Orleans jazz musicians and dancers. Cultural and historical information about the images is available in an appendix which is systematic and scholarly, but does not—because of its placement—distract from the flow of de Caro's text or the liveliness of the images. All in all, this is a fine book which should be read and seen by anyone interested in folklife, in Louisiana, or in documentary photography.

James Guimond

Rider College

Prescott N. Dunbar. *The New Orleans Museum of Art: The First Seventy-Five Years*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990, pp. 386. \$24.95. ISBN 0-8071-1604-1



Organizational histories have typically been associated with large, profit making companies. Increasingly, non-profit institutions are now being commemorated with such histories now. Frequently they appear near a milestone anniversary, following newsmaking activities or, as is the case of *The New Orleans Museum of Art*, simply because the tale needed telling.

Written by former museum trustee Prescott Dunbar, *The New Orleans Museum of Art* avoids the self-congratulatory tone common to "inside" accounts. Equally to his credit, Mr. Dunbar has avoided nit-picking. He has produced a thoroughly researched, even-handed documentary history of one of the oldest art museums in the South, the legacy of Jamaican born New Orleans businessman

Isaac Delgado (1839-1912). His donation of \$150,000 to the New Orleans City Park Improvement Association in 1910 built the facility. Important early gifts to the Delgado Museum included the Whitney jades in 1915, the Hyams collection of salon paintings in the same year and, later, Italian renaissance and old master paintings from the Samuel H. Kress Foundation. In the early years, meaningful collecting was impeded by the provincialism of Ellsworth Woodward, an early board member and later director of the Delgado.

Modern museum methods, including collection management, came to the Delgado during Sue Thurman's brief tenure as director in the late 1950s. After that time the museum grew rapidly in stature and reputation, changed its name and gained American Association of Museums accreditation in 1972. By the late seventies the museum was holding blockbuster exhibitions such as the Treasures of Tutankhamen.

In his account, Dunbar sticks to a strict chronology, lending a strong linear quality to the text. The normal peaks and valleys of activity and excitement surrounding the museum have been smoothed into a single continuous account which lacks anticipation or suspense. While this method is admirably unbiased, it makes it difficult to distinguish between occasions of greater and lesser importance, leaving the reader to wonder which events will have significant long-term implications for the museum.

Concerning events in the art world at large, an attempt to relate them to activities at NOMA would have been helpful. As one of the best known New Orleans artists, the collection of photographer Clarence John Laughlin is a subject worthy of a lengthier inclusion, perhaps at the expense of questionable appendices such as "The Economic Impact of King Tut." Also interesting would be a current organizational chart of departments within the museum and a current museum mission statement.

That an exhaustive work such as *The New Orleans Museum of Art* was written by a former NOMA trustee is a testament to his dedication to the institution. Through the use of NOMA archival material and meeting minutes, a painstakingly constructed portrait is presented. Of little interest outside the Gulf South, Dunbar's work contains many names instantly recognizable in this area. After laboring under restrictive boards for nearly half a century, it is easy to see how NOMA has recently experienced such consistent growth when one considers the leadership and enthusiasm of knowledgeable trustees like Prescott Dunbar.

Megan Farrell

University of Southwestern Louisiana


Samuel Eichold, ed. *History of Medicine: University of South Alabama College of Medicine, Mobile, Alabama*. Vol. 1. Mobile: University of South Alabama College of Medicine, 1991, pp. 137. \$6.00.

This collection of essays, directed mainly to a medical audience, was written by eight medical students at the University of South Alabama who selected their own topics, which range widely. Several focus on the medical history of Mobile. John Bruchalski used newspaper reports to examine the last months of the city's medical school before it moved to Tuscaloosa in 1919. Abraham Flexner had condemned the school in his important 1910 report ranking all medical schools in the U.S. and Canada. The Mobile faculty thought that they could improve given proper legislative funding, but they were unsuccessful in gaining political or professional support.

Dana Edwards studied Harry Tutwiler Inge (1861-1921), a Mobile surgeon who established the Inge-Bondurant Sanatorium at the turn of this century. Edwards made use of an unusual piece of evidence: a case record book of 608 operations Inge performed on 500 patients from 1915 to 1921. Edwards notes the diversity of procedures—at least seven different surgical sub-specialties—and Inge's impressively low two per cent mortality rate. But Edwards did not pursue the implications of the significant amount of gynecological surgery Inge performed.

Was there a secret abortion practice? Despite the evidence of age, gender, and residence available from this fascinating record, Edwards failed to analyze Inge's patient population.

Joseph Troncale discusses Inge's partner, Eugene DuBose Bondurant (1862-1950), one of Mobile's first specialists in nervous diseases. Bondurant worked at Bryce Hospital and the University Medical Department in Tuscaloosa before helping to found the Sanatorium. He studied beriberi, hookworm, and syphilis, diseases that could lead to serious neurological conditions. Unfortunately, Troncale misunderstands eighteenth- and nineteenth-century medical therapies. When asylum patients were treated with "emetics and bloodletting," this treatment was far from "torture." Instead it represented the widely accepted therapy which most physicians used for themselves and their families. This piece also lacks references and footnotes.



David Tipton offers an engaging study of the eccentric physician, businessman, and philanthropist Monte Leroy Moorer (1890-1961), one of the last graduates of Mobile's medical school. Moorer worked mainly in institutions, including Searcy Hospital for insane black patients in Mount Vernon. He became one of Mobile's largest landowners and made significant bequests to local hospitals, schools, welfare agencies, and other groups.

James Butler has made a promising start in his brief history of American family practice, a field not recognized formally by the AMA until 1969. He identified Flexner's 1910 report as the beginning of narrow specialism and the decline of the general practitioner. The decline was felt most acutely during and after the Second World War, when general practitioners were denied the higher rank of specialists in the Armed Forces in VA hospitals. In

1947 a group formed the American Academy of General Practice, and in 1970 applicants took the first specialty Board exam. This reviewer would like to know more about the intellectual content of these exams: what made general practice into the specialty of family practice?

Witold Turkiewicz offers an overview of Ayurveda, an Indian medical philosophy. A thousand years before the Greek tradition of Hippocrates, the Asian movement had established medical schools and hospitals. The article could have benefitted from more comparisons between the two traditions in order to convince readers more fully of its influence on Western medicine.

Suzanne Small has transcribed extracts from the 1851 journal of James Heustis, an assistant surgeon of the U.S. Navy. It is a fascinating record which includes both his womanizing and his medical practice on sea and land. The


essay, however, does not fit well in this volume, for it lacks editorial comments, a description of naval medicine in the nineteenth century or commentary on Heustis. Readers will also want to know whether Heustis ever met the “very pretty & pleasing” Miss Mills again.

In general the volume shows a disappointing lack of reference to recent works on medical history, and no mention of the important American medical history journals, the *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, and the *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences*. As a result, these writers rarely address broad historical concerns. In a “top-down” approach to medical history, they ignore the work of female and black practitioners and the patient’s perspective. Perhaps future volumes will show more awareness of medical history while retaining an equivalent level of enthusiasm.

Naomi Rogers

University of Alabama

Robin F. A. Fabel, trans. and ed. *Shipwreck and Adventures of Monsieur Pierre Viaud*. Pensacola: University of West Florida Press, 1990, viii, pp. 137. \$16.96. ISBN 0-8130-1000-4



In the role of historian as detective, Professor Robin Fabel of Auburn University has established the authenticity and exposed the embellishments of a bizarre eighteenth-century adventure story along the Gulf Coast of Florida. A Frenchman, Pierre Viaud, was the author and principal actor in an account first published at Bordeaux in 1768. The narrative was subsequently republished in France and translated into various languages including English.

Born in 1725, Viaud was a sailor by sixteen and a captain in the French merchant marine by 1761. By way of summary, the book, which proceeds like an oldtime Saturday movie serial, places Viaud at St. Domingue in late 1766. Before returning to France he made a business deal with one Desclau for a voyage from

Caye de St. Louis to Louisiana. The brigantine *Le Tigre*'s sixteen passengers also included Viaud's black slave, Captain La Couture and his wife and fifteen-year-old son, the mate, and nine sailors. The ship encountered bad weather, and on February 16, 1767, wrecked off Dog Island (directly opposite the present day fishing town of Carrabelle).

Amid much difficulty (one sailor was washed against a "rock" and killed), they got ashore. During that time and throughout the book Viaud portrayed himself as a larger than life hero. Although the mate died of sickness, the survivors managed to salvage some supplies from the ship. Soon, an Indian named Antonio appeared with his wife and family. They were from the British fort and trading post of St. Marks, some forty miles to the east. The Indians were camping on St. George Island, which lay west of Dog Island and was separated from it by a narrow inlet. The mainland was only a few miles away.

In a matter of days Antonio transferred the marooned to his camp and promised to deliver them to St. Marks. For whatever reasons, he took them island hopping, always within maddening sight of the mainland, but never to it. Oysters and roots were their main food supply, but they were constantly hungry. Antonio and his wife abandoned Viaud and the others. The survivors patched a leaky pirogue, and Desclau and Captain La Couture departed in it, never to be seen again.


Sub-plots relate how the rest of the crew scattered. Viaud, his slave, Madame La Couture, and the boy constructed a raft. The sick boy was left behind but the others made it to the mainland. From there they undertook a tortured trip toward St. Marks. Along the way, according to Viaud, they used fire to fend off wild animals, including bears, lions, and tigers. They became so weak from hunger that Viaud, with physical aid from Madame La Couture, killed his slave with a knife, and the deceased chattel became their main item of food. Readers, contemporary and modern, have recoiled from the cannibalism in the story.

Despite their human diet, supplemented with leaves, shellfish, rattlesnakes, and an alligator, which Viaud claimed to have killed with a stick, the unlucky pair wound up exhausted and dying. A kinder fate came in the presence of an English rescue party commanded by Ensign James Wright who found them. They also discovered the boy still alive, and the party was taken to St. Marks. There they were befriended by George Swettenham, the fort's commander. Later, Madame La Couture and her son returned to Louisiana. Viaud sailed to New York via a stopover in St. Augustine (where he was aided by James Grant, Governor of East Florida) and eventually home to France.

Professor Fabel's translation is excellent, and he has performed the added service of researching contemporary comments and opinions in England, Scotland, and France as well as the United States. He verifies that Viaud's story is based on facts. Yet he points out exaggerations, fictions (French novelist Dubois-Fontanelle co-wrote where literary license seemed called for), absurd topographical and geographical observations, and descriptions of animal life based on residents of Africa and Asia.

The author has provided historians and general readers with the unique effort of a one-book author. Fabel's careful scholarship is never obtrusive, and he concludes aptly that the book contributes "to an understanding of the human experience beyond the farthest boundary of colonial civilizations" (p. 32).

Joe R. Feagin. *Free Enterprise City: Houston in Political and Economic Perspective*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988, xii, pp. 322. Cloth, \$38.00. ISBN 0-8135-1321-9/Paper, \$12.95. ISBN 0-8135-1322-7



Free Enterprise City is not an urban biography in the sense that David G. McComb's *Houston: A History* (1969, 1981) traces the chronology of the Bayou City. This book, instead, is an extended essay which examines Houston's growth and development through a single-minded commitment to establish a "good business climate" for budding capitalists.

Feagin does not hide his light under the proverbial bushel. In attempting to explore the nature of the Houston economy, divine its political and economic leadership, and explain the city's phenomenal physical growth, he is no booster. The dogged adherence of the business elite to economic growth—be it in oil, petrochemicals, shipping, or space exploration—

came with a price which all Houstonians were forced to pay: a no-zoned, unplanned, polluted, poorly serviced, and socially discriminatory metropolis. His solution to many of these ills—"to bring major changes through political representation in redefining Houston's quality of life and pressuring the business leadership to address the costs of the good business climate" (p. 287)—is effective citizen organization. How that is to be accomplished, however, is not mapped out.

Feagin relies upon various social science theories to place Houston in a larger framework rather than simply to trace its political and social history. He uses three basic themes to address the Houston case. First, he places the city "within the global context of modern capitalism" (p. 5). He rightly views Houston as a "multisector economy," not simply the "oil capital" of the United States. Feagin is aware of the historic economic forces which shaped Houston—its long tradition of commerce and trade (e.g., the Houston Ship Channel) as well as industrialization and transformation into a service economy (e.g., Texas Medical Center) in the late-twentieth century. Houston was not a sleepy little East Texas town turned boomtown by oil, but a community where high-stakes economic development defined it from its earliest days.

Second, Feagin asserts that "free enterprise cities are *not* in fact free market cities" (p. 5). Executives of a few large corporations or businesses, according to Feagin, rather than the whole business community, make the important decisions. Also, the placement of defense-related industry in Houston during World War II, a major commitment to federal highway development, and the acquisition of the Johnson Space Center in the 1960s, are hardly the results of the free market.

A third point, Feagin argues, is that “local residents have paid a heavy price for the low-tax, laissez-faire, free market approach of the city’s business leadership” (p. 5). The downside of rampant urban growth and increased industrial capacity is air, water, and land pollution. Faith in private acquisition of capital was matched by a disdain for public programs which might impinge on that goal.

Much of what Feagin discusses has been raised by others in the academy, in the press, and in the larger political arena. His systematic economic critique through social science theory and his broad discussion of many economic, political, and social issues, are the major strengths of the study. However, the book’s breadth is often its weakness, and the answers that he provides—explicitly or implicitly—are perhaps too pat and too simple.

In addition, the discussion of the so-called “business elite” and their influence requires a much deeper empirical base. Too much of the research is based on secondary sources, and we learn very little about the economic-political power elite in Houston. Indeed, much of the book is episodic—more of an encyclopedic effort than an in-depth analysis of the key issues.

Despite this, *Free Enterprise City* is a valuable book, especially for the issues it raises. The condition of Houston and the nature of its growth are hardly unique in the Sunbelt, and there is a need to explore such new cities of the Southwest because of their essential role in the development of the region.

Martin V. Melosi


University of Houston

Gulf City Cook Book. Compiled by the Ladies of the St. Francis Street Methodist Episcopal Church, South, Mobile, Alabama 1878. Introduction by George H. Daniels. Tuscaloosa and London: University of Alabama Press, 1990, xxix, pp. 299. \$15.95. ISBN 0-8173-0508-4

In 1876 eighty-two ladies of the St. Francis Street Methodist Episcopal Church in Mobile compiled their favorite recipes and household tips and published them to raise money for their church. Their effort, the *Gulf City Cook Book*, admirably withstood the test of time, and over the next quarter-century the book was reprinted at least four times, including a revised version. The original edition, now reprinted as part of the Library of Alabama Classics, serves not so much as a practical aid for the modern cook, but rather as an invaluable record of the everyday life in post-Reconstruction Mobile. George H. Daniels, Professor of History at the University of South Alabama, has produced an erudite introduction to this new edition of the *Gulf City Cook Book*. Daniels notes: “Taken as a whole, this particular cookbook reflects the diet, economic situation, and some of the traditions of Mobile’s upper-middle class at the end of the 1870s. Read carefully, it can help historians paint an accurate and human picture of a place and at least some of its people at a particular time” (p. xxvii).

In the introductory essay, Daniels reviews the historical setting in which the original contributors lived and cooked, and discusses post-war economic and social conditions, the daily diet and home life, and cookbooks familiar to American

women at the time. The Introduction supplies photographs that illustrate Mobile's growing food and transportation industries. Daniels carefully notes the cooking styles, food preferences, and availability of various ingredients which existed when the book was originally issued and how these differ from modern methods and preferences.



The *Gulf City Cook Book* contains the usual categories of recipes, including "Soups," "Fish, Crabs, Etc.," "Oysters," "Meats, Poultry, Etc.," "Eggs," "Bread, Biscuit, Etc." "Vegetables," "Cakes," and "Preserves and Jellies." For those familiar with southern cuisine, the recipes provide few surprises—all the southern standards are included. In addition to economical, everyday fare, the contributors also included a number of fancy dishes suitable for parties or special occasions. The chapter on "Puddings" provided dozens of recipes for steamed and boiled puddings. Seldom seen in modern southern cookbooks, these delightful desserts can be traced to England, but the ladies of Mobile provided a southern touch. For in addition to "Queen's Pudding," instructions are given

for "Dixie Pudding," "Confederate Pudding," and "Rebel Pudding." For those interested in producing the recipes featured in the *Gulf City Cook Book*, Daniels has provided a handy glossary of nineteenth-century cookery terms which might be unfamiliar to modern readers as well as an enlightening section on nineteenth-century weights and measures.

Of particular interest to this reviewer was a reference in the "Beverages" chapter to iced tea (p. 202). The fact that the citizens of Mobile preferred "equal quantities of black and green" tea for both "Hot and iced tea" clearly contradicts the tradition that iced tea, that most southern of beverages, was first "invented" by the proprietors of the Far East pavilion at the 1904 St. Louis World's Fair. Though Daniels does not specifically discuss iced tea in his Introduction, he does note the prevalence of ice cream recipes in the cookbook and discusses the growing importance of the ice trade in Mobile.

Following the recipes themselves, the *Gulf City Cook Book* provides a chapter of "Comforts for the Sick," which includes recipes for the sick as well as suggestions for dealing with invalids. Ever practical, the book enjoins readers: "Always endeavor to have the food for the sick as attractive in appearance as in taste Avoid consulting the patient as to what he would like to eat" (p. 208). A "Medicinal" chapter follows, which provides instructions for making preparations such as cough mixtures, "gargle for sore throat," burn salve, fever

and headache remedies, and numerous other potions for common afflictions. Taken together, the two chapters point to the labor involved in producing simple and necessary medical preparations in the late nineteenth century.


The *Gulf City Cook Book* concludes with a "Miscellaneous" chapter of general housekeeping tips and prudent advice. This chapter provides an illuminating look at common housekeeping chores: how to keep eggs fresh; remove stains and mildew; clean blankets, woolens, and various fabrics; make "tooth-wash"; repair shoe soles; make whitewash, and tonics; and concoct "treatments" for cattle, chickens, turkeys, and horses. Modern readers will be mystified by some of the epigrams which compose the "Housekeeper's Alphabet": "Watch your back yard for dirt and bones" (p. 231). Yet others are as true in 1992 as they were in 1878: "Youth is best preserved by a cheerful temper" (p. 231).

The *Gulf City Cook Book* should appeal not only to cooking enthusiasts, but also to serious students of southern social and economic history. Professor Daniels's Introduction is a significant contribution to Mobile history in particular and Alabama history in general.

Kathryn E. Holland Braund

Auburn, Alabama

Paul E. Hoffman. *A New Andaluçia and a Way to the Orient: The American Southeast During the Sixteenth Century*. Louisiana State University Press: Baton Rouge, 1990, ix, pp. 354. \$42.50. ISBN 0-8071-1552-5



"In the reality of a late summer and fall spent on the sandy and marshy shores of coastal estuaries, [Lucas Vázquez de] Ayllón and his dream both died, but the Chicora legend he had created did not" (p. 60).

Thus Paul Hoffman sums up a 1520s episode that lies at the roots of southeastern United States history. While Vázquez de Ayllón died trying to fulfill a dream, the false picture that he painted of Chicora (which he claimed to be on the same latitude as Spain's Andaluçia and therefore to possess similar resources) lured many later explorers to the region.

Another myth that emanated from Giovanni da Verrazzano's voyage for France in 1523-24 reinforced and expanded

the Chicora legend. Failing to find a strait that linked the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, Verrazzano claimed to have discovered an arm of the Pacific separated from the Atlantic by a narrow isthmus. This Verrazzano legend was joined to that of Vázquez de Ayllón. Hoffman has concluded that "all the explorations

and the attempts at colonization by the Spaniards, French, and English were linked by the belief of their leaders and promoters in these two legends from the 1520s as they had been altered by the decades" (p. x).

The expeditions of Hernando de Soto, Tristán de Luna y Arellano, and Ángel de Villafane, meanwhile, eroded the exalted claims of Vázquez de Ayllón, and by their frustrating results gave La Florida a bad reputation. The Spanish Crown declared a moratorium on further exploration efforts but later altered that stance when the French appeared. Spaniards ejected the French intruders but "in doing so committed themselves to occupying the very coast that a generation earlier had written off as worthless" (p. 205). The longstanding legends, nevertheless, were known to Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, who ousted the French and founded Saint Augustine as the first lasting European settlement in the present-day United States. The Verrazzano and Chicora legends directly affected his efforts to maintain a settlement at Santa Elena (Port Royal Sound), to seek an overland route to Mexico, and to explore Chesapeake Bay.



As explorers sought "the new Andalucia and a way to the Orient," the theoretical locations of Chicora and the false Verrazzano sea shifted south and north. Punta de Santa Elena (Port Royal Sound) and Chesapeake Bay became the focal points. By the 1590s, the legends had withered in the light of costly and often tragic experiences. John White's failure to find the lost English colony of Roanoke Island "marked the end of efforts during the sixteenth century to find out the truth about the Chicora and Verrazzano legends by carrying out exploration and colonization in the American Southeast" (p. 308). Visions of success die slowly. Many clung to the belief that the region might yet offer great prosperity to those "prepared to deal with the land on its own terms and not as a new example of a familiar place The future belonged to another generation [for whom the way] was prepared by the sixteenth-century explorers" acting upon the Chicora and Verrazzano legends (p. 313).

Hoffman is a diligent researcher who has a solid grasp of the Spanish archives—even to the esoteric *Archivo Protocolos de Sevilla*. He deals comfortably with the political and diplomatic posturing that set the priorities of the three nations competing for a share of North America. The preface provides a lucid assessment of the author's purpose, and the epilogue contains a cogent summation.

Between the two, however, the narrative is uneven in quality, and afflicted by stylistic incongruities and cumbersome syntax. The early chapters, especially, are marred by digression, awkward sentence structure, and speculation. Diacritical marks are often omitted where needed and applied where they are not; e.g., "Luís Cancer" for Luis Cáncer and "Goncalo" for Gonçalo, or Gonzalo. The proper names Urrutia and Barcia have accents though they require none. Questionable orthography is found in some geographical names, such as "San Germain," "Norembega," and "Calosahatchee." The family name of the French explorer La Salle is Cavelier, not Cavalier. Diligent and alert editing would have expunged these irregularities.

Jo Myrle Kennedy. *Dauphin Island: French Possession, 1699-1763*. Selma: Jo Myrle Kennedy, Third Edition, 1989, pp. 79. \$7.50. ISBN 0-87397-168-X

Jay Higginbotham. *Old Mobile: Fort Louis de la Louisiane, 1702-1711*. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, Second Edition, 1991, pp. 585. \$19.95. ISBN 0-8173-0528-9



Local history is a difficult genre, traditionally shunned by academics in favor of broader topics. Though this is changing, most local history efforts remain those of non-academic historians and amateurs. As a result, these efforts are of highly uneven quality, ranging from excellent to embarrassing. *Dauphin Island: French Possession* and *Old Mobile*, both recently reprinted, demonstrate two approaches to Gulf Coast local history. One of these books serves as a general introduction for the lay reader, while the other is an acknowledged classic.

Dauphin Island: French Possession was originally published in 1976 by Jo Myrle Kennedy, a resident of Selma, Alabama. Kennedy's book is privately printed and includes illustrations and maps on good quality paper. Despite the title, this book is somewhat broader in its scope, with chapters on Fort Toulouse, John Law, and Fort Tombecbe. Indeed, it is difficult to isolate elements within French colonial history along the Gulf Coast given the interplay of personalities, events, and locations. How is it possible to discuss Dauphin Island without also discussing Mobile, New Orleans, Canada, and France?

Though *Dauphin Island: French Possession* is footnoted and contains a brief bibliography, scholars will find nothing new here. Yet the volume serves quite well as a general introduction to the French period in Alabama history and should prove popular in beachhouse and office.

Jay Higginbotham's *Old Mobile* was originally published in 1976 and has just been reissued by the University of Alabama Press in its Library of Alabama Classics. This edition features a new introduction by the author, now Director

of the Mobile Municipal Archives. The new introduction throws light not only on recent archaeological finds at the site of old Mobile, but also on how Higginbotham regards his now classic work.


Old Mobile is significant not only for its breadth and depth of scholarship, but also for its narrative style. Higginbotham is influenced by the French anti-novel of the 1950s and 1960s, with “stress on incident, the submergence of explanation” (p. 3). In other words, the facts and incidents in and of themselves convey the meaning, without interpretation. Higginbotham’s theme in this book is “the omnipresence of conflict, of struggle on every level—settlers against the elements (poverty, hunger, disease), militia against their common enemies (the English, the Spanish, the Indians), individuals against themselves,” all of which forms “a poignant motif, the place of struggle in the lives of men” (p. 3). This fundamental, universal theme is what fuels the book’s narrative power.

Higginbotham’s style may be appreciated by quoting the first and last sentences of the book. In the prologue he begins, “The flagship *Renommée* reeled and lurched in the raw December gulf, her bedridden captain, Pierre Le Moyne d’Iberville, lying listlessly below deck, his thoughts swirling among recent and ominous events” (p. 15). In the final chapter, after describing the move from Twenty-Seven Mile Bluff to the present site of Mobile, Higginbotham concludes, “There were some remarkably hearty and enterprising inhabitants present in his (Bienville’s) colony—men like Saucier, Rivard, La Loire, Trudeau, Trepanier, Rochon, Derbanne, Saint-Denis and the brothers Chauvin—men who had lifted themselves up by their own initiative, who, whatever might lie ahead, would carry the colony forward in this execrable and defiant land” (p. 467). This is prose worthy of Francis Parkman. Higginbotham is writing history as it should be written. He is telling a story.

The book’s narrative emphasis should not delude one into thinking that it is not factual. Indeed, as Higginbotham writes, “I went to absurd lengths to ascertain the facts, once attempting to slip into Cuba from Veracruz to scour burial records in Havana” (p. 3). There are extensive footnotes citing sources from Canada, England, France, Mexico, and Spain as well as the United States. Higginbotham’s American travels included the cities of Chicago, Mobile, New Orleans, St. Louis, and Washington. Indeed, the difficulty of researching Gulf Coast history may be appreciated by this distribution of materials.

Old Mobile richly merits its status as an Alabama classic. It is history as literature, and as such a rare example of a vanishing art. It is this reviewer’s fervent hope that Higginbotham will write another work in the narrative style. If he does and *Old Mobile* is any guide, it will be engaging, compelling, and above all entertaining.

Edward A. Mueller. *Perilous Journeys: A History of Steamboating on the Chattahoochee, Apalachicola, and Flint Rivers, 1828-1928*. Eufala, AL: Historic Chattahoochee Commission, 1990, pp. 460. \$27.95. ISBN 0-945477-09-0



Perilous Journeys takes the reader year by year from 1828 to 1928 and beyond, through the rise and fall of steamboat travel and commerce on this southeastern river system. The Chattahoochee rises in the Blue Ridge Mountains of northeastern Georgia and flows southwestward through Atlanta to Columbus, then southward to form half the boundary between Alabama and Georgia. The head of navigation for major steamboat traffic was Columbus, which became a primary outlet for shipping cotton to market. A lesser amount of steamboat traffic developed on the Flint, which rises near Atlanta and flows southward to join the Chattahoochee at the Florida state line. At that point the two converge to become the Apalachicola,

draining into the Gulf of Mexico at Apalachicola Bay.

Mueller's book details the traffic on this river system, which began as a means of transporting plantation products to market, and of bringing needed goods to the rural population of the area. The growth and decline of steamboat traffic through the years are catalogued and enlivened with accounts of regional historical developments and the people involved. The events reported are not limited to steamboat news, but frequently include sidelights that illuminate the stories of the river towns, especially Columbus and Apalachicola. The text is not polished prose, but serves its encyclopedia reference purpose well.

Illustrations are in eight groups, 148 pages in all. They include maps, diagrams, portraits, and photographs of people, plus many drawings and prints of the steamboats that traveled this river system. While there are many special maps, a helpful addition would have been a frontispiece map pinpointing historical references in the text (e.g. the "Negro Fort" or its location, Prospect Bluff).

The volume is scarcely "bedtime reading," as it is similar in size and weight to *Way's Packet Directory, 1848-1983*, but its steamboat data for the Apalachicola system includes the twenty years preceding 1848, where Way's record begins. Its format differs from Way's in that it is not an amplified alphabetical listing of riverboats, but rather a chronological account of river history of the Apalachicola region. *Perilous Journeys* should prove to be a valuable reference, particularly for southeastern U.S. regional historians and river buffs. The print is large, on two-column pages, with boat names in caps, while the names of people are in standard type form. The index continues that distinction for easy reference.

The two opening chapters summarize the region's pre-1820 history. The Indian era carries over into Chapter 3, titled "The 1820s—The First Steamboats Arrive." The plan for chapters four through fifteen is to detail steamboat and related history of a half decade per chapter.

The sequence of steamboat history on the Apalachicola system is similar to that of the Ohio-Mississippi rivers, but follows in time by about two decades, with the exception of involvement in major events, such as wars. The Apalachicola's first steamboat was the *Fanny* (or *Fannie*), built in New York and brought to Florida in 1827 via the coastal waters. On January 28, 1828, she created a sensation as the first steam vessel to arrive at Columbus, Georgia. Soon schooners were calling at Apalachicola for overseas shipments of cotton brought downriver by steamboat, to supply mills in eastern American and European cities.

The *Fanny* and her contemporaries on the Apalachicola were designed along the lines successful on eastern rivers and had trouble navigating the shallow southern waterways. Soon the Apalachicola steamboats were replaced with craft that followed the design originated by Henry Miller Shreve in 1816 on the Ohio. These boats were usually equipped with stronger, high pressure engines and double-decked to accommodate cargo and passengers. Most of the Apalachicola system steamboats were, in fact, built by the Ohio River boatbuilders. The *Hyperion*, the very first of the steamboats designed and built at the famed Howard boatyards at Jeffersonville, Indiana, was a shallow-draft double-decked sidewheeler, constructed in 1834 for Captain Adam Leonard of Apalachicola, Florida. She was brought to Apalachicola via New Orleans.

Snags and other obstructions in the rivers created difficulties in navigation and losses of lives, cargo, and boats, just as on the Mississippi River system. Petitions to Congress for appropriations for river improvements by the United States Army Corps of Engineers took a long time to get results and often produced very small appropriations. It was not until long after navigational improvement had begun on the Mississippi and its tributaries, that the Corps undertook much needed work on the Apalachicola system. Hence, the "perilous" nature of travel on the rivers, even in times of peace.

The author, Edward A. Mueller, an engineer by education and profession, served for many years in transportation management positions in Florida. He had a special interest in steamboats that ran on Florida waters, resulting in the compilation of information for this book. His research was exhaustive, involving searches of old newspapers, marine and other government records, doctoral dissertations, and pertinent published books and articles. The result is a treasure trove of information on this segment of the inland waterways of the United States.

Bruce J. Schulman. *From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic Development, and the Transformation of the South, 1938-1980*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, *xii*, pp. 333. \$35.00. ISBN 0-19-505703-1



This is an exhaustive analysis of southern economic development and its concomitant political and social effects from the end of the New Deal to the beginning of the Reagan revolution. It describes how the federal government has regulated and directed that growth since 1938. The study focuses on “place over people—of policies designed not so much to uplift poor people as to enrich poor places” (p. *viii*). It also demonstrates how federal policies contributed to “Herrenvolk development” or how southern white people, their politics, and institutions benefitted in place and instead of southern blacks.

In 1938 the New Deal “headed” South. Franklin D. Roosevelt, with a cooperative generation of young liberal Southerners, was determined to reorder the southern economy. Together they committed the federal government to programs which eventually made the South dependent on federal largesse. By the end of World War II, however, these policies had failed to accomplish the lofty political and social objectives FDR and southern liberals had for the South. The war itself also had an impact on the region. Defense spending during and after the conflict made the South ever more dependent on federal government. Defense budgets shaped the southern economy at the same time as the federal welfare-state programs waned. By the 1950s, moreover, southern leadership had changed. Instead of the young New Deal-Fair Deal liberals, a new kind of Whig appeared who was dedicated primarily to business development. He was more concerned with controlling federal welfare programs in his own locale to insure his political power and to sustain federal economic aid. Eventually, the South developed into the Sunbelt, while southern poverty remained.

Schulman supports his case with detailed analyses of the 1938 *Report on Economic Conditions of the South*, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and other New Deal programs including the TVA, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and the National Recovery Administration. Examining the careers of southern New Deal liberals, Schulman concentrates on Clark Foreman, George Mitchell, Aubrey Williams, Leon Keyserling, and especially Claude Pepper. He also examines World War II spending in the South, the rise of “military Keynesianism” in the 1950s, and the role of “footloose industries.” As for the new Whigs, Schulman


takes note of Leroy Collins and Luther Hodges as two of their important leaders. Finally, the book discusses Lyndon Johnson's Great Society, civil rights, and the community action programs of the 1960s and 1970s.

Unquestionably *From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt* addresses important issues. The analysis of the famous 1938 *Report*, the Fair Labor Standards Act, military defense spending in the South, and the social welfare programs of the 1960s-1970s is acute. Schulman's insights into the relationship between economic policy and its political-social ramifications are noteworthy. Further, his characterizations of the southern liberals and southern Whigs are interesting. Nevertheless, the book has its weaknesses. Inadequate proof-reading, tedious and excessively long explanatory footnotes, and repetition of ideas and arguments wear the reader down. Moreover the volume has an unsatisfactory analysis of Franklin Roosevelt, his policy formulation, and his relationship to advisers. Schulman failed to examine FDR's papers, and relied instead on published addresses. Similarly, the author needs more evidence to support some of the points he makes. For example, with regard to World War II, Schulman should have analyzed one or two southern states in detail, demonstrating the war's economic impact on them, rather than presenting the reader with region-wide general tables on growth or citing secondary works. Such criticisms are not meant to detract from the overall worth of the volume. Schulman has written an interesting and valuable book which students of the South should consult, and reflect upon critically.

Michael V. Namorato

University of Mississippi

John Michael Vlach. *The Afro-American Tradition in Decorative Arts*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990, xx, pp. 175. Cloth, \$50.00. ISBN 0-8203-1232-0/ Paper, \$19.95. ISBN 0-8203-1283-9



This book-catalog, first published in 1978, describes a traveling museum exhibition focusing on African-American "decorative arts." It was, John Michael Vlach argues in a preface to the 1990 edition, an unfortunate and misleading description. For the book abounds with examples of "grain baskets, patchwork quilts, wrought-iron gates, stoneware pots, and roughly hewn canoes," items "not expressly decorative," as opposed to the "silver, porcelain, mahogany and other precious materials" (p. vii) the title implies. Consequently, scholars, both humanists and social scientists, may have overlooked it. However, the focus of its concern, black creativity and African cultural continuity clearly is so important that re-publication

was appropriate. Indeed, the new preface contains an annotated bibliography of works, largely historical, that have come out since the book was written. Many validate, amplify, or base themselves upon its findings.

Arranged in nine short chapters, profusely illustrated, dealing with topics as diverse as baskets, graveyards, and architecture, Vlach's book shows how African aesthetic values survived among African-American craftsmen. He follows in the footsteps of Melville Herskovits in noting African retentions, but a more sophisticated conceptualization leads him to document survivals, in outlook if not in form, that even Herskovits failed to perceive in North America. He cites Richard Price but not the collaborative effort of Price and Sidney Mintz, whose influential pamphlet *An Anthropological Approach to the Afro-American Past: A Caribbean Perspective* (1976) advances the controversial concept of a "cultural grammar" that gives people from a particular cultural background, even when separated in time and space, a distinctive artistic outlook. Vlach's perspective may not be quite so audacious, but in his emphasis upon innovation as an abiding African-American value—in quilting, blacksmithing, and music—he reflects the Mintz's focus on cultural change as an early and continuing attribute of an African-American *mentalité*. This viewpoint allows Vlach to see African influence even in European crafts adopted by, or imposed upon, blacks in the New World.

This influence is visible on the Gulf Coast in the ornamental wrought iron work in Mobile or New Orleans. "Except for carpentry," Vlach comments, "there is no other trade in which Afro-American talent was expressed more often than in blacksmithing" (p. 108). While he admits that the designs which adorn balconies, gates, etc. around these cities are based on French and Spanish models, the New Orleans style, in particular, is distinguished by local improvisation. The "variance," he concludes cautiously, "may be due to Afro-American involvement" (p. 111). The case becomes stronger when viewed in the context of ironworking in Charleston, where black craftsmen yet practice. Modern Charlestonian Philip Simmons reveals the improvisational style, a process of modification and adaptation within a guiding framework that differs from Euro-American method and reinforces "the possibility of an Afro-American style within a Euro-American artifact—a black tradition hidden at the center of a white art form" (p. 115). This "aesthetic of innovation," he says, "we must evaluate as an African heritage" (p. 117).

The ability to get away from the static view of "retentions" is what distinguishes the best modern scholarship on, for lack of a better term, "Africanisms" in modern American and black American culture. For there is increasing recognition that the African component has had a widely-ranging influence throughout the culture, and in a positive rather than negative sense, one that extends beyond music, where such influence is universally conceded.

That early concession came because it was so obvious and nowhere more than on the Gulf Coast. New Orleans is justly fabled for the range and vitality of musical expression, heralded as the birthplace of jazz. Although improvisation is the classic attribute of this and other black music, extended by Vlach to various *artisanal* endeavors, it is in music where the most direct "retentions" or African

“carry-overs” can be observed. A drum created in colonial Virginia sometime before 1753 is African in every aspect except the New World materials used in its construction. African-style drums were omnipresent in the Americas and nowhere more in evidence than New Orleans’ Congo Square. The banjo, now associated primarily with white American music but whose African derivation Vlach explores, was described by Benjamin Latrobe in the Crescent City in 1819. The one he saw varied in details from the instrument commonly produced by blacks in the colonial period, but there can be little doubt about its relationship. Vlach locates Latrobe’s peculiar instrument in Senegambia. He documents variations of other African stringed instruments surviving into the twentieth century at Bogalusa, Louisiana, Senetobia, Mississippi and elsewhere. He traces the “intricate slide techniques in the Mississippi Delta style of ‘bottle neck’ blues guitar playing” (p. 23) to one of these instruments. A form of the African “thumb piano” was reported in nineteenth-century New Orleans.

The shotgun house, prominent in New Orleans and other Gulf Coast cities, in the enforced intimacy of its construction, particularly room size and openings, also has African antecedents. Mediated through the West Indies, it was modified there by Arawak principles. European concepts, especially the addition of a hallway, obviating the necessity for rooms to open upon each other and providing thereby more privacy, represented movement away from African communal concepts. Mechal Sobal has recently developed similar ideas about African influence on the architecture of Virginia, but Vlach is more convincing here. Indeed, all of his claims, even where the evidence is circumstantial, are presented with such caution and evident good sense that they find ready acceptance. Based on sound research, this book is both enlightening and delightful and can be read with profit by scholars, teachers, and the general public.

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From the Archives. . . The Historic Pensacola Preservation Board

George Ewert


In the heart of Pensacola's Seville Historic District visitors enjoy the several museums and museum houses owned and operated by the Historic Pensacola Preservation Board and its direct support organization, Historic Pensacola, Inc. Together they are known as the Historic Pensacola Village and occupy land from Seville Square to Plaza Ferdinand. The largest of the village structures, built in 1907 to serve as Pensacola City Hall, now contains the T. T. Wentworth, Jr. Florida State Museum. T. T. Wentworth, who actively collected historical objects, artifacts, documents, photographs, and ephemera for decades, gave his collection to the state of Florida in 1983.



Pensacola's Union Depot before 1909

T. T. Wentworth, Jr. Collection

Drawing from this large collection and other collections in their hands, the Historic Pensacola Preservation Board displays changing exhibits in the Wentworth Museum and offers other more permanent exhibits in the various "theme" museums housed in the other structures of the museum complex. Also, much of the Wentworth collection, including documents and photographs, is in the Historic Pensacola Preservation Board's archives. In addition, the archives contains historic site files for structures in the city's official historic districts and important structures surviving outside those districts. These files contain title information, architectural



*T. T. Wentworth, Jr.
Florida State Museum*



*Tom Muir in the Archives of the
Historic Pensacola Preservation Board*

Thomason Photographs


records, photographs, and family-supplied information that document the city's many historical buildings. Such files are regularly consulted by restoration specialists to insure architectural accuracy and authenticity in their work.

While the historic site files are very specifically focused, the Wentworth material is not. The collection occupies approximately 1000 sq. ft. of secure storage and includes a wide variety of items. Volunteers have worked for the past decade to catalog and physically stabilize the material, but much remains to be done. The collection contains nineteenth- and twentieth-century documents and ephemera covering West Florida. There are personal papers from prominent citizens, business records, and material from civic organizations such as the Odd Fellows and Kiwanis Club. There is a wealth of printed material relating to the Panhandle—lithographs, promotional literature—paintings and thousands of photographs. The latter have been organized by subject and copies may be obtained. The photographic collection alone is a very valuable asset and with the other material in its archives the Historic Pensacola Preservation Board's collection is a very important resource.

Unfortunately, limited resources and the priority of museum work has meant that the archival collection has not been organized and catalogued as fast as the Historic Pensacola Preservation Board would like. However, the archives are available for scholarly research upon written request, but researchers may have to schedule their visit at the convenience of the T. T. Wentworth, Jr. Florida State Museum staff. There is no catalog available at present. When writing for archival assistance, researchers are asked to be as specific as possible in describing their research topic so that the staff can determine what material in the collection may be useful.

Although working conditions may not be ideal, the archival material is physically secure and available to bona fide researchers. Perhaps future funding levels will enable the Historic Pensacola Preservation Board to make the progress with their archival collection that they have with the Historic Pensacola Village museum complex.


Interested persons are asked to write before they plan a visit to: Mr. Tom Muir, Museum Administrator, Historic Pensacola Preservation Board, 120 E. Church St., Pensacola, FL 32501.



*Nineteenth Century View of
Christ Church, Pensacola*

T. T. Wentworth, Jr. Collection

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